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 iii Preface
Preface
During my early introduction to architecture I found that I was motivated not only 
by matters pertaining to what architecture is, but also, to what it can do. Thus, the 
questions motivating this work derive from my education in architecture which, at 
their most rudimentary level, entail a deep fascination with the nature of space, and 
thus the problem of time. And, subsequently, a practical desire to understand the 
conditions that constituted experience, and thus perception, sensation and mind. 
My interest also developed from a general disposition towards others and world 
founded in principles of human equality and rights with respect to both freedom and 
responsibility. During my years practicing architecture, these questions as they were 
brought through the perspective of design continued to inspire me. At the same time, 
my interest in investigating these questions through theoretical and philosophical 
research persisted until my aspiration to engage in critical thought outpaced my 
desire to practice. Hence, a turn in career to work as an academic in the discipline of 
architecture and the area of architecture theory.
This research may be perceived by some as situated outside the realm of 
architecture. However, this is not the case. My approach to architecture theory is not 
one that begins with a study of the object, or, for some, one might say the subject 
of architecture. That is, if the object is understood as the manifestation in thought, 
process or form of the building or built environment (real or conceived) itself; and 
if the subject is understood as the thought or idea emanating from the mind of the 
architect (as author). While there is much architecture theory advanced from this 
perspective lining my own bookshelves and utilized in my work as an educator. 
The concerns that have always called me towards thinking about architecture as 
the imagined and constructed world in which we live are those that query the very 
nature of concepts, notions, ideologies and intellectual constructions and beliefs 
upon which culture and society – architecture as both a cultural product and a 
social actor – are formed. This goes, as well, to the considerations that motivate my 
concern for people, not users or inhabitants as such, but as ontologically situated 
beings in the world. Accordingly, my work primarily deals with the content, history 
and effects of architecture as it relates to theories of space, time, the body, and 
cognition. Employing and developing theories and methods from disciplines including 
philosophy, cultural studies, literary theory, political, social and economic theory, 
cognitive psychology, and the neurosciences in the broadest sense. 
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Admittedly, the nature of theoretical discourse has shown itself to be problematic 
over the past fifty-plus years; it has also proven to be transformative. Critical 
thinkers in the late 1960s developed a sustained critique of their philosophical 
predecessors – primarily in regard to Marx on one hand and Heidegger on the other 
– with a critique of social history and a displacement of metaphysics resulting in 
a repositioning of social and cultural discourse.  Of course, the debate unfolded 
against the philosophical and aesthetic background of not only Marx and Heidegger, 
but also Nietzsche, Hegel and Freud on one hand, and Manet, Cézanne, Baudelaire 
and Mallarmé, Wagner and Debussy on the other. In architecture, the debate 
extended to Ruskin and Wölfflin, and to Wright and Corbusier, amongst others. 
This period, in itself, refers to an unprecedented artistic, scientific, economic, and 
technological mutation. Prevalent underpinnings remain identifiable, for instance an 
attack on the absolute nature of knowledge, which has brought about a fundamental 
rethinking of both the nature of consciousness, as well as a critique of science. 
As Foucault suggested, one of the great problems that arose in the 1950s was 
that of the political status of science and the ideological functions that it could 
serve. Another rebuke can be seen as the challenge to the primacy of truth as an 
adequation of subject to thing. This culminated in a radical critique of subjectivity 
resulting, some years later, in the so-called post-humanist-subject. In order to 
be rid of the subject itself, Foucault, in ‘Truth and Power’ (1977) argued that it 
was necessary to dispense with the essentialist subject both at the extremes and 
in-between the enlightenment’s humanist subject and its ideals of knowledge as 
self-constituting; as well as phenomenology’s fabrication of the subject as evolving 
through and embodying the course of history. 
Reflecting on this history, that post-war moment of theory, one cannot help but be 
struck by the complexity and the ambiguity of the adventure; qualities most evident 
in the fact that new spaces and new means of writing and drawing, of thinking and 
making emerged. Ideas that modified our understanding of both communication 
and the image, of both space and time. Discourses, when combined with a reflexivity 
within certain architectures and certain texts, rendered them somehow indefinitely 
open. In the 1960s, literary theory transformed thought on both sides of the 
Atlantic. For instance, Roland Barthes’s de-sanctioning of the biography-centric 
author, or the removal of authority from the author turned scriptor in ‘The Death of 
the Author’ (1967), or Julia Kristeva’s concept of intertextuality with ‘Word, Dialogue 
and Novel’ (1969). These works impacted our thinking on linguistic phenomena 
and the origin (or non-originality) of textual content and further, on the invention of 
new forms of writing and affective relations. Such theories informed and redirected 
thinking in architecture, for instance, Diana Agrest and Mario Gandelsonas’s work 
‘Semiotics and Architecture: Ideological Consumption or Theoretical Work’ was 
published in the first issue of Oppositions, an architectural journal produced between 
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1973 and 1984 by the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies in New York. 
With this, the influence of the French intellectual climate as well as the Italian 
discourse on semiotics was brought to the centre of Anglo-American discourse in 
architecture theory. 
The intellectual trajectory along which this history is traced and the terrain on which 
it now takes place will be recognisable to anyone familiar with the work of such 
thinkers as Henri Bergson, Louis Althusser, Gabriel Tarde, Walter Benjamin, Pierre 
Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Jean-Francois Lyotard, 
and, of course, Félix Guattari, Gilles Deleuze, and Maurizio Lazzarato. The importance 
of the radically original works that emerged in the seventies and eighties cannot be 
overestimated, for instance: Foucault’s Discipline and Punish and his lectures at the 
Collège de France, The Birth of Biopolitics, and Deleuze and Guattari’s Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia volumes Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. These works, 
translated into English shortly after their original publication, were being read 
throughout many disciplines outside of philosophy including schools of architecture, 
and their influence can only be said to have increased. 
I share the above brief history so as to situate my work for those less familiar 
with the work of theory – whether architecture or otherwise – as this, too, is the 
intellectual trajectory and exploration along which my own work, as well as many 
of my contemporaries, travels. In my own work, the influence of the nineteenth/
twentieth-century French vitalist philosopher Henri Bergson – the great thinker of 
time and, as Walter Benjamin suggested, a seminal source to consult in considering 
the problem of experience – has quite profoundly informed my thinking and shaped 
its outcomes. Both with respect to time and space as well as body and brain, his 
influence is reflected in the title of this volume. That said, this is not a collection of 
chapters on Bergson’s philosophy. It is a collection on critical concepts I believe 
to be of importance for contemporary critique, delivered through topics that are 
relevant – at times directly and at others indirectly – to our current moment. This is 
a work of great commitment and it has sustained itself over time. It is my hope the 
reader finds some value in this as well.
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 1 Introduction
Introduction
From the Body to the Cognitive in Architecture
If things endure, or if there is duration in things, the question of space will need 
to be reassessed on new foundations. For space will no longer simply be a form 
of exteriority, a sort of screen that denatures duration, an impurity that comes to 
disturb the pure, a relative as opposed to an absolute: Space itself will need to be 
based in things, in relation between things and between durations, to belong itself to 
the absolute, to have its own “purity”. This was to be the double progression of the 
Bergsonian Philosophy. (Deleuze, Bergsonism)1
This ‘double progression’ of space and time gave rise to Bergson’s famous notion 
of time as durée. In the afterword of Bergsonism Deleuze suggests an extension of 
Bergson’s project in terms of three primary concepts: 1) Intuition – as a method 
which utilizes the means of differentiation on one hand and convergence on the 
other in establishing what he refers to as true and false problem statements, or in 
Bergson the ‘two successive turns in experience’.2 2) Metaphysics – in relation to 
immanence and duration a metaphysical image of thought corresponding to the new 
lines, openings, traces, leaps, and dynamisms discovered by molecular biology; new 
linkings and re-linkings in thought. And 3) Multiplicities – which he distinguishes 
in terms of the spatial and temporal, the actual and the virtual. In Deleuze’s view, 
the concept on multiplicities is one of the single most underappreciated aspects 
of Bergson’s thought – the constitution of a ‘logic of multiplicities’.3 This theory of 
multiplicity is one which is relied on so often throughout the chapters in this volume 
that an excursus on Bergson’s two forms of multiplicities, another doubling of sorts, 
has been included. 
To the above three concepts we would add the double movement of thinking and 
thought – time being both object of thought and presence of thought. While the 
contradiction remains within both time and thought; the contradiction does not 
remain between them. There are positive attributes of thought and thinking. The 
former as representation, and thought cannot represent succession without putting 
it in space; and the latter as action, as a real activity (active possibility) that is 
something other than cognition. Logos and intuition are here inseparable: pure 
space and pure time. Response to the contradiction of thinking and thought can be 
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found throughout Bergson’s work but we will point to just two: first, with respect to 
spiritual energy (Mind Energy of 1919) and second, with respect to the stasis and 
movement of intellect and intuition (Creative Mind of 1941).4 
Before outlining the chapters, we will introduce two precursors.  One will present 
brief remarks on the body as a multiplicity, the other will present a few thoughts 
on the nineteenth century origins of cognitive psychology in (primarily German) 
aesthetic philosophy. Following this, the chapters will be presented with respect to 
the theoretical concepts that underpin this work as a whole. While the topics of the 
chapters vary significantly, they each address issues central in the thought of many 
architecture and cultural theorists, as well as philosophers, sociologists, cognitive 
scientists, and others since the end of the nineteenth century. Through a range of 
contemporary thinkers, we will try to get to the heart of matters while relying on the 
central proposition that all questions pertaining to the double progression of body 
and brain must be thought in terms of time rather than space.5 
And What Can a Body Do?
Central to the project of humanism was the organizing of the body, its most 
spectacular achievement being the creation of a mathematics of seeing for the 
eye through perspective. Edmund Burke was one of the first thinkers to challenge 
the consequences for architectural practice of what he would describe as a forced 
analogy, namely, the ideas of regularity, geometry and proportion as deriving from 
the human body and being considered the ‘efficient cause’ for beauty in architecture. 
In A Philosophical Enquiry Into The Origin Of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, 
he remarks:
I know that it has been said long since, and echoed backward and forward from 
one writer to another a thousand times, that the proportions of building have been 
taken from those of the human body. To make this forced analogy complete, they 
represent a man with his arms raised and extended at full length, and then describe 
a sort of square, as it is formed by passing lines along the extremities of this strange 
figure. But it appears very clearly to me, that the human figure never supplied the 
architect with any of his ideas. For in the first place, men are very rarely seen in this 
strange posture; it is not natural to them; neither is it at all becoming. Secondly, 
the view of the human figure so disposed does not naturally suggest the idea of the 
square, but rather of a cross; as that large space between the arms and the ground, 
must be filled with something before it can make anybody think of a square. Thirdly, 
several buildings are by no means of the form of that particular square, which are 
notwithstanding planned by the best architects, and produce an effect all together 
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as good, and perhaps a better. And certainly nothing could be more unaccountably 
whimsical than for an architect to model his performance by the human figure, 
since no two things can have less resemblance or analogy, than a man, and a house 
or temple.6
The analogy, however forced, belongs directly to the dual planes of a distinct 
ontology without which the humanist project would not have been possible. An 
ontology which consisted of, firstly, a plane of nature, and secondly, a transcendent 
plane, functioning to organize and even socialize the first, and the special focus of 
that organization was the body. The thinking subject was set against the external 
world; for instance, in the work of Francis Bacon sociability organizes the body 
as corporate, itself an abstract body, and in René Descartes the thinking inverts 
the subject as object. Renaissance architecture could only be scientific as far as 
the perception of reality (Renaissance perspective) and the knowledge of space 
(cosmology) could be considered as one; dealing with perspective as a conceptual 
framework that is implicit in the theory of perception and proportion. In other words, 
our theoretical notions of reality are formative for our experiences: thus, what 
we consider important for the experience of architecture is not divorced from our 
conceptual frames. 
The manner in which we approach questions pertaining to the body are, of course, not 
only formative, but necessarily transformative as well. For instance, in contemporary 
criticism on Baruch Spinoza, reason or the power of thought cannot be seen as a 
transcendent or disembodied quality of the soul or mind.7 Rather, reason, desire and 
knowledge are embodied and express, at least in the first instance, the quality and 
complexity of corporeal affects. In Spinoza, body/mind suffer and act in concert, 
and thinking is a mobilization of an assemblage, a matter of place and jointures of 
movement and speed. Deleuze comments on this aspect of Spinoza: ‘When Spinoza 
says “The surprising thing is the body … we do not yet know what the body is capable 
of …”, he does not want to make the body a model, and the soul simply dependent on 
the body. He has a subtler task. He wants to demolish the pseudo-superiority of the 
soul over the body. There is the soul and the body and both express one and the same 
thing: an attribute of the body is also an expressed of the soul.’8 
In Spinoza, bodies are not defined by their genus or species by their organs and 
functions, but by what they can do – by the affects of which they are capable – in 
passion as well as action. In this view you have not defined an animal until you have 
listed affects. A body, in Deleuze, can be almost anything; it can be an animal, a 
body of sounds, a linguistic corpus, a social body; yet, a body must be defined as a 
unity of parts, parts held together relationally and having a capacity to affect and 
be affected both internally and externally; further, in this reading, it is only kinetic 
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and dynamic differences that mark the individual body and that along two axes: on 
the kinetic axis there will be a characteristic relation of speed, slowness, relative 
states of motion and rest that maintain the individual in existence – (hypokeimenon, 
substrate or perdurance) – and on the dynamic axis degrees of power, bodies 
which affect and are affected. Further, from his reading of the stoic philosophers, 
Deleuze derives an infinitive – a to walk, a to stop, a to flee, a to encounter, or as 
he puts it, verbs in the infinitive are limitless becomings. But in all the bodies and 
their actions and interpenetrations, which Deleuze sometimes calls resonance and 
interference, there is also the incorporeal, which for the Stoics lies in making a line of 
separation pass no longer between the sensible and the intelligible, or, between the 
soul and body, but where no one had seen it before, that is, between physical depth 
and metaphysical surface – these are the ‘effects’, the infinitives, that result from 
amalgams, expressed as ‘to be’.9
Issues surrounding the human body, its intellectual and sensory capacities are 
recurring themes in architectural discourse. In practice we are most often still 
dealing with a static concept, an ideal ‘whole’, for which sensory, aesthetic, and 
intellectual capacities rarely correspond to contemporary research in the sciences. 
The body today can be seen as a hybrid of organism and machine whereby the 
difference between natural and artificial is dissolved. Such theories deal with 
biotechnology, microelectronics and the human body, but at the same time are 
also about collectivity and individuality. Such thought models impact thinking on 
architecture and urbanism. Questions pertaining to and bearing upon notions of 
the body, its ability to simultaneously extend and delimit our understanding of both 
physically constructed and socially perceived space, belongs today to domains 
as seemingly diverse as architecture and the neurological and bio-technological 
sciences. In a contemporary reading of the very notion of body as presented here, we 
agree with Deleuze in that it is necessary to understand that there are many bodies: 
individual, collective, mystical, corporate, institutional, animal, even the body of the 
world and the heavens. And, too, there is a kind of indetermination and non-sense 
required for there to be thought, processes of what Deleuze and Guattari refer to 
as ‘deterritorialization’ or ‘lines of flight’: symptoms not codes, or ‘spaces of affect’ 
understood in contrast to ‘effecting space’. However, what bodies may become what 
new molar organizations take place – again, the concept of organism or machine 
– depends on the event as understood for science. In the theory of science as 
événementielle, scientists are more and more concerned with singular events of an 
incorporeal nature which are affected in bodies, in states of bodies, in completely 
heterogeneous assemblages. There are heterogeneous bodies and the events 
pass across irreducible domains, there are lines that shoot between domains – 
interregnums – and science and technology are part of a new geography of relations 
in which terms are relational; thus, the need for transdisciplinarity. 
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We find in Deleuze the recurring question of the need to experiment/experience; 
the question however remains: How can we think with and instead of is? This is the 
body as a continuous multiplicity and for Deleuze this question is the only secret of 
empiricism, thus in the phrase ‘body and soul’ the question is and what can a body do.
The Psychology of the Senses – the Sensory and Imaginative
In The Logic of Sense Deleuze writes: ‘Aesthetics suffers from a wrenching duality. 
On the one hand, it designates the theory of sensibility as the form of possible 
experience; on the other hand it designates the theory of art as the reflection of real 
experience’.10 The significance of the discussion on sense, perception and affect for 
architectural discourse can be traced directly to two main streams of scientific and 
philosophical work from the end of the nineteenth century. The first is the advance 
in discussion on the relation of descriptive and genetic psychology in the work of 
Brentano, Husserl and ultimately Freud; and the second is through the impact on 
aesthetic discourse which concentrated on the problem of founding a psychological 
account of the experience of architecture, which moved away from the Hegelian and 
Kantian inheritance of German aesthetic discussion, and more to an empirical, and 
ultimately phenomenological base.11 Within the discipline of aesthetics itself, a sub-
discipline in philosophy from the second decade of the eighteenth century, thanks to 
the work of Alexander Baumgarten and Edmund Burke, the main direction had been 
to establish ‘a science of the sensible’, and in Burke a genetic investigation into the 
origin of ‘our ideas’ of the sublime and beautiful, which he, Burke, routes through 
what Immanuel Kant in the Third Critique refers to as a masterful and nuanced 
psychological account.12 Burke tries to get from the genetic via the descriptive, and 
the late nineteenth-century German theorists take up this challenge again, by a 
rigorous partition of descriptive and genetic psychology, which is paralleled in the 
debates between Semperians and the advocates of Alois Riegl, on the evolution and 
pace of material culture and forms, which in Semper follows a strict evolutionary 
historical and social path, and in Riegl belongs as a free product of artistic ‘Will’. The 
abandonment of the Hegelian notion of the idea, and the Kantian reflection on the 
power of judgment, was forced by the development of a new empiricism in German 
research, which can be traced through Ernst Mach, Franz Brentano, Wilhelm Dilthey, 
and Edmund Husserl. 
German aesthetic theory – which would subsequently come to be held generally 
under the disciplinary field of Empirical Psychology – developed various approaches 
to the manner in which the aesthetic object is apprehended (both by mind and 
body) through such concepts as ‘kinaesthetic’ perception – a critique of perception 
based on the movement of the eye – primarily following Adolf Hildebrand on the one 
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hand, and the physiology of sensorial perceptions, held under terms such as feeling, 
mood and empathy (Einfühlung) following Robert Vischer, on the other.13 However, 
it is in the work of Heinrich Wölfflin and his dissertation of 1886 Prolegomena zu 
einer Psychologie der Architektur, that we find what could be considered the first 
vitalist account of architecture.14 The date is crucial, as almost at the same time, 
according to Oskar Kraus, Franz Brentano delivered his first lectures on ‘Deskriptive 
Psychologie’ and the task of genetic psychology. Edmund Husserl in his memoirs 
dated them at 1884–86.15 In his lectures Brentano distinguished his work as the 
discovery of the conditions of the coming into being of psychological processes, and 
saw it as necessarily connected with physiological investigation. Roughly speaking: 
sensation and the bodily experience are the source of all ideas, or concepts. 
Genetic psychology like a natural science would proceed by empirical observation, 
hypotheses, experimentation to law and posit inductive generalizations which show 
that mental effects have physical causes. For Brentano there are no innate ideas, all 
concepts can be derived from experience; thus, the task of descriptive psychology 
would be to analyse concepts and show from what experiences they have derived.16 
A guiding question in Wölfflin’s Prolegomena is that of expression: ‘How is it possible 
that architectural forms can express an emotion or a mood?’17 This question, 
inherited from an anthropomorphic notion of the aesthetic, can be summarized 
along two primary paths. First, by establishing a direct corollary between the work 
(generating pleasure or displeasure) which the eye carries out and the line or the 
contour of the form onto which the eye is focused. Secondly, by projecting onto the 
body (or the object) observed, the same emotional sentiments proper to or known 
by our own human form. The former follows from principles of kinaesthetic theories, 
which held that the appearance of the object takes it impulse quite directly from 
the movement of the eye – whether strained and linearly disjunctive or relaxed and 
curvilinearly flowing – which, in turn produces our aesthetic disposition towards and, 
subsequently, our understanding of the object.18  The latter follows anthropomorphic 
principle and goes further than the first in suggesting that perception works only 
when we can assign to the object of our observations associations with both our 
human physiological and psychological states. Or, as Wölfflin writes in referring to 
the beliefs of his predecessors, ‘physical forms possess a character only because we 
ourselves possess a body’. If meaning can be found in form, Wölfflin suggests, it is 
only because in them ‘we recognize the expression of a sentient soul’.19  Embedded 
in his commentary, Wölfflin takes steps with which he first moves his argument on 
architecture to an experience of space as opposed to an apprehension of form; and 
finally, opens the possibility of thinking architecture as being possessed, in itself, 
of a vital force.20  He further provides commentary on the optic-centric basis of 
perception in Rudolf Lotze, and offers a correction, writing: ‘it hardly needs to be 
added that we do not experience architectural creations in merely geometric terms 
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but rather as massive forms’.21 Architecture, according to Wölfflin, must be seen as 
possessing force, and he uses terms such as ‘will’ and ‘life’ in defining what he will 
discuss as ‘force of form’ (Formkraft). He writes that we sense a ‘formative force in 
every architectural creation, only it comes from within rather than without, like a 
creative will that fashions our own body’.22 
The goal is not the denial of matter but simply the organic structuring of it.23 He uses 
the term impression to indicate something more than the more commonly applied 
term ‘expression’. In Wölfflin impression denotes the effect of what we receive from 
an object and expression that which we understand as issuing from an object, or a 
body.24 Going directly to the heart of the matter he asks: how is it possible for us 
to ‘penetrate the object with our bodily feeling?’25 He insists that the architectural 
‘impression’ is something other than that which can be accounted for merely with the 
reckoning eye; that certainly, impression is based on a direct bodily feeling. But what 
this bodily feeling is, and how it is that it can be thought beyond the incorporating, 
the projected embodiments, of mind, into otherwise inanimate form is something 
that Wölfflin does not fully resolve. The argument Wölfflin is developing is that when 
a body encounters other bodies that it does not merely respond with imagination, 
nor by receiving physical excitations determined by a psychological mood, but that 
‘psychological and physical activities run parallel’. He argues that this problem, of 
what might be described as subject/object directionality, marks the very ‘limit of 
all science’.26  Wölfflin’s investigation may well provide the first vitalist account of 
architecture. Many consider it a decisive work in thinking towards an account of 
the psychology of architecture; it both follows the consequences of the empirically 
founded aesthetic of his contemporaries, and also moves towards the difficulty of 
expression and agency for matter. 
Just a few years later, in 1889, Bergson published his first major work Time and Free 
Will, the first chapter of which will also take up aesthetic feeling as derived from 
sympathy over expression and suggestion over impression. While he does not offer 
an extended discussion of architecture, the aesthetic feeling brought by objects of 
art brings a ‘suggestion of a possible movement towards ourselves, of a virtual and 
even nascent sympathy.’ 27 Bergson’s aesthetic feeling offers a precursor to what 
will later come to be discussed as (aesthetic) affect. These directions are later taken 
up by Deleuze in his nominated ‘higher empiricism’ which emphasizes more directly 
the relation of aesthetics and philosophy reconfigured to a practice of expression as 
creation.28 Contrary to the German aesthetic theories, for Husserl – the founder of 
phenomenology – the examination of mental states was a task for philosophers and 
not for psychologist, and, a fortiori, the examination of aesthetic experience. He also 
argued ardently against ‘psychologism’, going so far as signing a petition in 1912 
against the appointment of psychologists to the Chairs of Philosophy. He clearly 
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rejects the complete parallelism of the physical and the psychical as advocated by 
Ernst Mach where psychologists should seek for correlation between sensations and 
associated nervous processes, which alone is the specification of the conditions of 
appearance of a given phenomenon, a rejection which he shares with Vladimir Lenin 
against Machian positivism.29  
Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his searing critique of behaviourism and Gestalt offers 
a significant and extended account of perception which is faithful to Husserl’s 
position.30 Husserl regards intentionality as a fundamental property of consciousness 
and the principle theme of phenomenology. The significant feature of our ‘mental 
life’ is that it is about something. We are conscious as living beings of physical 
objects, ourselves, other persons, abstract objects, numbers and propositions, 
and of anything else we bring before our minds. Each mental state is in this way a 
representation of something other than itself and gives us a sense of something. 
However, some states could be seen alternatively (as not about something); for 
instance, euphoria, pain, dizziness, and the question of the representational remains 
problematic in Husserl as an account of awareness, as for Husserl only awareness is 
intentional.31 The question arises, how, in such an account, can a materialist claim 
for mind be supported? If our mental states also have a causative role in bringing 
other kinds of intentionality into existence, or at least allowing one to speak of an 
expressiveness for example of matter; then the question would be: how is mind 
related to ordinary objects? Generally speaking, this characteristic of mind being 
‘of’ or ‘about’ something is ‘intentionality’. On this account, Gilles Deleuze has 
shown that contemporary to Husserl, Bergson responds to this crisis of psychology 
precisely on the issue of consciousness. Suggesting that for Bergson ‘things are’; 
replacing the above formulation – awareness is consciousness of something, with the 
proposition that consciousness is something. 32  
That said, searching for alternatives to phenomenological interpretations (often 
understood as a return to humanism in rejection of technological determinism), both 
architecture practitioners and theorist have raised questions pertaining to what was 
generally understood as theories of ‘becoming’ over those of ‘being’.33 As mentioned 
above, such questions developed the possibilities of sensation, perception and affect 
as brought to bear on concepts related to the body. One turn in thinking the body 
has been situated in (post-structuralist) cultural theory, arguing the limits of the 
body as a constructed ‘Subject’ (subjugated, or without subjectivism), conceived as 
a discursive body.34 However, attempts to break from traditional phenomenological 
investigations into perception (the sensing, sensorial body) are problematic precisely 
because each exercise of isolating the exception from dominant ideologies forces a 
resituating of the body, or a reconstituting of the constructed Subjects, within the 
very structural framework from which it sought to extricate itself. In other words, 
TOC
 9 Introduction
these theories of the Subject (perception-expression-experience), which were 
potentially open to principles of ‘becoming’ – transformative experiences, dynamic 
processes of change (body-sensation-perception-affect) fell back into the situated 
(place, locatedness) of the phenomenological being-in-the-world. A different 
development, situated in materialist and vitalist philosophy, advance the potential of 
the body as dynamic and emergent ‘Individual’ (individuated, haecceities), conceived 
as a pre-discursive body.35 
In many ways the above precursors, plus the influence/inspiration of Bergson’s 
‘double progression’, inform each chapter in this volume. For instance:
Vitalism, as discussed in Chapter One, ‘Live Space’, is addressed not only through 
the primary readings (Bergson/vitalism, Deleuze/emergence, Spinoza/conatus, 
Varela/autopoiesis, etcetera), but, with the help of Scott Lash, rethinks the nature 
of substance and form, through a vitalist sociology. This is based on certain 
readings of Karl Marx and Georg Simmel. And, in developing an argument on value-
substance and life-form we argue that Marx provides a reading of labour that can 
be seen as organic and that Simmel provides a theory of value that should be seen 
as concrete, corporeal, and also mutating; basically, as substance or information 
capitalism’s ‘real’ and with life-form as the informational symbolic. This account 
offers implications for both the ‘live- and not-so-live’ space of the global information 
city, or global information space. A position taken up in great detail in the final 
chapter of this volume. Such forms of capitalism operate in extensive and highly 
dispersed networks, in so-called ‘pure flow’ and ‘pure flux’. It becomes undeniable 
that theories of the ‘spaces of flows’ – which have long been defined primarily by 
the empty surface and as spaces of abstraction – are not adequate to address these 
concerns. In this chapter we suggest instead, a reading of the ‘vitalist-city’ as one 
is that engaged with a theory of ‘energy’ (everything has a metabolic cost) and 
with the specific ‘flows that traverse it’. For this we draw on a Bernhard Riemann-
Bergson-Deleuze interpretation of multiplicity – particularly that of the ‘continuous 
(Bergson) or virtual (Deleuze) multiplicity’. Thus, working through Bergson’s Matter 
and Memory and his notion of durée we examine what Deleuze has referred to 
as Bergson’s ‘matter-image-ontology’, whereby matter and image are ultimately 
collapsed. Here, immanent representation just seems to correspond to life-forms in 
dreams and memories, to forms in the city that imagine something other than that 
which can be said to merely repeat. 
Concepts as they are related to materialist philosophy come under fire the moment 
the question of individuality and commonality are set against notions of the body 
as subject, or subjectivity in all its guises. In Chapter Two, ‘A Cosmopolitan View 
on Thinking and Being-in-Common’, the issues of subject formation are taken up 
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with respect to individuality and commonality regarding the city and the rights of 
belonging that it should offer both the domestic resident and the foreigner. The city 
as material practice is discussed through the work of Ulrich Beck’s Cosmopolitan 
Vision. This chapter can be seen as eccentric to the other four chapters in that my 
frame of reference for my retort to Beck comes not from the Deleuze/Foucault axis 
that is typically deployed elsewhere in this collection but from the work of Jean-
Luc Nancy and Étienne Balibar. Nancy offers a nuanced and considered account 
that has no need to situate the social with the individual (subject or subjectivity), 
bringing the ‘we’ to the forefront, not after the construction of the ‘I’, but prior. 
However, what is crucial on this account is to understand that the ‘we’ is not 
made up of predetermined and inclusive groups (the ‘we’ of we versus them), it is 
constituted by mutual abandonment of constrains and an opening to each other. 
This is different from the recognition of the Other which relies on the reconstitution 
of the constructed subject as mentioned just above. Balibar’s work offers one of the 
most significant contemporary reading of globalization, migration and transnational 
citizenship that significantly contributes to expand the idea of cosmopolitanism 
beyond the dichotomies and modalities of multiculturalism or the conflation of 
cultural identity and practice with politics. What these two authors share are 
arguments that challenge notions of sovereignty and identity politics.
The notion of a double progression includes, either implicitly or explicitly, notions of 
the virtual and the role it plays within theories of emergence or the question of how 
something new can be said to (be)come into being (assemblages both striated and 
smooth). While Henri Lefebvre may seem like an unlikely source for an exploration 
of virtual emergence in urban theory, in Chapter Three, ‘On the Virtual: Lefebvre and 
the Urban Problematic’, we find that his problématique, and the complexity in which 
it is developed, allows for an inquiry into the distinction between logos and intuition, 
between the problem of thinking and thought as identified above. This chapter works 
primarily from Lefebvre’s The Urban Revolution in order to question the nature 
of urban space and ‘the urban’.36 The city is no longer recognizable as a singular 
entity (a unity with respect to multiplicities). Urban reality manifests as fragmentary, 
shapeless, and the ‘urban phenomenon’ locates itself at a point of articulation of 
widely, globally dispersed processes. For Lefebvre, this is a ‘form without content’ 
and, as such, the city is incapable of creation but does, in itself, ‘centralize creation’ 
by providing the situation for exchange, encounter, assembly (simultaneities) to 
take place. We examine these issues with several theoretical filters in Foucault and 
Deleuze by looking at distributions of power relations – and their ability to generate 
new forms of relations (articulations) – through both visible and invisible (material 
and immaterial) structures of logic and practices.
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Chapter four, ‘Benjamin and Bergson: Memory Matters’, addresses what Benjamin 
notably referrers to as fundamental structures of change in experience resulting 
from new modes of human sense perception. In order to take up the problem of 
experience Benjamin turns in many of his writings to Bergson; and in his work On 
Some Motifs in Baudelaire he turns to Marcel Proust. In this chapter we will attempt 
to rethink the relation between the ‘pure memory’ of Bergson and the ‘involuntary 
memory’ of Proust. Of course, in writing on Baudelaire Benjamin situates both 
sensation and memory in the modern metropolis with all the sensorial impact that 
it inflicted. Thus, the issue of shock (Benjamin’s Schockerlebnis), its impact on 
both body and mind (as well as the central nervous system), how these forces are 
processed, inflected, and deflected through consciousness leads, among other 
things, to issues related to memory, perception and attention. This goes beyond the 
turn in experience to an intelligence which reflects (intuition) and, thus is enlarged 
and has gone beyond the turn of utility (intellect).37 It is ‘a consciousness that has 
virtually re-conquered itself. But still the virtual has to become actual’.38 Naturally, 
Bergson waivers on this point and reminds us that ‘the intellect is not made to think 
evolution’; it must suffice to represent becoming as a series of states, to stable 
reconstructions which, for Bergson, thus ‘lets what is new in each moment of a 
history escape.’ 39 
In another turn, aesthetic affect does not place us in a position, but in a disposition 
towards action as opposed to awareness. In Deleuzian terms affects are ‘becomings’; 
and as such they are dynamic, plastic and emergent. On this account aesthetic affect 
also attempts to free itself form the embedding of aesthetic experience in language 
(discourse) and symbolism (representation) as found in both phenomenology 
following Martin Heidegger and post-structuralism following Subject theories. In 
this sense, aesthetic affect should not be confused with emotion or feeling (though 
it has a correlation with sensation). As Brian Massumi points out, in reading the 
notion of affect through Bergson and Deleuze we must understand affect as clearly 
differentiated from emotions and feeling. Emotions, in this reading, are discrete, 
they are expressive of identifiable qualities, thus they are, in their own way, 
representational. Affects, conversely, are pure vitality, a continuous and vibrating 
release of potentialities, undulating between sensations and states.40 Of course, in 
addition to sensation and affect, memory and attention can be seen as crucial in 
discussing the role of experience. 
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This leads to Chapter Five, ‘Architecture & Mind in the Age of Information and 
Communication’. Thinking on this inherently socio-political relation between forms 
and forms of communication utilize a twofold interface generating new modes 
of logic of representation. Perhaps this is most easily exemplified in the global 
marketplace, which, with the help of the continuing scientific research on perception 
and cognition, has successfully created powerful complex networks of attention 
which allow for the manufacture of explicit connectiveness that further define both 
political and aesthetic regimes, which effectively determine the organization of the 
senses. It is in this sense that Maurizio Lazzarato discusses Deleuze’s ‘societies 
of control’, mediated as they are by technology, whereby power relations can 
operate through ‘action at a distance … through the brain’s power to affect and 
become affected’.41 Drawing on Lazzarato’s suggestion that Foucault’s analysis of 
‘disciplinary society’ – institutions aiming at the reproduction of populations (bios, 
bio-politics) – benefits greatly by extending this theoretical framework to include 
Deleuze’s analysis of ‘societies of control’ – referring to disciplinary institutions in 
crisis, forming modulations in behaviours of persons (nous, noopolitics), implying 
another manner of investigating power and its impact on both society and individuals 
(individuation of/into ‘dividuals’). This relates directly to aesthetic experience acting 
on both bodily affect – dynamism and the potential for continuous (intensive) change 
– and simultaneously operating on mind or mental disposition (here bios and nous 
collapse all distinctions).42 Bergson’s philosophy of difference, Lazzarato suggests, 
is the ‘first to tackle the new molecular biology and the studies on the brain. 
Bergson’s work concerns the living not only because it directly confronts biology and 
evolutionary theory, but because of his research on memory, time and its modalities 
of action: the virtual and the actual.’43  
In fact, the history of this thought and its image is what Deleuze has referred to 
as Noo-logy. Or with Jacques Rancière, the ‘distribution of the sensible’ as this 
relates to ‘laws governing the sensible order that parcels out places and forms of 
participation in a common world’.44 Or, for instance, ‘phatic stimuli’ (Paul Virilio); 
which have evolved into highly attention-grabbing conglomerates of stimuli that act 
as multiplicities and operate beyond the sensorium reaching into the folded gyri and 
sulci of the brain itself. We are speaking here of intense, designed, repetitive stimuli 
and networks of stimuli acting in concert; for instance, the worldwide relay stations 
of global media can stimulate certain conditions in the brain preferentially. As such 
the brain might become sculpted (Gerald Edelman) by the conditions of built space 
through which and upon which mediated environments operate. Over time such 
changes could, in fact, change the very structure of the brain (Terrence Deacon).45 
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In ‘Architecture & Mind’ we explore recent ideas emanating from neuroscience. 
The theories of neuronal group selection and the neural constructivist approach 
for example, have been linked to evolving ideas in philosophy, cultural and media 
studies. The former theory provides explanations for the way in which the evolving 
modes of perception are the result of Darwinian pressures which sculpt initially 
through their effect on the individual and then upon populations, whereby new forms 
of neural architectonics provide the brain with new opportunities for thought and, 
perhaps more importantly, imagination. The latter, constructivist account, posits 
a dynamic interaction between neural growth and environmentally derived neural 
activity. The first, providing a mechanist doctrine, the latter a constructivist account. 
Parallels in Bergson are developed in Creative Evolution through a dual account – 
‘two kinds of order’ – of Darwinian determinism (mechanist) and Lamarckian finalism 
(inheritance). Here, both principles assume a linearity, or rather a directionality 
of forces which subsume the past and the future in the calculable function of the 
present. The primary difference being that while mechanism pushes (causally) 
from behind, finalism pulls (affectively) from the front. It is worth noting that these 
two kinds of orders are developed with respect to the two contrary philosophical 
positions of idealism and realism. Bergson writes: ‘If order did not appear to us as 
a conquest over something, or as an addition to something (which something is 
thought to be the “absence of order”), ancient realism would not have spoken of 
a “matter” to which the Idea superadded itself, nor would modern idealism have 
supposed a “sensuous manifold” that the understanding organizes into nature.’46 In 
other words, all order is contingent.  
We can also speak here of sovereignty, that a body, whether absolute or popular, 
local or global, that has jurisdiction over a territory or a group of people, today 
organizes this distribution with sophisticated apparatuses that are reminiscent of 
the (Foucauldian) ‘Society of Control’ expressed in Michael Hardt’s and Tony Negri’s 
Empire and Gilles Deleuze’s Foucault.47 Here, the logics of perception and experience 
are no longer materialistically defined only by contours of geometric and linear time 
and space arranged hierarchically in a rigid lattice but rather follow curved, non-
linear Riemannian paradigms that are expressed in complicated, non-hierarchical, 
rhizomatic flows. The Guggenheim Bilbao, which generated what became known as 
the ‘Bilbao Effect’, not only innovated a new form or architecture, but advanced the 
function of architecture as an economic generator of cultural industry. This impacts 
not only the city and the life of its inhabitants, but issues forward a new ethos as 
well. Architecture exhibiting political, economic, cultural bio-power. Of course, 
establishing a relationship of correspondences at a distance between the ‘sayable 
and the visible’ (Rancière) or ‘statements and visibilities’ (Foucault) is an issue that 
equally underpins much of the work presented in the following chapters.
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Finally, it should be said that with the following chapters we neither believe that the 
partial view we have presented offers an exhaustive theoretical treatment of the 
concepts presented, nor are we attempting make a conclusive statement. Thinking 
across, with and through such seemingly divergent discourses and disciplines 
remains emergent and in flux – metastable, as Kelso would have it, with James’s 
image of ‘perching’ and ‘flight’. Our intention is to bring forward topics, concepts, 
and ideas that are discussed in the work of many cultural and thinkers in order to 
identify critical issues that might be on interest to both the world of architecture and 
other worlds.
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1 Live Space
Living labour time reproduces nothing more than that part of objectified labour time 
(of capital) which appears as an equivalent for the power of disposition over living 
labour capacity, and which, therefore, as an equivalent, must replace the labour 
time objectified in this labouring capacity, i.e. replace the production costs of the 
living labour capacities, in other words, must keep the workers alive as workers. . . . 
There is an indifference on the part of the substance [Stoff] towards the form, which 
develops out of merely objectified labour time, in whose objective existence labour 
has become merely the vanished, external form of its natural substance, existing 
merely in the external form of the substantial [das Stoffliche]. (Marx, Grundrisse)1
This chapter puts forward considerations on a vitalist theory of space, on what we 
will refer to as ‘live-space’. Beginning what might be called a vitalist sociology or a 
Lebenssoziologie, we might re-think the sociological classics: alongside and partially 
instead of works of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber would be those of Gabriel Tarde 
and Georg Simmel. Not the early Simmel, nor even especially the Simmel on the city. 
But the Simmel of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer and Lebensanschauungen, of the 
Bergson essays and Grundfragen der Soziologie.2 Henri Bergson spoke at Tarde’s 
funeral, while, in fact, Durkheim saw Tarde as an avowed enemy, perhaps the enemy. 
Indeed, the école durkheimienne destroyed for a century Tarde’s legacy, yet by the 
late 1990s we find that Tarde’s books are reprinted in France.3 Maurizio Lazzarato, 
from the French revue, Multitudes, published a book on Tarde, Puissances de 
l’invention.4 For Lazzarato, the ‘multitudes’, unlike the atomized mass of the people 
or the proletariat, are a ‘monadized mass’. Similarly, what we are here referring to as 
live-space, can be seen in the sense of Stefano Boeri, whereby multiplicity, live-space 
comprises not just humans but at the same time non-humans; finally live-space is 
understood as a space of difference. Thus, contemporary space as multiplicity is 
at the same time multitude-inous. The idea of live space that we will discuss here 
might somehow be grounded in the philosophy or ontology of difference – difference 
not in the sense of Derrida or Heidegger’s ontological difference, but as a much 
more immanentist ontology; in that of vitalism’s usual suspects: Spinoza-Nietzsche-
Bergson-Marcel Duchamp-Deleuze-Negri. We are interested in a ‘Weltanschauung of 
difference’ – and how this underlies the shift from manufacturing to informational, 
or what we will call for the purposes of this chapter, cognitive capitalism.5 This 
chapter will also have implications for the live- and not-so-live- space of the global 
information city, or global information space.6
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Substance and Form
The third classical vitalist sociologist is Marx, or to be more precise, one particular 
period of Marx, in which he addresses one significant aspect. This period is the Marx 
of the Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie. It is in the Grundrisse that 
Marx famously speaks of the value-form (Wertform): that is, not just exchange value 
but the value-form. He also there speaks of value-substance (Wertsubstanz). The 
value-form, though it is reflected on all levels of the social formation, remains along 
the lines of exchange-value in that it is abstract and homogenous. Value substance 
is labour, but it is not homogeneous labour, nor is it labour-power as a use-value 
primarily as a utility for the capitalist. It is labour as substance. It is organic labour, 
at least in the sense that its time and space are full and thick. Value-substance 
is largely constitutive of the real in manufacturing capitalism; and like the real 
it is unspoken, not fully graspable or utterable. Value-form conversely comes to 
constitute manufacturing capitalism’s symbolic. If in the Grundrisse Marx is avant la 
lettre a vitalist, then he is a labour-puissance vitalist. Indeed, labour for Marx is not 
just the source of value, but the source of energy. Labour-power is the energy force 
for the whole social formation. It is, most certainly, the ‘motor’ of history. Thus, in 
order to speak of live-space there must be some notion of energy source. 
Georg Simmel will also use the form and substance juxtaposition. He will obsess 
over a theory of value. This however is not a labour theory of value but a life 
theory of value. Simmel is a life-force vitalist: he will speak not of value-form 
and value-substance but instead of life-form (Lebensform) and life-substance 
(Lebenssubstanz). Perhaps this should be understood to be more ‘information-
age’ than ‘manufacturing-age’ thinking. Here we have concrete, corporeal, plastic, 
mutating life – which of course embraces death – as substance, as information 
capitalism’s real, and life-form as the informational symbolic. We see here 
Foucauldian and informational bio-power prefigured in Simmel: bio-power of 
course as pouvoir and not puissance (which surely is the Negrian problématique 
on Spinoza). In this sense value in the manufacturing age is based on labour-
power (pouvoir) not so much as work force (puissance de travail); and here pouvoir 
connects to the value-form which extends not just to capitalist exchange value but 
to the abstract law of the state as well as its abstract, hence legal rational (that is, 
not at all Kafkaesque) bureaucracy. Substance, then, is indeed here puissance; but, 
then, what of matter, is it similarly to be considered puissance? And what then of 
‘life’ in the information age? Life is no doubt force (puissance) – hence this notion of 
the body and architecture, in which architecture is understood by many, as technique 
(techne) or craft. Indubitably then technique, perhaps rather than knowledge, is 
pouvoir. But at the same time, as we will see, technique is also puissance. Knowledge 
is to logic what technique is to the algorithm. We want to understand technique in 
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terms of technologization of both science and art. Do we have aesthetic algorithms? 
Does conceptual art operate through aesthetic algorithms? All these questions will 
be returned to at various moments further on. But, for now, let us begin to explore 
the issue of form.
First, the value-form in all its modalities is linear. That is, pouvoir is linear in 
industrial capitalism. In cognitive capitalism it may largely be non-linear (that is, 
through the life-forms, indeed through forms of life). Put another way, such power 
in industrial capitalism is reproductive, not merely repetitive. The family, social 
class (for Durkheim and Jacques Lacan), works through reproduction. In Pierre 
Bourdieu the symbolic itself equally works through reproduction.7 In cognitive 
capitalism, on the other hand, power is productive; it works not through identity 
but through the production of difference. More importantly however, we will raise 
another question about form: that is, can we do without form? In his Schopenhauer 
and Nietzsche, Simmel contrasts the two German thinkers. Schopenhauer has a 
theory of pure will: pure will as substance with no form. This pure will was akin 
to the Kantian noumenon, the essence of substance as contingency. Simmel had 
trouble with Schopenhauer’s ‘pure’ will. Nietzsche, conversely, had will or flux on 
the one hand and form on the other. You had two distinct categories of form – often 
in the shape of moralities: master moralities and slave moralities, or, life-enhancing 
and life-destroying moralities. What came between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, 
Simmel notes, is Darwin. Thus, the Übermensch itself is form, it is not so much 
the achievement – through reflexive or creative evolution, as through a certain 
production of difference – of a higher being. It is rather form as becoming – form 
as reflexive becoming – of the human body doing work on the self. Thus, Simmel 
would have not a lot of time for a problematics of pure flux, of pure flow. He would 
have little time for Georges Bataille’s economy of formlessness (économie générale 
l’informe)8; or even a Deleuzian politics of ‘lines of flight’, or, much less, the idea of 
a city of only of flows and circulation. Indeed, in this sense, live-space, or any sort 
of vitalist city cannot be conceived as just a space of flows. There is no question 
that the live-space of the global city draws energy from the flows that traverse it: 
especially from flows of immigrants, but also of images, finance and the like. It must 
hence be understood as a continuous multiplicity.9 Here we move from the city as 
Cartesian mechanism in what Lefebvre calls representational space to the city as 
lived and living self-organization. This is the vitalist city, or the virtual problématique 
of the urban.10 This is live-space. But this is the city considered as multiplicity, as 
Mannigfaltigkeit. It draws its energy sources from the outside and converts them to 
include to higher levels of complexity. Perhaps then it does make sense to speak of 
urban energy: of the city as source of energy, much like the hard drive is a source 
of computing energy. Spaces of flows – as we have them from David Harvey to 
Manuel Castells – are on the surface empty, abstract spaces. The informational city 
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is, as mentioned already by Stefano Boeri, a multiplicity. Or with Sanford Kwinter, 
a manifold, following Riemann an n-dimensional topological space.11 Things move 
through informational space, through this manifold, like blood, or excrement or a 
virus moves through the thickness of a body. Hence the organism that is live-space 
takes in energy on the one side to produce not just difference but also to produce 
(excrete) junk-space.12
We are questioning the manner in which we can think substance and form in the 
information age; in a sense, it addresses the problematics of flow in contemporary 
theory. From Castells to actor-network theory (Bruno Latour and John Law’s 
‘materialist-semiology’) to Arjun Appadurai to even to Hardt and Negri’s Empire; 
there is something very unsatisfactory about what sometimes amounts to a 
problematic of pure flow. Pure flow is like pure contingency, and network terminals 
are not enough to constitute it. What is needed is a new notion of form. Yet, what 
forms, indeed what institutional forms, are to replace the old ones in an age of 
flows? Here is where the urgent question of form comes in. Subsequently, we need 
to think further, whether even the notion of flow is oversimplified. Information theory 
is equally unsatisfactory, with its ideas of noise and pattern or noise and form.  
Can flow be conceived as pure noise, or can substance be thought through pure 
contingency? We do not think this makes sense, for substance is also puissance. It 
needs to have reference to an energy source; as already mentioned, any idea of live-
space will need an energy-source.
We might also suggest that there is a problem with the pure as it is understood in 
terms of a Bergsonian or Deleuzian position. In this you have flow, flux, or the like 
but form is reduced to event (pure reserve), at least in the latter of the two. You have 
a body without organs and affective intensities on the body without organs; but you 
do not have the figures of dreams – a point we will return to shortly. Everything, in 
this sense, is potentially a conductor of intensities. The idea of an event architecture 
has become popular; but we are not at all convinced that form and event are the 
same thing. In Benjamin, for example, form and event (Ereignis) are very different. 
Perhaps, then, we still need a doctrine as form of form, however transmogrified it 
may be. Forms may now become non-linear and mutating, labile and the like; but 
they are still form. Multiplicities, at least of the qualitative type, are heterogeneous, 
mobile substance: substance rather than matter. But can we then say that what 
multiplicities produce, what emerges from them, is only the event? Why not form?  
Form can arise from substance without an author, without a subject. Indeed, this 
was the idea in antiquity, so unlike the Kantian imposition of form on chaos. Thus we 
don’t want to see flow or flux as pure contingency. That is, unless we open up the 
idea of the event to include almost anything, in other words, if we extend the event to 
comprise any eruption of real, full, plasmatic time into abstract, clock and Newtonian 
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time, or what in Bergson is described as space. But does the event not also typically 
signify speed and immediacy, like in Walter Benjamin’s Schockerlebnis. The real time 
of form can be thought otherwise, as in its slowness as well. Breaking with Newtonian 
time for carnival may be événementiel; but what about sleeping in on weekends, 
what about couch potato-ing, and meditation? A theory of slow-space needs to be 
developed as well.13
In the book The Harvard Guide to Shopping there is a very instructive interchange 
between Rem Koolhaas and Robert Venturi. Here Koolhaas is surprised when Venturi 
says that his early books, Complexity and Contradiction, and Learning from Las 
Vegas with Denise Scott Brown, are about cultural form. Koolhaas states that in 
contrast, Delirious New York is about ‘urban substance’. What is at stake here? What 
can be meant by substance? What by form? In neither case are we necessary looking 
at identitarian concepts. Substance is here neither formless – à la Immanuel Kant 
and his idea of formless matter – nor is substance pure flow. For Koolhaas though, 
urban substance is delirious. It is also nothing like Bausubstanz, the heavy matter 
of mansion blocks in Berlin, built on Haussmann-like presuppositions, only heavier 
somehow. The skyscrapers of delirious New York are not substantial vernacular: not 
tectonic stuff (Stoff). They are light, mobile, material and immaterial at the same 
time. The substance of live-space is not like Theodor Adorno’s artist (Pablo Picasso/
Henri Matisse) working through the aesthetic material: it is lighter than this. We 
are looking instead, in a sense, at a sort of conceptual architecture, a conceptual 
urbanism, an architecture of motion and change in which the flows and flux of 
movement and exchange constitute the urban fabric. Not empty space or abstract 
space nor heavy Bausubstanz as space; but a live-space. Delirium is not a dream. It 
is not even a daydream. It connects not necessarily to involuntary memory (mémoire 
involontaire). Delirium is perhaps a horizon as future. But horizon not as flat de-
natured screen; instead it is a horizon that goes all squishy, labile and organic like 
the cassette in David Cronenberg’s Videodrome. Then there is Venturi on form. Pop 
art and form: life, contemporary conceptual art and popular culture. Algorithmic 
culture: software, art gone algorithmic like design, instructions as with procedure 
attached. Art becomes technique: technique and production of difference.
Body and Spirit in Matter and Memory
On the back cover of the Zone Books edition of Henri Bergson’s Matter and Memory 
is a citation from Walter Benjamin.14 Bergson clearly influenced Benjamin’s notion 
of involuntary memory.  Bergson was, as Benjamin, Deleuze and many others have 
noted, also a major influence on Proust, again inter alia on his idea of mémoire 
involontaire.15 This is unsettling for vitalist theory because Benjamin’s and Proust’s 
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notions are famously dualist. Mémoire involontaire sets up a parallel sort of dream 
world, a world complementary and disruptive to the calculating workaday ego 
of Newtonian time. Yet coming to Bergson, after reading commentary from such 
writers as Keith Ansell-Pearson and Sanford Kwinter (to name only two), one 
would understand Bergson as a monist: steeped and rooted in the philosophy of 
immanence, and not transcendence. Yet, at least as concerns Matter and Memory, 
it would seem that Benjamin, Proust, and indeed Deleuze support a dualist account 
of Bergsonian thinking.16 Indeed, Bergson states at the outset of the book, or at 
least he claims that his philosophy works through dualist accounts, and that through 
the notion of memory he will resolve the mind-body problem, or as he puts it, that 
memory will be shown to provide the ‘intersection between mind and matter’.17  
And his work does certainly provide such a convincing bridge to the mind-body 
disjunction; with arguments which no other dualist accounts have ever come close 
to producing. Yet, he does not answer his stated aim in the manner which he initially 
claims, solely through the notion of memory. Instead the bridge that Bergson 
will build will be constructed in a double movement between representation and 
experience. And with this the mind-body duality will no longer remain consigned to a 
vulgar dualism, but will be solved in terms of his celebrated notion of durée.
Bergson offers a powerfully sharp analytic distinction between the notions of matter 
and memory (thought traditionally as body and soul). Yet, the famous first chapter 
‘Of the Selection of Images for Conscious Presentation. What our Body Means and 
Does’ – which is such a basis for Deleuze’s Bergsonism and his cinema books – is 
almost totally devoted to matter, or more precisely to developing a theory of the 
image as it relates to perception, which for Bergson, at least at this point, is more 
natural than cultural.18 There is, on the one hand, cerebral substance, the body, the 
real, the image, vibration (movement, sensation) the brain and utility.  There is, on 
the other, mind, culture, spirit, the ideal. Before, analytically, memory is introduced 
at all we have a notion of matter. It is fully within the sphere of matter the body 
perceives matter as image. However, our own bodies too are equally part of this 
matter, yet they operate in a privileged state in that we do not only know our bodies 
from without (as pure percept) but from within in the form of sensation and feeling 
(as affect). This body with cerebral substance perceives matter, indeed knows matter 
not through merely making a representation of it, but through its possible action on 
things and its ability to be acted upon by them. Bergson never stops arguing against 
philosophers or men of science who presume that cerebral substance works through 
either the construction (epiphenomenalism) or the recognition (parallelism) of an 
image of matter; for Bergson, matter is image.19 Mind is not spatially separate from 
matter. Bergson opposes realist and idealist philosophy in that for realism the brain 
as substance accounts for the creating of representation; but, also because in both 
realism and idealism the mind is spatially separate from matter. Matter perceives 
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matter, not through how it represents it, but through action, and through images that 
are part of external matter itself. Matter is then understood as the carrier of action 
and not as the substratum of knowledge.
The transition from image to representation is formulated in terms of perception and 
later will be thought as being bridged through memory. This, at the same time, can 
be considered a transition from sensation to sense, from nature to culture. It is in 
this sense that Bergson breaks surely with the subject-object dualism, or subject-
object notions of transcendence, for what is indeed a philosophy of immanence. That 
is, the material subject-body is in the same world, the same ‘field’ as the material 
object. He does not symbolize it or imagine a representation of it, but he grasps a 
piece of it in the real. In other words, to think an associationist relation between 
the concrete and symbolic reconstruction of it is, as he puts it, to ‘confuse the 
explanation of the fact with the fact itself.’20
The body in the world with the object perceives only that aspect of it that interests it. 
This is effectively a form of utility; but not Newtonian and not a utilitarianism of the 
possessive individual or ego, but of an immanent body that is in the world, having an 
attitude towards the object that has to do with the possible action of the (privileged) 
body. This aspect of matter that the interested body-with-attitude perceives is the 
image. This is an image that is real. Furthermore, the body-with-attitude perceives 
this matter-image not through representing it but through movement, sensation 
and vibrations. Hence Deleuze is right to speak about a matter-image ontology.21 
The body penetrated into the real of matter (Bergson) in the sense that the camera, 
in the view of Deleuze, surgically carves out a bit of the real (Benjamin). That bit of 
the real is image – it is image not as symbolic, or semiotic, or even indexical but as 
a slice, what Bergson refers to elsewhere as a ‘partial view’ of the real.22 This opens 
onto the distinction between difference and repetition, on the living and the static (in 
Deleuze as well as Bergson), and we thus understand it as already stating something 
about how the body relates to (non-corporeal) matter-image in informational space.
Bergsonian Memory, understood as the ‘intersection’ of mind and matter, also 
proceeds through a form of double progression. In one sense (actual) memory 
is immediate, in that in its most concentrated state it provides for an automatic 
response to (unconscious) bodily states. Here memory no longer ‘represents’ 
our past, it ‘acts’ it. In another sense (virtual) memory is where perception is 
both preserved and prolonged and related to consciousness. Memory, in terms of 
recollection, is also the representation of absent objects, of duration and temps 
perdu. Memory does work through representation, but only at the juncture where the 
object is actually perceived; prior to perception, then, an image may have presence 
without representation. When the object is not there, image (matter) becomes 
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representation (form). As Bergson writes in Matter and Memory, ‘Representation 
is there, but always virtual – being neutralized, at the very moment when it might 
become actual, by the obligation to continue itself and to lose itself in something 
else’.23 There is a different rhythm of duration in memory than in perception. Memory 
works through interior perception and its rhythm (Alfred North Whitehead calls this 
self-stimulation). In short, the more reflexive, the more self-organizing is matter, the 
more contracted is its working through memory; while the more reflective, the more 
matter allows for indeterminacy, the more relaxed is its working through memory.
Bergson also saw memory partly as unconscious, though it was a function of 
consciousness rather than the brain. Yet memory is in representations; not Cartesian 
representations of abstract time and space, but in the form of what Bergson refers to 
as ‘recollection-images’. They are more like a dream. More like the images in a dream 
which are also transformed rhythmically (feeling to image, image to word). The point 
is that these non-logical, immanent representations seem to correspond to forms. 
To forms in dreams, to forms in the city, to memory in the city, to memories which 
imagine as opposed to merely repeat. Hence the ancient in Benjamin’s city (in casu 
Paris) erupts into the modern.
Cognitive Capitalism, Immaterial Labour
We are arguing that it still very much makes sense to think the substance-form 
distinction: to think the transition from labour substance to life substance. To think 
of the difference in form that connects to it. To think how urban form as well as 
urban substance might then be understood as vitalist: as live-space. For instance, 
recalling that the reflex of the value-form is property; the reflex of the life-form will 
be intellectual property. We will get back to this shortly when we return to the issue 
of technique. Form remains so important because, as we have already suggested, the 
global city and the network society are more than pure flow, pure circulation. It is 
flow, but it is also hesitation as Bergson would have it, it is similar to what Duchamp 
called stoppage: and these stoppages take on the shape of form, or might we say, 
the form of form. The problem remains that there is something incredibly immaterial 
about informational substance: about life-substance. It has so much to do with 
activity, with reflexivity also in the sense of the triumph of virtuality. In other words, it 
deals with the virtual-actual axis over that of the possible-real.24
As mentioned above with respect to Lazzarato, Tarde’s sociology was at the same 
time a monadology, as Jean-Clet Martin has explained.25 Additionally, Leibniz’s 
monadology is set up against atomism (for atomism and Descartes simple substance 
is identity); monadology, simple substance, the monad is difference. Yet we wish 
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to posit difference without a coordinating agency as Leibniz’s God so provided; as, 
indeed, an ontology of immanence and difference. Whereas Bergson’s starting point 
is the I-it of epistemology, Tarde, in correspondence with Simmel, implies a certain 
I-thou. Though his I-thou can be understood as any two monads: as monads do not 
so much cause one another but communicate with one another or dominate one 
another. They form collectives, whether they are molecules or individuals. They are 
reflexive, and, to a certain extent self-organizing; but other collectives in conflict will 
have the tendency to disorganize them. Instead of Durkheimian mind-like collective 
consciousness, for Tarde there is a collective brain (at once material and immaterial). 
But more a naturalist than Durkheim or even Bergson, Tarde would seem closer 
indeed to Deleuze. In Tarde monads desire: desire is the puissance partly behind 
the puissance de l’invention. When desire opens out and connects/communicates 
with another monad there is affect. This is the moment of will. But there is inevitably 
also a moment of perception or reflection or let us say a cognitive moment in which 
monads close down their windows and separate themselves from other monads. 
This is a moment similar to that which Bergson identifies in his notion of the interval.26 
This further relates to Lazzarato’s idea of immaterial labour and to cognitive 
capitalism.27 Immaterial labour produces difference. Material (Marxist) labour 
produces identity, or is involved in its reproduction. Immaterial labour has the power 
of creation as puissance de l’invention. That is the immaterial labour of those monads 
comprising the multitudes, the cerebral collective; not that of ‘the’ proletariat (as a 
form of identity). Neither collective nor mind but brain is the seat of this puissance 
de l’invention. Energy plus creativity: real multitudes and actual multiplicity. Both live 
as both are sources of life. Bergson was clear that memory itself was not a source 
of energy. It came into contact with perception only through what Deleuze would 
later refer to as ‘planes of consciousness’; yet without memory, for Bergson, there 
could be no perception. Energy-movement was there in matter. Monads (Leibnizian 
or otherwise) – whether they will combine as multiplicities of urban substance or the 
multi-uses of collective practice and the collective brain – are produced of difference 
and are very much real. Here we have issues much more of substance than of form, 
even if it is a multiplicity of immaterial substance. Nevertheless, there must still be 
form. Property relation was formal appropriation. Property is form. What about when 
property relates to an activity as in immaterial production and not to a thing as in 
material production; how does pouvoir then reassemble itself? Form and substance: 
Art, even in the information age, no matter how event-full, no matter where the 
intervention is, no matter how non-optical, or how conceptual, no matter how 
virtual. No matter how much it problematizes the interface. Indeed, no matter how 
architectural form may be: substance and form. Does this work as well for media art? 
At the turn of this century, popular culture within conceptual art has in common with 
its 1960s predecessor a minimalist conceptualism which remains hermetically sealed; 
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yet, it is still form. Though in Venturi’s sense, it is living form. Lazzarato’s worker acts 
in the elements of form and substance. And this must be the meaning of technique. 
Science is about form. Art is about form. Technique is the integration of form and 
substance. Technique is algorithmic: logic plus control. With Kwinter we might agree 
that all architecture is technique, or technicity in Simondon; but we are less sure 
that all technique is architecture. In each case, as in intellectual property, there is an 
intervention of form into substance. Design intensity of the collective brain produces 
differences. Knowledge – it is all about knowledge – hence cognitive capitalism.28 
Why Cognitive Capitalism?  
What we are considering here is the potential meaning of the term reflection in 
Tarde’s sense, or hesitation in Bergson’s. Bergson needs a transition, a turn, from 
matter to memory. Matter and memory first stand in a dualism, of course, but he 
then asks the question: how does matter come to have memory? This is through 
excitations, stimulations, vibrations, sensations, and so on, transmitted through 
matter. Matter only has memory in this moment of consciousness. Tarde’s moment 
of ‘pulling back’. Bergson’s moment of ‘standing still’. It is at this moment that there 
is perception with the absent object. The window is closed. The pattern of movement 
and vibration turn inward in what Bergson calls affect. In Whitehead it is with the 
body which becomes reflexive in self-affect, self-stimulation or self-excitement, that 
matter comes to have memory.29 Thus, the body enters culture. The body indeed 
selects images from the environment only at the same time in a moment of self-
reflection. But when this self-reflection comes to the level of memory then it is no 
longer just a utilitarian self-reflection. It is here that we have form. Memory entails 
form or representation; it is constituted materially but is no longer purely material. 
Here we might need to make a brief mention of Kant’s third critique, The Critique 
of Judgement, in which nature becomes a finality, that is, not just utilitarian or 
an instrument. This is not the pure epistemology of the first critique; it is not a 
question of Wissen.  It is a question of knowledge in a broader, not logical but 
perhaps analogical sense. This is what Kant calls Erkenntnis as distinct from Wissen. 
Wissen is systematic and logical in a sense that Erkenntnis is not. Yet Erkenntnis 
is translated as cognition. And the third and aesthetic critique is about knowledge 
in this very broad sense. It is about feeling, hence affect in a way that the first 
critique cannot accommodate. It is subjective rather than objective. It is based 
in a sensus communis. At issue are not logical forms, but subjective, affective 
forms. The problem, it might be argued, comes only when Kant reabsorbs all of 
this into transcendence. Hence the sensus communis is a ‘promised community’, a 
transcendental community. It is, perhaps, its own form of double progression. 
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As practitioners, what we need to do is bring this into the empirical realm of sense 
and sensation. Thus our moment of reflection draws on these analogical forms, 
on our relationship of sensation and affect to these analogical forms, these dream 
images, these ideas and representations that work through both condensation and 
expansion. We are not here suggesting the concept of idea as complementary to 
that of sensation; we are dealing, instead, with ‘mental oscillation’ and ‘sensory 
harmonics’; with the movement of ideas and sensations towards difference. This is 
memory. It has to do with sensation and duration, it is constituted perhaps inevitably 
through (biological) rhythms of duration. To that internal reference memory is 
always there to decide how the body – or all bodies – will select images form the 
environment. But this is cognitive. It works in today’s capitalism through design 
– whether scientific or aesthetic – to produce difference. This difference is form 
as much as substance. It is technique rather than science or art. It takes place in 
laboratories and studios. In the new lab science becomes technique and research 
becomes research and development; the resultant form is patented as intellectual 
property. In the studio art becomes design. It is the principle of the information 
society: of cognitive capitalism in which labour is transmuted into life. In which 
labour productive of identity (as stasis) is mutated into life as (vital) productive of 
difference: live-space. The laboratory and the studio are spreading, as relay points of 
the flows giving the global information city its multiplicitous topography. The mould 
for all this – the intervention of form in substance – may have been set, for better or 
worse, by the architect.
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13 Michael Bell and Sze Tsung Leong, eds., Slow Space (New York: The Monacelli Press, 1998).
14 Bergson, Matter and Memory.
15 Walter Benjamin, ‘Some Motifs in Baudelaire’, in Charles Baudelaire, a Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism 
(London: Verso 1997).  
The original essay was written in 1939 in response to a critique by Theodor Adorno on Benjamin’s ‘The 
Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire’ completed the previous year. It is worth noting that in this essay, 
Benjamin, in classifying Bergson’s philosophy writes: ‘Since the end of the last century, philosophy has made 
a series of attempts to lay hold of the “true” experience as opposed to the kind that manifests itself in the 
standardized, denatured life of civilized masses. It is customary to classify these efforts under the heading of 
“philosophy of life” [Lebensphilosophie]’. 
16 In this chapter we will focus on Bergson’s Matter and Memory, however a comment on this point of a ‘monist’ 
as opposed to ‘dualist’ reading of Bergson’s work should be included. Bergson clearly works through dualist 
accounts within philosophy; but he does this not so that he can, in the end, maintain them or reframe them as 
oppositions within his own work. Nor does he work through dualisms in order to bring them together in what 
may be seen as a form of dialectic synthesis. Dualisms allow Bergson, as Deleuze puts it, to analyze (badly 
constructed) composites; and as mention in this chapter, his analytic precision is highly accomplished. With 
this, Bergson establishes a ‘directionality’ and ‘relationality’ of thought and experience through which his own 
work has developed original philosophical insights and arguments.
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17 On the point of the importance of the unity constituted by the word and in Bergson’s Matter and Memory, see 
Frédéric Worms, ‘Matter and Memory on Mind and Body: Final Statements and New Perspectives’, in The New 
Bergson, ed. John Mullarkey (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1999).
18 Walter Benjamin in his well-known essay ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ (1935), 
writes: ‘During long periods of history, the mode of human sense perception changes with humanity’s 
entire mode of existence. The manner in which human sense perception is organized, the medium in which 
it is accomplished, is determined not only by nature but by historical circumstances as well.’ The historical 
circumstances of the day, the technological advances underway had the power, as Benjamin suggests, to 
alter the very mode of human sense perception. In Time and Free Will Bergson, foreshadowing Benjamin, 
asks: ‘If, in order to count states of consciousness, we have to represent them symbolically in space, is it not 
likely that this symbolic representation will alter the normal conditions of inner perception?’ He continues: ‘In 
the same way, our projection of our psychic states into space in order to form a discrete multiplicity is likely 
to influence these states themselves and give them in reflective consciousness a new form, which immediate 
perception did not attribute to them.’ (p. 110).
19 For Bergson, the notion of matter (as that which we typically think of as having material form) is understood 
as ‘an aggregate of images’: ‘Image’, being understood as that which falls between the notions of 
representation (idealism) and the thing itself (realism). See: Matter and Memory, Chapter 1.
20 Bergson argues against what he sees as the errors of associationism at numerous points in Matter and 
Memory. His early debate with theories of association can be found in Time and Free Will: Essay on the 
Imnediate Data of Consciousness, in Chapter III, ‘The Organization of Conscious States: Free Will’, 162–63.
21 Deleuze, Bergsonism, 38.
22 Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. M. L. Andison (New York: Citadel 
Press, 1992), 28–31. In this section Bergson is implicitly making a statement against more traditionally 
Germanic phenomenological accounts, suggesting the ‘partial view’ of the ‘original situation’ to repetitive 
positionings of an ‘elementary phenomenon’. Further, with regard to the phenomenological argument that 
consciousness is a consciousness of something; Bergson retorts that consciousness is something.
23 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 36.         
The distinction between image and representation is highly nuanced in Bergson’s philosophy. The two 
terms are used interchangeably; at times, they are utilized to provide a distinction between matter itself and 
symbolic representations of matter. The ‘final work’ on what constitutes image has thus been a source of 
much debate with both protagonist and antagonist of his work. 
24 Bergson develops this argument in The Creative Mind, Chapter III, ‘The Possible and the Real’. 
25 Jean-Clet Martin, ‘Tarde: une nouvelle monadolgie’, Multitudes nr. 7 (2001): 186–92.
26 The notion of interval is utilized throughout much of Bergson’s work. It can be said for the sake of brevity 
that he develops it in primarily two directions: the first being related to the (non-measurable) space that 
remains between things once divided into a numeric (discrete) multiplicity (as developed in Time and Free 
Will); the second being related to his theory of action as it relates to consciousness (developed significantly 
in Matter and Memory). Here we are referring to this second aspect of the interval whereby Bergson discusses 
it as that in which man suspends reaction and inserts action, which he further refers to as the ‘decisive turn’ 
to the condition, as opposed to the state of experience.
27 Maurizio Lazzarato, ‘Immaterial Labour’, in Radical Thought In Italy: A Potential Politics, ed. [abbreviation of 
‘edited by’] Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
28 Architecture theory has often employed the term techne as a principle – whether in addition or opposition 
to episteme – in order to bring action (seen as engaged and industrious) into the heart of knowledge (seen 
as disinterested and introspective).  Labour and technique are tied in material production. Intellectual effort, 
commonly thought as immaterial, when considered as cognitive capital equally finds it force in substance and 
form.
29 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: The Free Press, 1979 
[1929]). See section II.
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2 A Cosmopolitan 
View on Thinking 
and Being-in- 
Common
The founding duality of the national outlook – foreigner-native – no longer 
adequately reflects reality. All methods of enquiry that operate with statistical 
concepts such as foreigner and native are unprepared for the realities of life 
in a world that is becoming increasingly transnational and involves plural 
attachments that transcend the boundaries of countries and nationality. 
(Beck, The Cosmopolitan Vision)1
This chapter takes up a socio-political problematic of inclusion and exclusion, or 
rather in this case, the domestic and the foreign as a condition of the cosmopolitan 
city. It will engage primary in commentary on Ulrich Beck’s book The Cosmopolitan 
Vision, and also seek to address a primary difficulty which arises within cosmopolitan 
discourse, namely that of the co-essence of individuals as others, as so profoundly 
expressed in Jean-Luc Nancy’s construction: Ego Sum = Ego Cum.2 While 
architecture and urbanism will be briefly addressed in relation to the city, inclusion 
and exclusion will not be developed based on the view which sees in architectural 
form or style (in the sense of vernacular versus international, for instance) a 
recourse to – say – the domestic understood as native and natural or recognizable 
as person or place, and the foreign understood as that which comes from elsewhere, 
thus belonging to someone/somewhere else. Simply, the ideas of inclusion and 
exclusion, which haunt the notions of the domestic and the foreign, will not be seen 
solely as the formally visible or invisible, and/or legible or illegible. Rather, they will 
encompass as well the manner in which an actor or agent is able to articulate their 
aspirations within the space of the city – in the sense of belonging-to as opposed to 
being excluded-from a society or community. Equally, the cosmopolitan city will not 
refer to the city as defined by size, scale, extension, scope, or the city as metropolis 
or otherwise capital city, global city, etcetera. The cosmopolitan city addressed here 
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will be about intensities and a disposition towards living in common. Or, calling upon 
the title of Nancy’s work, it will display an inclination towards the Being Singular 
Plural 3 of individuals and collectives as they form and transform the world.
Cosmos-Polis 
The ancient notion of the cosmopolitan (κοσμοπολίτης or kosmopolitês) – or 
‘citizen of the world’ – appears historically in various, and often diverse, forms.4 
The shifts in formulations have acted upon the very concepts of what constitutes 
the city in religious doctrine, political philosophy and, more recently, the social 
sciences. The Stoic philosophers were perhaps the first to offer a definitive 
philosophy of cosmopolitanism; this was followed by, among others, Roman, Judaic 
and Christian interpretations. The Dutch philosopher Desiderius Erasmus drew on 
ancient interpretations specifically in a plea for national and religious tolerance. 
Further, Kant’s writing on cosmopolitanism still acts as a fundamental source for 
contemporary interpretations.5 It is arguable that the modern vision of the city 
is rooted in the Enlightenment belief in a ‘good society’, that is, one founded in 
accord with Kantian (or neo-Kantian) cosmopolitanism. At its core, the principle 
of cosmopolitanism, which asserts that all human beings have the right to belong 
to a single community, continues to endure (of course, with various caveats and 
limitations). It is necessary to point out that any view of cosmopolitanism must 
accept the fact that it not only contains emancipatory principles, but establishes 
restrictions as well. Regarding cosmopolitanism as it is formulated in Enlightenment 
thinking, Jacques Derrida contends that the laws of cosmopolitanism are not 
restricted to ‘the conditions of universal hospitality’ only; for with Kant we can 
identify two limitations: first, the exclusion of hospitality from a right of residence in 
favour of the more limited right of visitation; secondly, by defining hospitality under 
the rule of the law, it is consigned to a condition dependent on state sovereignty.6 
In the contemporary notion of a ‘citizen of the world’, Derrida asks whether it is 
still possible to make an accurate distinction between the City and the State as the 
generally accepted forms of the metropolis. That leads us to one of the primary 
characteristics of cosmopolitanism, namely the possibility that the city should 
provide a place of refuge to anyone seeking asylum and that the cosmopolitan 
city, as such, has the obligation to provide hospitality: ‘offering hospitality to the 
foreigner, the immigrant, the exiled, the deported, the stateless or the displaced’.7
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Dichotomies and Modalities 
At the beginning of The Cosmopolitan Vision, Beck quickly draws a distinction 
between the terms globalization and cosmopolitanization. He defines globalization 
as primarily a one-dimensional economic condition in which the global market and 
its defence of neoliberal economic growth is understood in terms of the free-flow 
of capital, commodities and labour across national (or other such defined) borders. 
In contrast, he considers cosmopolitanization to be multi-dimensional, seeing it 
as a process that has ‘irreversibly changed the historical “nature” of social worlds 
and the standing of states in these worlds.’8 Suggesting that cosmopolitanization 
‘comprises the development of multiple loyalties as well as the increase in diverse 
transnational forms of life’, he points to the emergence of non-state political actors 
(from Amnesty International to the World Trade Organization), and the ‘development 
of global protest movements against (neo-liberal) globalism and in support of a 
different kind of (cosmopolitan) globalization.’9 It is worth pointing out that in 
Beck the term ‘cosmopolitanization’ can take two forms: the first being something 
that occurs ‘unconsciously’, its effects being generated passively as side effects of 
global trade or global threats. Yet, when he applies his own prefixes, for example 
‘scientific’, to cosmopolitanization, he is intending to suggest a methodological as 
opposed to merely theoretical approach to this phenomenon.10 What were earlier 
conceived as the primary oppositions upon which socio-political discourse was 
based (democracy vs. communism, capitalism vs. socialism, and so on) primarily 
denoted ideological differences in terms of political and economic position and 
policy; while contemporary conflicts include major cultural antagonisms and clashes 
of values between civilizations, ‘culture, identity and religious faith, which used to 
be subordinate to strategic political and military imperatives, now set the priorities 
on the international political agenda.’11  Beck suggests that we are witnessing an 
invasion of politics by culture. ‘Dividing lines between civilizations are mutating into 
threats to international stability and global order. The democratic values of the West 
and the premodern values of the Islamic world are confronting and colliding with 
one another in ever more menacing and hostile ways, both within nation-states and 
between different global regions.’12 Culture in this sense is invading politics. In other 
words, the aestheticizing of politics has become the rule for all political practice. We 
will return to this point just below in discussing matters commonly considered under 
the rubric of the postmodern.
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Offering a view of what a contemporary cosmopolitan vision might entail, Beck 
first distinguishes between what he calls the ‘philosophical’ (normative) and 
‘social scientific’ (analytical-empirical); subsequently, he proceeds to outline 
several existing models, or ‘social modalities’, which deal with the notion of 
cosmopolitanism. We believe it is important to add that Beck consistently offers a 
reading of these modalities which suggests that by their own internal dichotomies 
they have been prevented from addressing the reality of social and cultural difference 
in a positive manner. Let us briefly reiterate a few of these modalities:
Nationalism (or ‘methodological nationalism’), which has traditionally been based 
on the assertion that the nation-state is what defines a national society. As such it 
imposes a territorial model, or a self-containment model, by which, among other 
things, the nation-state both creates and grants both human and civil rights. Issues 
of morality, the area of human rights, for instance, have been taken as universal 
presuppositions. Yet, whether or not the nation-state generated and sustained the 
rights of the people, or the demands for rights by the people forced the foundation 
of the republic, both individual and collective rights were held (relatively) under the 
sovereignty of the nation-state. However, today it can be argued that human rights 
(universally) cross all national boundaries. Additionally, we would add that a moral 
(just or good) society does not develop merely on the basis of rights; it develops 
equally on the basis of obligation. Furthermore, that obligation addresses itself 
immediately to community, while rights address themselves directly to the individual. 
Today it appears that we are witnessing a disconnection taking place between the 
nation, the state, and society, which in previous times were held to be inextricable. 
Thus, to Derrida’s question, as cited above, the problem arises as to how it is now 
possible to distinguish within a concrete social context between foreigners and 
nationals, between citizens and noncitizens, between human rights and civil rights. A 
‘national outlook’ under these conditions must be sustained, as Beck argues, within 
a ‘territorial social ontology’ that goes to the heart of everyday life in domains (that 
were once) as diverse as politics and mass media.13 Beck further begs the question 
within a realistic cosmopolitanism: ‘How do “societies” deal with “difference” and 
“borders” under conditions of global interdependence crisis?’14 An issue we will 
return to shortly.
Universalism as a social modality presumes equality between all individuals. Yet, 
in its aspirations towards pure equality it levels differences by assuming a form of 
human and social similitude as well as applying a form of cultural homogeneity. Such 
a disposition can limit curiosity about what makes others different, and, by extension, 
can thwart deference to another’s individual or community values. Moreover, 
according to Beck, ‘the particularity of others is sacrificed to an assumed universal 
equality which denies its own origins and interests; universalism thereby becomes 
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duplicitous, leading to an excess of respect and hegemony, rationality and terror.’15 
Such a view, he argues, is dependent on the presumption of a national and an 
international territorial distinction – which, in principle, does not take into account 
the fact that the two are so interdependent that the first actually presupposes the 
second. In other words, there exists an internal fallacy within the universalist position 
in that it applies a particular set of (social) principles to the general (universal) 
society. Significant problems thus arise when we attempt to transfer (correlate or 
contrast) our own (nationalistic) understanding to another’s model. This can lead to 
a conflation of internal and external structures which can, respectively, be isolated in 
terms of spatial perspectives.
Relativism, for very similar reasons, stands no better to resisting hegemonic forces 
than does universalism. Its aspirations towards the recognition and subsequent 
acknowledgement of contextual (geographic, biological or cultural) difference, 
are conceptually plausible, but, in practice, it reverts to an incommensurability of 
perspectives which only furthers our ignorance. Beck, for his part, offers the notion 
of a realistic cosmopolitanism, one which is practiced ‘not in an exclusive manner but 
in an inclusive relation to universalism, contextualism, nationalism, transnationalism, 
etc.’16 He argues that it is precisely this particular combination of semantic elements 
which the cosmopolitan outlook shares with the universalistic, relativistic and 
national outlooks and which by the same token distinguishes it from these other 
approaches. Summarizing this in the following way: ‘the unintentional irony of the 
relativist incommensurability thesis is that it is almost indistinguishable from an 
essentialist world view.’17 On the other hand, contextualist universalism, in assuming 
the historical norm of cultural intermingling, presupposes that various forms of 
interventionism are inevitable. And this is also what is meant when we refer to our 
contemporary era as exhibiting the crisis of global interdependence. The crisis, as 
such, issues from what we might refer to as an ethics of tolerance (inclusionary 
in principle) which is confronted by an incommensurable practice of integration 
(exclusionary in actuality).
Beck further includes multiculturalism as a social modality. To our mind, however, 
multiculturalism as a mode of thinking has become all but irrelevant when it is 
utilized only to indicate diversity and as a strategy for dealing with difference. 
Yet it remains worth noting that under the terms of Beck’s ‘non-integrationist 
supposition’, multiculturalism, when conceived using the model of the nation, 
does not recognize the individual as such but only the fact of multiple nations.18 
Étienne Balibar suggests that political violence often leads us to the problems 
of multiculturalism, since it is based on the fact that certain linguistic, religious, 
geographical, and historical identities are not officially sanctioned as ‘legitimate 
mediations’ of (secondary) national identity. He writes: ‘we speak of exclusion in this 
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case because the logic of hegemony ought to be able to use all primary identities 
in order to integrate them into the national community, or to construct a “fictive 
ethnicity”’.19 This same line of thinking leads to misunderstandings of pluralism, 
or cultural plurality, which rely on either universal homogenization (the generic) or 
incommensurability of perspectives (particularism). The main point is that when 
culture is conceived as territorially circumscribed, then the question of plurality 
leads to a sterile and false alternative: either universal sameness (McDonaldization) 
or relativistic perspectives that resist comparison (incommensurability). Many of the 
claims made by so-called postmodernism seem to fall easily under similar modalities. 
In architecture, these two modalities were perhaps seen in the shift away from the 
immutable and the pure, towards plasticity and plurality. Here we might simply 
recall Robert Venturi’s counter pronouncement that ‘less is a bore’ in response to 
Ludwig Mies van der Rohe’s canonical statement ‘less is more’. This is, of course, 
something other and something more than merely a shift in style from what we often 
think of as the international to the postmodern. Beck discusses the relation between 
postmodernism and post-nationalism using terms such as: playful, satirical and 
ambivalent. We might add the term irony, since it has been so widely discussed in 
architecture. He notes the use of various styles, symbols, and concepts stemming 
from older historical cultures, writing: ‘this shallow cosmopolitanism of quotation 
and montage can indeed exploit the past to renew itself continually and try to pass 
it off as a fashionable invention. But is it widely thought that it cannot locate itself in 
history or dispel the basic fact that cultures and cultural imagination are historically 
specific and rooted, and hence territorial, phenomena.20
In this sense the question points to the importance of memory, specifically cultural 
memory. Yet, anyone who has studied objects of cultural production may well agree 
that within this now almost axiomatic critique of postmodernism lies at least one 
misconception; being that there is actually something new about eclecticism. Even 
in Western architecture’s earliest treatise we know that the engineer Vitruvius Pollio 
privileged both Roman exemplars and precedents from Greek architecture, primarily 
Hellenistic, extending his references to all of Asia Minor despite the existence of 
imbedded vernacular or indigenous examples of cultural and social expression 
found in relatively isolated situations; any socio-cultural formation that took place 
in the city incorporated a multiplicity of various influences and streams, thereby 
simultaneously incorporating and producing cultural memory. In fact, one might 
suggest that the so-called purity of the modern vision provides the exception and 
certainly not the historical rule. Modern art and architecture aspired to pass from the 
material to the immaterial, progressing from abstract expressionism and minimalism 
on its way to its own purification, its own erasure through self-effacement and 
self-actualization in conceptual art. Modern discourse had to move through Kant, 
absorb the sensorial in the sentient, move to the transcendental ideal or reject it 
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completely in its search for a new form of universal oneness. It had to get beyond 
the necessity of modes of representation – and so it did.  What Beck identifies as the 
problem of post-nationalism’s non-signification was already present in the modernist 
turn towards abstraction (in art, architecture, literature and theatre), which equally 
sought a universalist view of humanity. In this sense historical dislocatedness, so 
often attributed to postmodernism, took on its contemporary form long ago when, in 
philosophy’s grey on grey, as Hegel expressed it, the Owl of Minerva took flight.21
Beck’s observations on the postmodern sit dangerously close to what he identifies 
as ‘contextualist universalism’ (and from a social scientific view point this may well 
be the case).22 Nevertheless, while many social scientists, geographers, economists, 
and others, contribute meaningfully to various discourses on space, rarely do 
they discuss, as Kant describes, that which is above the surface of the globe. And 
whatever potential dangers of failure (or incommensurability) lurk within the manner 
in which different disciplines approach their understanding of cultural production, in 
my view, the point remains that if we are going to extend analysis to practice, then 
we must hope to grasp not only the methodological instants, but the movements that 
fluctuate and thereby elude our most rigorous analytic filters. Thus, going against 
the common logic which sees architecture and urbanism as a fixed and immutable 
field (on which the social is simultaneously enacted and indifferent), we should 
keep our minds open to the spacings, the intervals and the between-ness in which 
the city is a living and breathing participant.23 Furthermore, the crisis, mentioned 
just above – that is, the conflict between inclusionary principles (tolerance) and 
exclusionary practice (incommensurability) – is being enacted not only through 
reflexive but also through recapitulative productions of socio-political and spatio-
temporal knowledge and practice.24 Furthermore, the socio-political implications 
of the postmodern (post-national) view of cosmopolitanism require, for Beck, a 
realistic cosmopolitanism that can include the recognition of differences ‘beyond 
the misunderstandings of territoriality and homogenization.’25 In this respect, he 
reiterates that any thinking about difference that is theorized through boundary-
confirming categories such as ‘internationalism’ will find itself unduly restricted. The 
cosmopolitan view, by contrast, has the potential to transform international relations 
by ‘opening and redrawing boundaries, by transcending or reversing the polarity of 
the relations between us and them, and not least by rewriting the relation between 
the state, politics and the nation in cosmopolitan terms’.26 In other words, unlike the 
international outlook, the cosmopolitan outlook is capable of grasping the changes 
taking place within what Beck refers to as a social and political grammar. Moreover, 
and this is particularly important, he adds that through the process of integration 
‘the cosmopolitan outlook determines multiple spatial, temporal and practical both/
and realities to which the national perspective remains blind.’27
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Being in Common
At this point we can turn to what may be thought of as the temporal dimension of 
cosmopolitanism as opposed to the spatial dimension of globalization. The former 
is typically related to history (and, rightly or wrongly, memory); while the latter 
assumes a primary role in discussions within most fields dealing with (global) 
economy, sociology and urban geography, amongst others. This is the time of space. 
With respect to identity, it has been suggested that cosmopolitanization accepts 
multiple (plural) loyalties and nationalities. It is perhaps no accident that Beck here 
moves from the question or the challenge of the temporal (read here as memory), 
directly to that of identity. Worth noting, for instance, is his commentary on patriotic 
identity, while recalling the above reference to Balibar. When patriotic identity is 
seen as the only legitimate form of identity, there is generally a tendency to see 
ethnic conflicts as nothing more than tribal feuds. Suggesting that inhabitants of 
cosmopolitan modernity, by contrast, seek to overturn such categorical limitations, 
Beck states that they do not seek to avoid the conflicts that may arise out of 
conflicting identities. In fact, he contends, they know that it is precisely through 
this ‘overlapping and conflict with other identities’ that individuality itself becomes 
productive, arguing that each individual makes his/her own contribution to this 
process. At the same time, he adds that there are ‘certain forms of indifference and 
social distance which can also make a positive contribution to social integration.’28 
This leads to the idea that cosmopolitan society arises to the extent that national 
societies are split and disintegrate. Thus, cosmopolitanism derives great benefit from 
transnationalism, which offers a completely different view of borders and frontiers. 
For, as Beck observes, the cosmopolitan outlook ‘has its home in amazement, in 
the expanding in between, in which seemingly eternal certainties, borders and 
differentiations become blurred and effaced.’29 Here we find transecting identities, 
something we might think of in terms of multiplicities (rather than multitudes). 
But what becomes relevant is not merely the complexity suggested within the 
individual (as the construction of self), as if incorporated and multiple experiences 
and perspectives will, in and of themselves constitute cosmopolitanism. It is equally 
important to stress that the individual, or the trans-identity of self, is not restricted 
to, nor constructed within, multiple national identities alone. We will return to this 
below with Balibar’s reference to the transindividual.
Balibar offers another position regarding identity, arguing that ethnicity as a 
model of identification, though powerful thanks to the fact that it can combine 
cultural characteristics, always produces fictive elaborations founded on the basis 
of genealogies and religious or linguistic similarities. He further suggests that 
every individual must be understood as a ‘multiplicity of competing identities’; 
and every individual must confront the same problem: ‘how to proceed in order 
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to orient oneself – to “find oneself” – among one’s multiple personalities, with the 
help of others (who can be abstract or ideal others: memories, stories, symbols or 
institutional emblems, “maps” in the most general sense of the term).’30 We might 
return here to Beck’s notion concerning the interconnection between space and 
society; for the temporal dimension must be considered along with the spatial if we 
are not to be led to some form of ‘ahistorical reification’, or one-dimensional view. 
Such a reductive, entirely spatial view ‘exhausts itself in its concentration on the 
pluralization and interpenetration of   boundary-constructions.’31 What Beck will then 
refer to as a ‘deeper real-cosmopolitanism’, is one which ‘alerts us to the empirical-
analytical and the normative questions produced by the cosmopolitanization of 
society and politics, of history and memory in the temporal dimension.’32
Yet, here, too, we find a distinct overtone with regard to the political dimension of 
memory. In this sense the global has no memory, as Beck asks: ‘how does globality 
get refracted historically in the non-simultaneity of concurrent cultural situations 
and self-definitions? …. the present is colonizing the future and the past.’33 The 
city that is extended in only the spatial dimension, has no access to memory, to 
time. ‘It is conceived as the expansion of loyalties, identities, obligations and rights. 
The cosmopolitan outlook trapped in the metaphysics of the eternal, turbulent, 
catastrophic present remains restricted.’34 Beck is here introducing the problem of 
the instant; that which in other terms can be understood as the spatialization of time, 
that which replaces the flow of the continuous (belonging to human experience) with 
the frozen frame of the discrete (belonging to social scientific and socio-political 
analysis). To get at the problem of the individual beyond the frame of trans-national 
constructions of identity, it may be helpful to turn to the ideas of Jean-Luc Nancy in 
order to address the relation between the individual and the collective, or what was 
referred to above, citing Beck, as the relations between us and them. For behind the 
‘I’, indeed perhaps in front of it, as Nancy has argued convincingly, is the ‘we’:
The one/the other is neither “by,” nor “for,” nor “in,” nor “despite,” but rather 
“with.” This “with” is at once both more and less than “relation” or “bond,” 
especially if such relation or bond presupposes the preexistence of the terms upon 
which it relies . . .  “With” is the sharing of time-space; it is the at-the-same-time- 
in-the-same-place as itself, in itself, shattered. It is the instant scaling back of 
the principle of identity: Being is at the same time in the same place only on the 
condition of the spacing of an indefinite plurality of singularities.35
Being ‘together’, in this sense goes to the heart of simultaneity, to the sharing of 
time and space without the reduction to the instant, or the instantaneity of pure 
succession. To quote Nancy: ‘same time/same place assumes that “subjects”, to call 
them that, share the space-time, but not in the extrinsic sense of “sharing”; they 
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must share it between themselves; they must themselves “symbolize” it as the “same 
space-time” without which there would not be time or space.’36 This position not only 
treats time and space as philosophical abstractions but also as concrete practices 
that include the ‘distinctness of place’; continuing with the previous citation, we 
note that ‘the passage from one place to another needs time [du lieu à l’autre, il 
faut le temps]. And moving in place [du lieu à lui-même] as such also needs time: 
the time for the place to open itself as place, the time to space itself.’37 We would 
like to suggest here that it is also the notion of a ‘we’ that has falsely generated 
the idea of the ‘other’ (found in Enlightenment, post-colonial and psychological 
theories of self, the self-same, and the other, which includes Erasmus’s concept of 
tolerance). In other words, concepts of both individualism and collectivism, which 
utilize denotations (and dualities) such as the foreign and the domestic, are simply 
inadequate to reflect our daily realities. 
Returning to the above challenge to memory, and against the absence of a collective 
memory, Beck argues that the global might well be in the process of producing 
a collective future. Or it would be if we take seriously the ‘world-threat’ and the 
‘self-endangerment’ of civilization together with the possibility of imagining a 
‘transnationally shared past which takes on concrete form in the dialectic of 
memory and forgiveness.’38 It should be argued, as well, that this concrete form 
is acted out in place, in community itself, and that we must be willing to examine 
the concrete as signifying what Nancy refers to as ‘the real object of a thinking 
of being-in-common.’39 To proceed further in this vein we must also be able to 
distinguish between our consciousness of and practice of cosmopolitanism. In this 
connection, Beck argues that while we may be witnessing a shared global awareness 
of a collective future, there is, in fact, no current set of practices which corresponds 
to this awareness. Of course, many might take issue with this, for instance 
environmental awareness (our systematic destruction of the globe has for some 
decades now been on the agenda of architects and urbanists). However, here Beck 
is attempting to open up a perspective that, even in his view, does not yet surpass 
theoretical constructs. In fact, we see in his work a constant opposition to the kind of 
analysis that takes globalization as ‘the’ reality through which social research should 
advance. Nevertheless, Beck continues to provide models of thought that allow us 
to gain a deeper understanding of cosmopolitanism. For instance, he argues that 
a monological imaginary is found at the core of the nation-state’s nationalistically 
centred image of self (domestic) and other (foreign); and that this can only result in 
the manifestation of exclusionary practices. He offers a counter-position in the form 
of what he refers to as a dialogical imaginary of the internalized other. Introducing 
Nietzsche’s observation that modernity was engaged in an age of comparison, Beck 
subsequently interprets Nietzsche within the framework of the cosmopolitan, writing 
that what was important was the latter’s recognition that cultures had begun to 
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‘interpenetrate’, producing a changing of perspectives whereby ‘the cosmopolitan 
worldview becomes an imagining of alternative paths within and between different 
cultures and modernities’.40
Following Dominique Schnapper, Balibar offers a similar distinction between 
substantialism and formalism.41 The former is based in the citizen’s participation in 
‘a single traditional culture, a single language, or ethnic heritage, inaccessible to all 
those who have not inherited them by birth or been entirely assimilated into them’; 
and, in the latter case, ‘citizenship would stem entirely from individual adherence 
to certain moral values (the rights of man), from the respect of certain juridical 
(constitutional) rules, and from the “contract” implicit in republican institutions.’42 
Balibar further suggests that the nation must escape from forms of exclusionary 
(nationalistic) practice while simultaneously creating what amounts to a singular 
identity. In thinking the nature of democracy – as it extends beyond the traditional 
boundaries of the nation seen as a self-sustaining and independent body – Habermas 
in Postnational Constellation uses the term ‘humanity’ to describe a normative model 
of community that is truly inclusionary, where exclusion is, in fact, impossible.43 In 
other words, the nation must work both to integrate and welcome the non-national 
(foreigner) and to engender a sense of belonging that is experienced in common and 
transmitted from generation to generation.44 Yet this bringing forth of belonging 
occurs both at the level of thought and at that of action, as mentioned several times 
now: with rights come obligations. Obligations and rights become acted and enacted 
not only in our minds, our homes, and our neighbourhoods (our institutions); they 
are transcribed within the very dynamics of our cities as well. The city is not simply 
the passive frame, the background upon which our interconnected lives play out. Nor, 
as Nancy argues, is the city primarily community; nor is it simply public space:
The city is at least as much the bringing to light of being-in-common as the 
disposition (dispersal and disparity) of the community represented as founded in 
interiority or transcendence. It is “community” without common origin. That being 
the case, and as long as philosophy is an appeal to the origin, the city, far from 
being philosophy’s subject or space, is its problem. Or else, it is its subject or space 
in the mode of being its problem, its aporia . . .  philosophy is the problem of the city; 
philosophy covers over the subject that is expected as “community”.45
The problem of the city also includes our aspirations towards an open society, 
one in which the cosmopolitan view can live. To realize such a dis-position it is 
necessary to think through the question of who, in fact, might be the ‘we’ within a 
complex society (of domestic and foreign inhabitants). In other words, the ‘us’ and 
‘them’ of the domestic and the foreign as a category of distinction which aligns 
oppositional fields of interest in the form of both knowledge and practice, must be 
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abandoned in order to make way for inclusionary as opposed to implicit exclusionary 
practices. Accordingly, we must discuss relations of people to people and not only 
those of states to states. Simply, issues of identity (as shared articulations) are not 
represented but practised – inclusion/exclusion at the levels that are the subtlest 
and most difficult to discern; they generate urban patterns of practice and habits of 
movement and encounters that remain unarticulated in most urban or architectural 
analysis. In agreement with Nancy, our task is to ‘understand how history – as a 
singular, Western accident – “became” what one might call “global” or “planetary” 
without, at the same time, engendering itself as “universal”.’46 But here we must 
accommodate, as discussed above, a different sense of the universal. Not as it is 
applied to society as such but as it speaks to the nature of the individual and, even 
more importantly, of the individual in community with other individuals. Using the 
framework outlined above, Beck deepens his analysis of the ‘cosmopolitan real’ by 
developing a concept, or modality, of ‘interconnectedness’, understood, of course, 
from a social-scientific point of view.47 Utilizing Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of 
liquid modernity48 – in light of concepts developed under the terms of flows and 
networks (whether economic, cultural and/or social) or imaginary communities 
– Beck explores the difficulties in sustaining a model dependent on axiomatic 
notions of a closed society.  Employing the metaphor of liquidity he suggests that 
cosmopolitanism should examine and explore ‘the boundary-transcending and 
boundary-effacing multiperspectivalism’ of social actors and political agents through 
new theoretical and analytical filters.  Beck writes: 
The cosmopolitanization approach differs fundamentally from the afore-mentioned 
approaches to the empirical investigation of globalization in that (a) it distinguishes 
systematically between the perspective of social actors and that of social scientific 
observers: (b) it replaces the opposition between national either/or “streams,” 
“networks” and “scapes” with a both/and typology (transnational, translocal, 
global-local, global-national, etc.); and (c) it inquires into the congruence or lack 
of congruence between actor and observer perspectives, and thereby highlights 
discrepancies among the options open to social and political actors and institutions, 
on the one hand, and social scientific approaches and perspectives, on the other, 
and traces their implications for concepts and theories in the social sciences.49 
We take this to include architectural and urban practices of both the actors (the 
designers, planners and so on) and the agents (the performers, transformers, 
interpreters, transcribers) of spatial and temporal enunciations (perhaps 
‘expressions’ in Beck’s terms). In fact, nothing is to be gained by continuing to 
separate the (concrete) problems of the city as seen from the perspective of urban 
researchers from the conditions formulated in (abstract) theories propounded in 
numerous spatial- and/or spatio-temporal discourses – a separation rooted in long 
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held antagonisms. Nevertheless, Beck also poses a similar set of problems, asking 
such questions as, ‘Does public space emerge in which seemingly sharp oppositions 
between “us and them” become blurred and a conflictual and cooperative culture of 
transnational openness and reconfiguration of the local arises?’50
Perhaps we can get at this further by turning to the theory of assemblage. Let us 
provisionally accept the theory that the global or the local do not exist as such but, 
instead, are made at every moment within language and through various social-
political-economic-spatial/temporal practices. Further, that it is impossible to 
address such concerns independently of a position on the status of the individual 
and the collective. We can interpret this term collective in a broad sense – also as 
community or citizenship – as long as we understand by this that which provides a 
sense of belonging. On this point Balibar offers the following assessment with regard 
to the individual: every identity as such is transindividual. This breaks from ideas for 
models that see collective identity as organically or culturally driven (‘organicist / 
culturalist’), or social psychological theories used to represent national characters 
and group identities. ‘But neither does anything allow us to think that the individual 
“self” constitutes an autonomous and self-sufficient reality whose identity could be 
formed independently of social processes and a collective imaginary’.51 Collective 
identity is not in this sense a given, nor a metaphysical condition of agency. ‘It is 
certainly not a mythical image that could be forcefully imposed upon reality by 
inventing this or that historical criterion . . .  It is a quality of collective agency, which 
changes form and content in time, as new agents come into play and new solidarities 
are built among those who, not long ago, were ignoring or fighting each other.’52 
Where Balibar discusses agency, we would add Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of 
assemblage to describe the dynamic qualities of a body (individual) in relations of 
exteriority with other bodies (transindividual). These ‘constellations’ incorporate the 
properties of the imaginative (collective and individual) and contingent codifications 
resulting in the process of territorialization; both in turn and co-temporally, the 
processes of deterritorialization, and reterritorialization continue as, respectively, the 
disarticulation and rearticulation of assemblages are formed.53
We should question if it is even possible to think any generic notion of the common. 
Balibar asks: ‘Can difference and sharing, conflict and the general interest be 
thought together?’54 Of course on this point Beck appears to remain clear with 
regard to what he calls the cosmopolitan sensibility, as this sensibility and capability 
arise from the clash within one’s own life as it encounters what amounts to cultural 
collisions at the heart of everyday experience. ‘The cosmopolitan constellation 
qua domain of experience and horizon of expectations means the internalization 
of difference, the co-presence and coexistence of rival lifestyles, contradictory 
certainties in the experiential space of individuals and societies.’55 Here he situates 
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the ‘dialogical imagination’ in both quotidian and scientific experience. ‘This involves 
two things: on the one hand, situating and relativizing one’s own form of life within 
other horizons of possibility; on the other, the capacity to see oneself from the 
perspective of cultural others and to give this practical effect in one’s own experience 
through the exercise of boundary-transcending imagination.’56 This very idea of 
transcending boundaries through the faculty of imagination is, in fact, precisely what 
is needed in both the analytic and intuitive thinking about architecture and urban 
theories and practices.
In the end, perhaps Beck’s cosmopolitan vision relies too heavily upon the self-
realization of individuals to both critically reframe their own openness to the world 
and willingly act within a new cosmopolitan sensibility. This leap of faith, or rather, 
the leap to the belief in the individual’s ability to place themselves in an open 
disposition towards others must equally be understood as a positioning of the ‘with’. 
While it would be naive to ignore the fact that within any exchange of ideas – the 
clash of cultures, even within one’s own life perspective – there is also an exchange 
of power; power acting upon power which remains inherent in any form of socio-
political and spatio-temporal practice.  Foucault, in an interview with Paul Rabinow, 
was pressed to take a position as to whether architecture as a practice could claim 
to exert the power of space. Foucault concluded it could not, because ‘the three 
great variables – territory, communication, and speed … escape the domain of 
architects.’57 Today, with the double progression of body and brain expanding bio-
politics to noo-politics, we believe this conclusion no longer holds. 
Thus, to turn the idea of cosmopolitanism into that of an active disposition, a 
practice, we not only need new forms of research and thinking (as Beck argues); 
it will also be necessary to open this discourse in two directions. To a political 
problematic that is receptive to philosophical discourse on the self and other; and, 
secondly, it will be necessary to invent modalities for conceiving this perspective in a 
way that critically considers the physical environment within which both conflicts and 
confrontations and ‘being-in-common’ take place. 
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A first version of this chapter has appeared under the same title in: The Domestic and the Foreign in 
Architecture, eds. Sang Lee and Ruth Baumeister (Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 2007).
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3 On the Virtual and 
Lefebvre’s Urban 
Problematic
We apply the term subjective to what seems to be completely and adequately known, 
and the term objective to what is known in such a way that a constantly increasing 
number of new impressions could be substituted for the idea which we actually have 
of it … but there is no change in the general appearance of a body, however it is 
analysed by thought, because these different analyses, and an infinity of others, 
are already visible in the mental image which we form of the body, though they are 
not realized: this actual and not merely virtual perception of subdivisions in what is 
undivided is just what we call objectivity … and space is accordingly, the material 
with which the mind builds up number, the medium in which the mind places it. 
(Bergson, Time and Free Will)1 
This chapter is an exploration of the notion of the virtual and the problem of 
conceiving the city with reference to the difficulties encountered in urban theory 
when, whether by analysis or design, we attempt to fix or stabilize our findings and 
projections onto the surface of the city. Of course, the surface itself, mapped with 
spatial properties and qualities, is by its nature the very problem to be addressed 
utilizing the notion of the virtual. This problem is well understood; even so, the ways 
in which we search for the forces and factors transforming our cities and our societies 
are still being explored. The traditional ‘empirical method’ is no longer adequate 
to the aims of understanding dynamic and emergent processes. We now advance 
with much more radical and ex-centric empiricisms, developing our means and our 
concepts as we go. Borrowing from Bruno Latour we might simply say that our work 
has shifted from ‘matters of fact’ to ‘matters of concern’;2 no doubt a horrifying 
thought for many. But this freedom to search does not come free of the responsibility 
to communicate, to challenge and to be challenged, to discover and define the limits 
and thresholds within both the theoretical and practical concepts by which we claim 
to advance knowledge and substantiate actions. It is our position that the notion 
of the virtual (and/or concepts under its broader rubric) is required to suspend the 
hypostatizing process of design and to intensify intuition as well as imagination.3 
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To explore this contemporary urban condition through theories of the virtual using 
both sociological and philosophical perspectives, we start with the work of Henri 
Lefebvre. This chapter will focus on a small but concentrated work of Lefebvre: 
The Urban Revolution of 1970.4 This book is commonly understood as Lefebvre’s 
response to the social uprisings of 1968 as seen from the point of view of what he 
defines concisely as the ‘urban problematic’.5 However, the questions and concerns 
posed in this work are not be limited by a single historical circumstance, they belong 
more broadly to the history of intellectual debate that, while it may be thought to 
have emerged in the sixties, belonged to a moment that both preceded and followed 
it.6 This belongs to a period and an episteme (Foucault) struck by the richness 
and complexity of thinking that sought to transcend disciplinary boundaries. Thus, 
to elaborate through a double reading a set of concerns for this analysis, we will 
pay particular attention to the work of Michel Foucault and, more particularly, 
to Deleuze’s reading of Foucault. We have chosen to situate this work with these 
thinkers notwithstanding Lefebvre’s explicit rejection of Foucault. For those 
unfamiliar, suffice it to say that in Lefebvre’s view, Foucault’s work on knowledge 
privileged the theories of knowledge (savoir) at the expense of knowledge produced 
by the subject (connaissance), and his work on power privileged analysis over 
practice and left little room for individual agency as regards the production of the 
social-spatial.7 In other words, for Lefebvre, Foucault was just too systematic and 
his explanations of history too conservative. Further, his insistence on the text (or 
articulation as will be discussed below) as the primary locus of knowledge was seen 
as a denial of the importance of the philosophical concept as a point with which to 
begin any theory of social signification. Contrary to this, it could equally be said that 
Foucault’s insistence on examining the localizable, or the specific over the general or 
global, allowed for a well-defined analysis of the invisible or hidden (virtual) forces, 
both determined and determining, that constitute our social and, for Lefebvre, our 
urban reality. Of course, resolving these issues is not the problem set forth in this 
chapter. Nor is it our intention to place Lefebvre and Foucault in opposition. Instead, 
it is our position that Lefebvre’s passion, his vision, and Foucault’s precision, his 
historian’s gaze, form a powerful alliance, and we will be utilizing aspects of their 
early work to begin by looking back, in order to open onto a view of the urban 
problématique today. 
Movements and Orientations
Henri Lefebvre opens The Urban Revolution with the following hypothesis: ‘Society 
has been completely urbanized.’ He then provides the following definition: An 
urban society is one which ‘results from a process of complete urbanization. This 
urbanization is virtual today, but will become real in the future’.8 These first few 
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lines immediately introduce two key concepts that Lefebvre will work with (and 
against) in this book: first, the very expression ‘urban society’ by which we will look 
at its qualities and what it signifies, as well as question how it acts.9 And second, 
the inclusion of the notion of the ‘virtual’ in the opening sentences of the book 
is considered as an opening to of the central problematic of this work. With the 
above definition of ‘urban society’, Lefebvre sets out to clarify certain ambiguities 
that might exist around this term. Ambiguities, he argues, arise when the term is 
used too generally, in reference to a city or urban agglomeration, for instance. 
Generalizations cause the social relationships unique to an individual formation, or 
a specific type of urban production, to go unobserved. In other words, by using the 
term ‘urban society’ without understanding that it is characterized by process over 
product, we are in danger of making comparisons between things, or states, which 
have nothing in common. In the chapter ‘The Right to the City’, Lefebvre expresses 
these relationships succinctly: he uses the term ‘generalities’ to denote a too broad 
or totalizing view, ‘particularities’ to denote that which we believe differentiates one 
entity from others, but he also includes the term ‘singularities’ to denote ‘the ways 
of living of the city, more properly understood as to inhabit’.10 This comment, on 
what might commonly be referred to as the general and the particular, alerts us to 
a complexity suffused throughout the book. For instance, we will find him asserting 
theories of the global while equally insisting on a focus that is local. He will claim, 
for instance, that the ‘urban problematic’ must be understood as a (virtual) object, 
global in reach, while simultaneously reminding us that it is necessary for any 
methodological study to look carefully at the specificities of the object at hand.11 
Although these as well as other terminological distinctions often seem to conflict, 
Lefebvre has little trouble resolving them. However, these reconciliations do not 
derive from precise or conclusive definitions, but are situated squarely within his 
theoretical approach to concepts.12 
As a result of ignoring the specificities of urban societies, Lefebvre suggests, the 
following ideologies emerge: organicism, continuism, and evolutionism; the first 
being characterized by its belief in an organic ‘whole’, the second by that of historical 
continuity and the third by different periods whereby the social relations, during their 
transformations, actually disappear.13 Extending the definition of the term ‘urban 
society’, Lefebvre writes: it is ‘that which results from industrialization as a process 
of domination that absorbs agricultural production. This urban society cannot take 
shape conceptually until the end of a process during which the old urban forms, 
the end result of a series of discontinuous transformations, burst apart.’14 Thus 
far, it all seems very concise. A process that absorbs product is something other 
than evolutionism, which leaves one product behind by selecting another; and the 
emphasis on the discontinuous within the transformative refutes the ideology of 
continuism. On the ideology of organicism however, the rebuttal is not so direct. 
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We will return to this shortly, but suffice it to say that the very notion of an ‘organic 
whole’, which can be seen in its entirety and thus studied as a model, is contrary to 
the notion of the virtual or the possible object which is understood as a central thesis 
in this work. 
In Lefebvre, the term ‘urban society’ should be understood in place of the more 
common designation of ‘post-industrial society’. Although he accepts that there 
is both ‘empirical and conceptual truth as well as an element of exaggeration and 
extrapolation’ in many of the appellations applied to what is commonly understood 
as the post-industrial era (that is, technological, consumer or leisure society), 
he believes that with the term ‘urban society’ he can open understanding of the 
contemporary urban condition to such things as its ‘tendencies, orientations, and 
virtualities’, which he posits against the idea that urban society might be understood 
as being composed of any existing or ‘preordained reality’.15  
Why though is it necessary for Lefebvre to give a new name to this period, this 
condition? Does he believe that given his original hypothesis, the term ‘urban 
society’ offers a more accurate description of this ‘society which cannot take shape 
conceptually until the old urban forms break apart’? Brian Massumi, in discussing 
the concept of the ‘singular expression’ in Deleuze and Guattari, refers to the 
propositional model of language as characterized by what they have referred to as 
‘a three-sleeved strait-jacket on expression’s movement: designation, manifestation, 
and signification; the particular, the personal, and the general’.16 In Deleuze and 
Guattari, among others, it has been argued that the moment an individual movement 
(personal or collective expression) has been articulated as such, it is vulnerable 
to absorption or capture by structured ideologies, regulating bodies or hegemonic 
powers.17 In other words, the fluid, the emergent, quickly become stratified. 
To put it rather brutally, that which is named is easily commodified.18 However, 
Massumi offers a further consideration: if an expression can resist appropriation 
by an established power, ‘insisting on defining its own traits, in a self-capture 
of its own anomaly, [it] will retain a shade of the unclassifiable and a margin of 
unpredictability’, the expression will appear as what it is: ‘a multiplicity in flux, an 
expressive “movement” or “orientation” still under formation’.’19  
Lefebvre writes that his hypothesis (involving the social sciences) is based on an 
‘epistemological and methodological’ approach.20 Here he states that knowledge is 
‘not necessarily a copy or reflection, a simulacrum or simulation of an object that is 
already real’ nor, he claims, is it necessary for knowledge to ‘construct its object’ for 
the sake of a theory – what he refers to as ‘a theory of the object or its models’.19 
Nevertheless, Lefebvre does not leave off with merely an approach to the object but 
provides a theoretical hypothesis, as he puts it so succinctly: ‘the object is included 
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in the hypothesis; the hypothesis comprehends the object’.21 And it is by the use of 
this proposition that Lefebvre reconciles many otherwise incongruent terminologies 
and claims. Qualifying the terms of the hypothesis: ‘Even though this “object” is 
located outside any (empirical) fact, it is not fictional. We can assume the existence 
of a virtual object, urban society; that is, a possible object, whose growth and 
development can be analysed in relation to a process and praxis.’22  
Lefebvre is here setting up a position by which he will claim that the future as such, 
the virtual, of urban society does not preclude an epistemological account.  However, 
Lefebvre’s claim alone is not adequate to address an epistemology of the not yet 
real. While theories of knowledge occupy an entire area of philosophical discourse, 
we will here turn to the historian/philosopher who developed an enormously 
influential epistemological theory in order to elaborate the issue. In Foucault’s work 
on the subject of knowledge we are reminded that nothing exists prior to knowledge. 
He employs the term épistème to denote an intellectual era and the prevailing 
epistemology by which any such era is given systematic formulation. But in a more 
familiar parlance he also refers to ‘an age’ in order to point to a particular period as 
identified by a set of historically determined conditions; these can be understood 
as ‘historical strata’, and the knowledge that constitutes a given age necessarily 
pre-exists its enunciation.23 To state it otherwise: an age cannot occur or pre-exist 
the statements and visibilities that determine its discourse. He claims that our very 
facility to see (visualize) or to speak (articulate) is contained in our ability to know 
of those things which are visible and sayable. Deleuze writes that with Foucault, 
knowledge is defined by ‘the combinations of visible and articulable that are unique 
to each historical formulation’; and as such, ‘knowledge is a practical assemblage, a 
mechanism of statements and visibilities’.24 With this the distance between Lefebvre 
and Foucault appears irreconcilable. For how, if nothing exists prior to knowledge, 
can knowledge in its turn be other than a copy of that which is already ‘real’? 
However, and importantly, Foucault further provides that in their turn, non-discursive 
(vision) and discursive (speech) practices also inform, and thus transform, the 
forms of expression and the images by which we advance towards a future. For there 
is always a flowing, a folding of one form into another, a crossing and passing of 
statements and visibilities, which spontaneously cease to exist at the very moment 
they come into being. In other words, knowledge exists, though it is by virtue of this 
existence neither necessarily nor always real (and by this is meant realized).
Provisionally accepting Lefebvre’s position towards knowledge, we might understand 
this as an epistemology which accepts the futurity of this ‘not yet real’ (or this not 
yet arrived) of ‘urban society’. But how exactly are we to understand growth and 
development as not belonging to the ‘ideology of organicism’ (as warned against 
earlier)? He does place these unities in (analytical) relation to process, but we 
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should question whether this is sufficient to provide reconciliation to these otherwise 
incongruent terms as such, set within the futurity of the virtual/possible object, 
contained in a ‘non-fictional yet non-factual’ empiricism. Lefebvre is here attempting 
to explain his theoretic (to my mind speculative, whereas to his methodological) 
with an epistemological approach, as the ‘empirical’ by definition is precluded, or, at 
least, deferred, and understood, as he will express shortly, as that which flees before 
our grasp. 
Let us conclude this section with the observation that it here appears that Lefebvre 
is attempting to resolve the non-predictability of the current situation, without giving 
up claims to the possibility of analytic precision.25 To which we will suggest that 
the distance between what ‘exists’ and what is ‘real’ is precisely the distance that 
separates what can be known from what is, in other words we might imagine that 
Lefebvre, while making theoretical claims to epistemology, is, in fact, opening up an 
urban ontology.26   
The Virtual as the Possible Real
In their book A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari developed their theory 
of assemblage which they applied to, among other things, society and social 
formations. The idea includes the observation that society is not, nor has it ever 
been, based on a stable ontology (either ideological or material). They posit a 
conceptual difference between two terms: ‘limit’ and ‘threshold’. The former being 
that which designates the penultimate, marking a necessary re-beginning, and the 
latter the ultimate, marking an inevitable change.27 At issue here is the condition of 
mutation and change, more precisely, the problem of the discrete and the continuous 
or the actual and virtual. Assemblages resist an organismic approach that seeks to 
understand the social as an inextricably linked combination of interrelated parts. 
Instead, the assemblage conceptualizes relations as contingent as opposed to 
necessary and thus fundamentally indeterminate as opposed to probabilistic. 
Lefebvre, referring to what he will later describe as the ‘theory of complexification’ 
(whereby social phenomena have progressively acquired greater complexity), 
discusses the problem of the theory/praxis axis. Arguing that the expression ‘urban 
society’ should not be understood as merely a pedagogical or rhetorical device, 
but one which, as we have already suggested, decisively compels, as he puts it, 
‘its own theoretical position’. However, as we might expect, he goes on to suggest 
that this theoretic must also move toward the ‘concrete’, leading to a properly 
‘urban practice’. Simply put, Lefebvre’s concrete must here be understood as social 
practice.28 Nevertheless, in order to enter this domain of the concrete we must recall 
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that here we will not find a precise, or empirically supportable, set of conditions 
(facts) by which we can derive what he refers to as this new ‘urban reality’, or 
product, so to speak.29 The development of such a theory, he argues, asks for 
research into the virtual object, and understanding (and defining) this object must 
be seen as part of a continuous project.30 We will have reason to return several 
times to this idea of the possible, the futurity held within, if not yet projected by, this 
new urban reality as such. But for now, we should simply recognize that it is within 
this process of asserting the theoretical necessity which the ‘urban society’ itself 
compels, that we are now addressing not only the meaning or the signification of this 
term – the what it is – but more importantly we are beginning to reveal its function – 
the how it acts – within this discourse on ‘urban society’ whether virtual or actual. 
To further support his theoretical hypothesis, Lefebvre draws on a concept referred 
to as ‘transduction’, succinctly defined as ‘an intellectual approach toward a possible 
object’.31 In Writings on Cities, Lefebvre argues that transduction ‘elaborates and 
constructs a theoretical object, a possible object from information related to reality 
… [it] assumes an incessant feedback between conceptual, the framework used, and 
empirical observations’ (insisting on defining its own traits, in a self-capture). Its 
theory … gives shape to certain spontaneous mental operations of the planner, the 
architect, the sociologist, the politician and the philosopher.’32 Lefebvre draws on 
an example with the expression ‘urban revolution’, explaining that the term refers to 
processes of transformation. Transformations, he suggests, are sometimes abrupt 
and at other times they are gradual, planned and determined. He further provides 
with ‘urban revolution’ the condition that the term does not refer to actions that are 
violent – the moment of revolution per se – however, nor is violence excluded.33 He 
asks: ‘But how do we discriminate between the outcome of violent action and the 
product of rational action before their occurrence? Isn’t thought characterized by 
the effort to reduce violence, beginning with the effort to destroy the chains that 
bind our thoughts?’34 Foucault has no need to vacillate on this point, as he writes: 
‘Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at 
universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs 
each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to 
domination’.35  
In the chapter sketching the history of development ‘From the City to Urban 
Society’, Lefebvre argues that what we see when attempting to identify urban society 
is the effect of process, hereby equated to urban reality itself. Subsequently he 
situates this as the new and pressing problématique urbaine, positing ‘if an urban 
reality manifests itself and becomes dominant, it does so only through the urban 
problematic’.36 The significance of the term problematic as it is used here imparts 
a critical position. The term provides for a double inference; first, the problematic 
TOC
 58 Architecture  and the Time  of Space
provides for a set of questions to which the theory must address answers, and 
secondly, it acts as the conceptual frame by which the questions derive their 
significance.37 Foucault, too, recognized the importance of ‘problematizations’, 
linking them to ‘the development of a domain of acts, practices and thoughts’.38 
Lefebvre precisely follows on this point by articulating a series of questions; 
culminating in one of particular bearing here; he asks: ‘can we achieve significant 
progress in theory and practice so that our consciousness can comprehend a reality 
that overflows it and a possible that flees before its grasp?’39 With this question 
we are led back to the problem of the possible and its relation to the actual, or, as 
he characterizes it, the ‘real’. Suggesting that we should not forget that even at its 
inception, urban society and its modalities and processes retained characteristics 
already determined under the rubrics of industrialization; but furthermore, even 
with the term ‘industrialization’ we must recognize multiple and different modes of 
processes and practices as they are associated with conditions which emerge and 
become part of the problematic of the urban phenomenon. And with this we see 
the appearance of a new and, as Lefebvre refers to it, abbreviated form of ‘urban 
society’, with this second appellation: ‘the urban’.40
‘The urban’ was already utilized as a signifying (as opposed to descriptive) term in 
‘The Right to the City’. There he used the term primarily in italics – the urban. With 
few exceptions, in the The Urban Revolution he removes this emphasis, indicating 
that the function of the term has shifted in relation to the problematic as posed in 
each of these works. This brings us back to the strategy of naming and gives us 
opportunity to pick up where we left off above in discussing both its significance 
and purpose. With the addition of a definite article, he converts an adjective – urban 
(society) – into a noun – (the) urban, providing for a rotation from the descriptive 
to the substantive. Clearly the noun ‘urbanity’, was not adequate to his aim. This 
is certainly something other than a philological sleight of hand; and, as he argued 
already with the use of the term ‘urban society’, it is much more than a mere 
pedagogical device. We noted earlier that he applied the term ‘urban society’ to 
the current state of affairs (global in reach), in place of the more commonly used 
term ‘post-industrial society’. Further, that this term should be used in place of 
other designations such as ‘the technological society’, ‘the society of abundance’, 
‘the leisure society’, ‘the consumer society’, etcetera. Of course, in its most simple 
formulation the urban only further replaces these other significations. However, 
to the same end, could he not have stayed with the means already employed and 
expressed with ‘urban society’ and ‘urban reality’? But this is not the case, and it 
should be clear that there is nothing arbitrary about this renaming. It is, in fact, a 
conceptual if not methodological reframing of the problematic itself. 
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With the articulation of the urban, Lefebvre not only replaces, or excludes, these 
previous terms, he includes all things within the complex of ‘urban society’ itself. 
In this sense he enfolds the multiplicity of conditions (both process and product) 
by which we can identify a particular period by sets of predominance or dominating 
socio-economic activities or socio-politic structures – that is, at the level of specific 
associations with technology (Paul Virilio), spectacle (Guy Debord) or information 
(Manuel Castells); or at the level of general associations with globalization (Saskia 
Sassen), high capitalism (Fredric Jameson), or postmodernity (Jean-François 
Lyotard, David Harvey et al).41  In other words, the urban acts it gathers within 
its designation, perhaps by the very lack of its referential claim to activities and 
structures, the very continuities (Peirce’s Synechism) and possibilities  which he 
associates with the virtual object. Lefebvre elaborates this with the example of the 
noun city; writing that the term ‘urban’ is preferable to ‘city’ as the latter seems 
to designate a clearly defined object, ‘a scientific object and the immediate goal of 
action, whereas the theoretical approach requires a critique of the “object” and a 
more complex notion of the virtual or possible object.’42 
Henri Bergson, in referring to the problem of the real, of a movement (which is life 
and within life), offers another point related to linguistic formulations such as these. 
He argues that the mind has a way of stabilizing movement that is represented 
in the form of a ‘motionless design’ in three ways: as qualities, forms of essences 
and acts. He offers a correspondence to these categories in the form of adjectives, 
substantives and verbs respectively. The first two he suggests ‘symbolize states’, 
while the latter is related to movement, ‘the verb itself, if we keep to the clear part 
of the idea it calls up, hardly expresses anything else’.43 What Lefebvre is missing, 
what his rotations in terminologies predicate but don’t quite fulfil, could perhaps 
be accomplished if he were to pose the term for the urban in the form of a verb 
as opposed to a noun. That is, if they are to perform in correspondence to his 
requirements for non-limited and open as opposed to limited or closed systems, 
giving action, not merely description or definition, to the ‘there is’ of urban. Foucault 
also acknowledged the dynamic importance of the spontaneity or the ‘there is’ of 
language. Our concern in this sense remains with the possibility of the new and the 
emergent, those actualizations which evade realization, even if momentarily, in what 
we may think of as the interstices of thought (within thinking) itself.
The urban, used as an enunciation, identifies (perhaps it even captures) the nature 
of Lefebvre’s problématique urbaine. Further, and importantly, he continues with the 
idea of the virtual claiming that the urban cannot be understood as an ‘accomplished 
reality, situated behind the actual in time’, but, on the contrary ‘as a horizon, an 
illuminating virtuality.’44 He then returns us to a recurring question asking whether 
theoretical knowledge can treat this virtual object as an abstraction, and clearly 
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affirms that it cannot. Exactly as we would expect, he writes: ‘theoretical knowledge 
can and must reveal the terrain, the foundation on which it resides: an ongoing social 
practice, an urban practice in the process of formation.’45 We will provide a further 
condition with what is often referred to as virtual visibility or a visibility outside the 
gaze: that which is revealed in forms of visibilities must not be reduced to its object, 
to a perceptible thing or quality, as such, to merely a physical environment to which 
it aspires, or in which it transpires. 
In Lefebvre, the ‘virtual object’ thus described is inscribed in what is commonly 
understood as a space-time axis. And it is with this that we open onto what might be 
considered the weakness of his doctrine. For, as such, it can be seen as a possible 
futurity, based on its historical (pre)determinations, however complex. In short, 
this is understood as historical time.46 Yet, to equate the virtual with the concept 
of a future – placed on the (linear) temporal axis of past/present/future – points 
precisely to that which ‘pre-exists its object’– a condition, as mentioned above, that 
Lefebvre argues against. However, it is also clear that Lefebvre believes that this 
‘virtual object’ cannot be fixed, for it is that which he places over and against the 
false problem posed in conceiving the urban as an already accomplished reality. 
The danger remains that in reading his space-time axis as one that follows the 
historically determined (and determining) arrow of time we run the risk of subverting 
the creative and spontaneous to the teleological, if not causal. Lefebvre waivers 
here, and we believe he does so for good reason.47 On one side he knows that ‘urban 
reality’ is made of a plurality of ‘urban practices’; these practices being ‘concrete’ 
(material) and not ‘abstract’; on the other he believes that the virtual object stands 
‘outside the global . . .  crisis of reality and thought.’48 
Continuing further on this decisive point, in the chapter entitled ‘Blind Field’ Lefebvre 
continues to advance his theory of the virtual by addressing the space-time axis. He 
argues that ‘with the arrival of history, our awareness is able to grasp two opposing 
movements’, described as either ‘regressive (from the virtual to the actual, the actual 
to the past) [or] progressive (from the obsolete and completed to the movement 
that anticipates that completeness, that presages and brings into something new).’49 
Although it could be argued that Lefebvre’s very reliance on this trajectory, past-
actual-virtual (past-present-future), aligns his own theories with the reactionary 
(regressive), as opposed to visionary (progressive), approach. In short, it appears 
as if Lefebvre uses the terms ‘possible’, ‘virtual’ and ‘future’ synonymously and the 
conflation of these distinct designations provides for an elementary limitation in his 
argument. For if we understand the urban problematic to be one which addresses 
merely the ‘possible’ then we are doing little more than arguing that the once 
‘deterministically related’ and ‘empirically observable’ conditions of modernity’s 
urbanism – this term used to indicate the idea of a totalizing view which held to the 
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belief that intention could control outcome – are no longer predictable as such. 
Whereby, due to the rising level of complexification, of the influences acting upon 
and emanating from the city itself, we can no longer calculate the outcome of forces 
(again) acting and being acted upon in regards the ‘futurity’ of the city, or ‘urban 
society’. In Lefebvre the possible indicates not only the ‘not yet known / not yet 
real’; but the ‘will be’ / ‘already determined’ of the urban. In other words, as we 
above challenged the implied unity or ‘organicism’ of his framing terminologies 
on knowledge, we might now suggest that his axis of time offers little more than a 
reiteration (albeit in a renewed form) of what he already rejected as the ‘ideology of 
continuism’. Repeating his above definition: ‘this urban society cannot take shape 
conceptually until the end of a process during which the old urban forms, the end 
result of a series of discontinuous transformations, burst apart’.50 
The argument is that Lefebvre’s formulation constructs the possible as a discrete as 
opposed to continuous multiplicity, which can only be grasped once it has become 
real (or realized). Bergson suggests that possibility does not precede reality, but only 
once a reality has appeared (become actual) can we then look back and find what 
we believed to be the inevitable ‘futurity’ held within the past.51 Further, in positing 
the ‘virtual’ in opposition to the ‘real’ we have not yet accepted the real of the 
virtual. In other words, the virtual as it is involved in the process of open actualities 
(not the actual) should be understood as much more inventive (spontaneous) than 
the possible, which is given only in realization. Simply stated, we must distinguish 
between the realization of a possible and the actualization of the virtual. Further, 
understanding with this that the virtual acts, and it does so by its engagement in a 
continuous process of differentiation, here we are also speaking of the continuous 
versus the discrete, and as mentioned above, with the creativity of language, it 
simultaneously ceases to be itself while retaining something of itself. This ceaseless 
folding and unfolding of the virtual (not the possible) is precisely what define the 
very mode of its activity, the ‘what is’ of the virtual itself. The virtual, as such, can 
be seen as in a process of progressive differentiation. But the key to understanding 
this is to recognize that in this process, and within the movement of its actualization, 
the virtual differentiates not with respect to matters of degree, but in relation to 
matters of kind.52 And returning to the distinction made above regarding that which 
‘exists’ and that which is ‘real’, we would add that although the virtual is real it does 
not predicate this ‘real’ on that which can be said to ‘exist’, but rather subsist. The 
tendency to stabilize these notions, to set them into a precise relationship (of before 
and after) belongs more to the structure of analysis and is useful as such. However, 
if, with Lefebvre, we wish to open up a revolutionary critique of the ‘virtual object’ we 
will have to find another, more supple discourse by which to advance not only our 
knowledge but our understanding and actions as well.  
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The Urban Not-Seen
Continuing the commentary on The Urban Revolution, in the chapter entitled ‘Blind 
Field’, Lefebvre writes that ‘the future illuminates the past, the virtual (possible) 
allows us to examine and situate the realized.’53 He argues that the concept (also 
the phenomenon) of a ‘blind field’ necessarily entails dark moments, events and 
forces that slip through our intellectual and perceptual grasp. Like the blind-spot 
in vision – not merely a dark region but the very negation of vision – accounting 
for painful transitions in any ‘critical phase’ of socio-spatial evolution that, though 
present and active, go unnoticed due to embedded ideological assumptions. They 
produce ‘floating signifiers’ to the signified of the sign. We can understand this 
as ‘verbal layers … unable to attach themselves to a “philosophical subject” or 
a “privileged object” or a “historical totalization”.’54 Blindness: we are operating 
without sight, we are also unable to speak. In developing his metaphor of blind fields 
Lefebvre demonstrates that urban practice and theories continue to utilize the tools 
and language of a past period (the industrial) and as such must be understood as 
‘reductive of the emerging reality’.55 Similarly, in its most simplified formulation, 
Foucault’s definition of ‘archaeology’ (as a study of stratifications) is that it works to 
discover the form of expression proper to each discourse, or form (each episteme). 
More critically, as Deleuze phrases it: ‘the task of archaeology is double: it must open 
up words, phrases and propositions, open up qualities, things and objects. It must 
extract from words and language the statements corresponding to each stratum and 
its thresholds, but equally extract from things and sight the visibilities and “self-
evidences” unique to each stratum.’56 
Keeping with this problem of that which operates outside of sight, outside of speech, 
Lefebvre utilizes linguistic references to further his argument. In the chapter entitled 
‘The Urban Phenomenon’, referencing the philological model of ‘speech acts, 
discourse (parole), semantics, intelligibility’ of Ferdinand de Saussure and Noam 
Chomsky, Lefebvre draws out the condition referred to as ‘presence-absence’.57 Here 
he points out that speakers who ‘know their language’ have no need of linguistic 
rules in order to employ language. In fact, he suggests that the very efficiency of 
speech relies upon the ‘absence of system at the level of effects, acts, and events, 
even though its presence is manifest to varying degrees.’58 He includes a stipulation, 
stating that while the underlying system is necessarily hidden from immediate 
awareness, its concealment ‘cannot be absolute’ as understanding inevitably reveals 
it, bringing it out into the open. Returning to Deleuze on Foucault, he similarly writes 
that within a given age ‘nothing is ever totally hidden; neither is it immediately 
revealed’.59 Through dispersion and dissemination stratifications emerge and, as 
quickly, they disappear. The disposition of this argument reiterates the point of the 
open machine versus the closed system. Lefebvre formulates another question with 
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which to further the problematic, asking if the urban might be conceived along these 
same lines, considered as a virtuality, a presence-absence.60
In developing the notion of presence-absence Lefebvre gives examples in relation to 
linguistic tropes. To get at the relevance of this figure of thought (or thought model) 
to architect and urban theory it will prove useful to discuss the distinction Foucault 
draws out between statements (belonging to speech), and visibilities (belonging to 
light or luminosities). Visibilities are not merely what we may commonly conceive 
them as – in other words, they are not limited to perceptible objects, qualities, or 
things. Visibilities are not those forms or objects that belong exclusively to the 
perceptual apparatus of vision, or seeing. For Foucault, visibilities are forms of 
‘luminosity’, they are created by light and they allow a thing or object to exist as ‘a 
flash, sparkle or shimmer’.61  With Deleuze we find a correlation to the statement 
cited just above in Lefebvre, ‘visibilities are never hidden, they are none the less 
not immediately seen or visible. They are even invisible so long as we consider only 
objects, things or perceptible qualities, and not the conditions which open them 
up.’62 An example of architecture is also provided whereby visibilities are not defined 
by virtue of the quantitative (enumerating) aspects typically attributed to form 
(buildings as objects); but, ‘first and foremost forms of light (qualities) that distribute 
light and dark, opaque and transparent, seen and non-seen, etc.’63 To further 
elaborate this example it is sufficient to recall Foucault’s well known example of the 
Panopticon but it is important to include a caveat: while this example can easily be 
read figuratively, it should be read quite literally. In other words, the description 
should not be generalized but should remain where it is, as a point of articulation 
illuminating a particular structural relationship and not as a formal description of 
an aspect that can be applied to buildings in general, the aspect of ‘light’ as it is 
commonly understood. 64  
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault describes the Panopticon in terms of ‘luminosity’; 
whereby it is light which makes possible that the prisoner is in the view of the guard, 
while the guard (who is held in shadow) is prevented from being viewed by the 
prisoner.65 Thus, constructing what Deleuze describes as the ‘machine of the prison’. 
Visibilities are inseparable from the machines that produce them (as the statement 
is inseparable from the system in which it is produced). This can be understood 
as a doubling of light and luminosity, whereby in the first instance light opens up 
things and brings them into visibilities, and in next these things which now are, are 
contained within the second movement. Having passed into perception (Lefebvre’s 
‘real’), the flash becomes a product which is something other than its process. 
Lefebvre also constructs a similar ‘doubling’, discussed in terms of the ‘two-fold’. 
Reiterating this in terms of historical formations or stratifications, conditions are 
provided for visibilities (just as they are provided for statements). To be precise: 
TOC
 64 Architecture  and the Time  of Space
although light can contain objects, it cannot contain visibilities; and similarly, 
although language can contain words it cannot contain statements. 
The Will to Pure Form, Function and Force
In The Urban Revolution Lefebvre describes a historical process by which ‘the city’, 
as such, was no longer recognizable as a totality, as a singular entity. In the opening 
pages of the chapter entitled ‘Urban Form’, he attempts to delimit terms such as ‘form’, 
‘content’, ‘substance’ and ‘function’. Although Lefebvre admits of both the ambiguities 
and the plurality of meanings surrounding such terms,66 they are utilized to denote 
the distinction between what once was the ‘city’ (artisanal, manufacturing, industrial, 
and so on) with what is now ‘the urban’. The ‘urban reality’ (not to be confused with 
the urban form) has thus shifted to fragmentary, shapeless disjunctions. Functions, 
including such categories as administrative, productive, commercial, he argues, are no 
longer clearly delineated or structured. They have a ‘twofold character’; on one side 
the urban administers, dominates, and quite literally covers, territory; on the other 
side this territory is itself administrating and dominating (‘to the extent that it is and 
because it is dominating’). He argues here that the urban phenomenon itself is located 
at the ‘juncture of these twofold functions, their point of articulation’.67 To develop 
this this point we will further consider these two characteristics, first identifying the 
possible site of this juncture and secondly the conditions of its articulations. In doing 
so, we will discuss the nature of power both by virtue of its presence and its absence. 
If we are to understand the relationship between power and knowledge as dynamic 
(continuously folding and unfolding) we cannot stop at the point where speech or 
sight generate things as forms and power generates probabilities as force.  
Power relations between dominating and dominated structures alternate 
continuously. In ‘On Urban Form’  this is put simply: a form which has become 
function enters into new structures. Lefebvre describes two such structures: the 
morphological and sociological.68 The former denoting sites, buildings, streets, 
squares and so on, and the latter being understood as distributions of population, 
age, sex, and the like, whether active or passive, socio-professional categories, 
managers and the managed.69 Just as in the case of the functions, so do the 
structures of this phenomenon operate in a twofold relation. Form, understood more 
conventionally, also exhibits this twofold, perhaps even a folding, of the plastic, 
in one sense traditionally formal, and in the other sense dynamic in respect to 
the necessity of circulation; in other words, to the geometric he adds movement. 
Seeking to imagine where the forces of this ‘new urban’ reveals itself – the urban as 
spectacle, consolidating and expanding (contracting and dilating) before the eyes of 
the spectator – he provisionally and provocatively uses the term ‘elsewhere’.70 With 
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this we understand that forces do not simply reveal themselves (their structures) in 
cleanly delineated forms; there is no transparency, no precise correlation between 
the two. Deleuze is very direct on this point: ‘an exercise of power shows up as an 
affect, since force defines itself by its very power to affect other forces …  and to be 
affected by other forces’.71 Forces are spontaneous and receptive (as with speech 
and visibilities) and they simultaneously hold the power to affect and be affected. 
Continuing on this point, again with Deleuze, ‘the power to be affected is like a 
matter of force, and the power to affect is like a function of force … but, it is a pure 
function, that is to say a non-formalized function, independent of the concrete forms 
it assumes, the aims it serves and the means it employs.’72 Any equilibrium that the 
forces can claim (or symmetry that we wish to assign to forces) can be captured 
only as a temporary (metastable) condition.73 To which we will find applied our 
ability to form the snapshot view utilized in the structure of an analytic. Categories 
of power should be understood as determinations unique to the particular action 
and its particular medium. ‘Pure form’ can here be thought further as ‘pure function’: 
function not meaning what it possesses, or what it is, but more importantly, how it 
acts. Lefebvre’s ‘juncture’ gives way to what he later describes as ‘rupture’.
In addressing the problem of ‘content’, Lefebvre asks: what does the city create? 
To this question he responds that it creates nothing. Because, he argues, the 
city ‘centralizes creation’ in that it affords the form, the ‘situation’, for exchange 
and proximity to take place; in short, it provides for relationships of difference 
to be established.74 The urban, he concludes, ‘is a place of encounter, assembly, 
simultaneity’; but, this form, he adds, has no specific content, for it accumulates all 
content; it is an abstraction, ‘but unlike a metaphysical entity, the urban is a concrete 
abstraction’ it is ‘pure-form’; it also precludes defining it as an object (substance) or 
subject (consciousness).’75 In ‘On Urban Form’, Lefebvre further argues that once 
social, institutional, spatial structures become codified into diverse contents such as 
objects, situations, activities, ‘form detaches itself from content(s) … thus freed, it 
emerges pure and transparent: intelligible. That much more intelligible as decanted 
from content, “purer”. But here is the paradox. As such, in its purity, it has no 
existence. It is not real, it is not.’76 It is worth noting the shift in Lefebvre’s delivery on 
the concept of pure form; in ‘The Right to the City’ the pure term needs no qualifiers, 
for such is the nature, the extent of this purity that it does not even exist. A person 
might occupy for hours if not a lifetime the space of the metaphysical abstraction that 
Lefebvre creates with the final three words in the statement ‘it is not real, it is not … 
.’ Yet, in The Urban Revolution, published only two years later, Lefebvre is searching 
for something more tangible, the abstraction here becomes qualified by the term 
‘concrete’. However, by his use of the term ‘tangible’ we should not understand 
something which has conventional material substance or form; for with the term 
‘concrete’, as stated above, we must understand this to mean social practices.
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In Foucault we do not see the importance of the term ‘pure form’ but instead that 
of ‘pure function’.77 Returning to the example of the Panopticon we will clarify some 
aspects of this terminology. The Panopticon is understood as a ‘pure function’ in 
that it imposes particular requirements on a multiplicity of particular individuals. 
However, allowing for the possibility that neither the form (prison) nor the function 
(discipline) will remain constant, Foucault develops a concept of the ‘diagram’. 
For example, by extending the categories of defined activity in the form-function-
substance relationship, the form ‘prison’ extends to ‘school’ and ‘factory’, which 
supports the end function ‘discipline’, shifting to ‘education’ and ‘production’, and 
the substance ‘inmates’ is exchanged with ‘students’, ‘workers’ etcetera.78 Further, 
and remaining with the case of the prison, in addition to the ‘disciplinary function’ 
another function emerges, that of ‘administrative control’ (Lefebvre uses the term 
‘technological’ to denote legislative or administrative practices). Deleuze specifies 
two pure functions, as ‘anatomo-politics’ and ‘bio-politics’ and their ‘bare matter’ 
are, respectively, a particular body and a particular population. The politics of the 
body here becoming more urgent than the social body of the urban.79 
To the Point of Articulation 
Let us return to Foucault on the point of ‘articulation’ of the ‘twofold’ relation, 
whereby we understand the difficult and enigmatic relation (or non-relation) between 
the articulable and the visible, between strata of knowledge functioning in relations 
of power. Deleuze puts it simply: there is no isomorphism between statements and 
visibilities.80 Although we speak of what we see and see that of which we speak 
in a simultaneous motion, their structures remain distinct and irreducible. Yet the 
two comprise the stratum, and from one stratum to the next they are transformed 
at the same time (although not according to the same rules). ‘Between the visible 
and the articulable we must maintain all the following aspects at the same time: the 
heterogeneity of the two forms, their difference in nature or anamorphism: a mutual 
presupposition between the two, a mutual grappling and capture’.81 
The point of articulation located at the juncture of the dominating and dominated 
seeks to make use of similar terms, in understanding that there is no absolute 
balance of powers, but instead a continual shifting between varying types of forces. 
Power relations are highly dynamic, ‘simultaneously local, unstable and diffuse’.82 
Power relations do not emanate from a distinct or central point, they move; they 
shift from one point to another with facility and ease. Their medium is the field of all 
forces (pure force), they are capable of marking inflections, resistances, twists and 
turns, when one changes direction, or retraces its steps. This is why although they 
are ‘particular’ they are not ‘localized’ at any given instant.83 In Deleuzian terms, 
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they constitute a ‘strategy’, strategies which are ‘anonymous’, and almost ‘blind and 
mute’ since they ‘evade all stable forms of the visible and articulable’.84 Lefebvre 
also understood this notion of the strategic, discussing the urban as sometimes 
productive and sometimes that which is produced by forces too complex to analyse 
without developing a new theoretic.85 He further brings in the concept of ‘rupture’, 
(‘disjunction’) understood as the discontinuity of the urban with what before was 
understood as city, adding that this rupture ‘simultaneously introduces and grounds 
a form of knowledge, a field … similar to logical form and almost as abstract and 
active as that logical form which is associated with language’.86 For, as stated above, 
if we are to comprehend the dynamic relationship between power and knowledge we 
must search beyond the point where speech or sight generate things as forms and 
power generates probabilities as force.  
On this issue we might further extend the qualification which Deleuze makes 
in arguing that relationships between forces remain ‘transitive, unstable, faint, 
almost virtual, at all events unknown, unless they are carried out by the formed or 
stratified relations which make up forms of knowledge.’87 Power relations – their 
affects – can be seen as being actualized (thus stabilized and stratified) through 
their integration into formalized structures. This, as mentioned above, is provided 
for in the operation by which we construct an analysis, whereby we temporarily 
homogenize particularities and read them as general lines of force. This is, of 
course, an operation that is carried out in all practices, whether social, political, 
economic or spatial.  And, importantly, it is for this reason that the various forms of 
institutions (urban policy makers in governmentally sanctioned administrations for 
instance) have the ability to integrate the fluid and transgressive power-relations by 
constituting them (bringing them into sight and speech, making of them visibilities 
and statements which can be manipulated and distributed) as forms of knowledge. 
Citing Lefebvre from his chapter ‘Levels and Dimensions’: ‘simultaneously social 
[political] and mental [logical], this level projects itself into part of the built domain 
… it is the level associated with what I refer to as institutional space … this assumes, 
if not a system or systems of explicit action, at least some form of systematized 
action’.88 Or, the institution as it is understood not as an entity but as a practice, not 
as productive but as reproductive of the very relations which they presuppose. In 
Foucault, it is the institution (state, family, market, culture) that is made by these so-
called integrating factors or ‘agents of stratification’.89 The ‘twofold’, which we saw 
above with Lefebvre, approximates this aspect of integration.
No matter how hard we work to distinguish the static and the dynamic (the stratified 
and the strategic in Deleuze), by its very nature, to think these things, to inscribe 
then in the lines of this, or any text, is also to capture and thus stabilize them. To 
reiterate; in Foucauldian terms, visibilities expose formed substance, statements 
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reveal formalized or finalized functions. Knowledge thus gives rise to formal 
categories such as ‘discipline’, ‘educate’, ‘administer’, and so on. Power, on the other 
hand, is force, possessing affective categories such as ‘incite’, ‘provoke’, ‘pacify’, 
and so on. Power forces pass through vision and sight, speaking and seeing in order 
to be actualized. In Lefebvre’s terms perhaps, does force become form (the urban 
as ‘pure form’)? The short answer is, yes. However, as we might expect, this is a 
fleeting affirmation, for it excludes any possibility of coincidence. For actualizations 
form integrations, but only by also creating a system of formal differentiation, and 
by so doing they remain multiple, both local and partial, exhibiting ‘affinities’ with, or 
tendencies towards, other particular points in this field of forces. Lefebvre suggests 
that ‘reflection’, so defined, extends the problematic and can elaborate a ‘scheme 
of forms’, what he refers to as an ‘analytic grid’ (‘provisional and modifiable’) which 
can ‘decipher the relations between the real and thought’, and which ‘can move from 
the most abstract to the most concrete.90 Form, pure form, is not, it is absence; and 
simultaneously it makes all things into presence. But, these things, and non-things 
can only be seen and spoken about by virtue of analysis and of thought (speech) 
alone. This problematic is anything but new to philosophy, whether one wishes to 
employ the terms of substance and form, of the material and the ideal, body and 
mind (spirit), the visible and the invisible; the list is extensive and the distinguishing 
characteristics provided by each uniquely differentiated. In Bergson, for instance, 
the life of the ‘real’ belongs properly to theories of time, which therefore cannot be 
thought, for thinking is, itself, a spatializing, thus hypostatizing, practice resulting 
in what he refers to as ‘discrete’ as opposed to ‘continuous’ multiplicities. However, 
when it comes to the city as a concrete entity as well as the urban, when understood 
as a series of concrete practices, this problematic becomes pressing. For the city 
and its subjects not only act, but they are acted upon; and this ceaseless push 
and pull, this folding of forces, must be understood epistemologically and situated 
ontologically if the architect, the sociologist, the practitioners of socio-spatial 
practices are to ‘act’ as opposed to continually ‘reacting’ to the multiplicity of 
forces at play. 
By detaching itself from its content, form detaches itself from the concrete. The 
summit, the crest of the real, the key to the real (of its penetration by knowledge 
and the action which changes it), it places itself outside the real. Philosophers have 
tried to understand for two thousand years. Nonetheless, philosophy brings the 
theoretical element to this knowledge. The approach is in several states and has 
a strategic objective. That is to grasp through the movement of reflection which 
purifies forms and its own form, and which codifies and formalizes the inherent 
and hidden movement of the relation between form and content. There is not form 
without content. No content without form. What offers itself to analysis is always 
a unity of form and content. Analysis breaks this unity. It allows purity of form to 
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appear, and form refers back to content. Yet, this indissoluble unity, broken by 
analysis, is conflictual (dialectic). By turns thought goes from transparent form 
to the opacity of contents, of the substantiality of these contents to inexistence of 
“pure” form, in a ceaseless if not momentary movement.91 
To do justice to the above passage from ‘The Right to the City’ it would be necessary 
to begin this chapter again by returning to the concepts introduced in terms of the 
notion of the virtual. In so doing, further elaborating on the qualities that distinguish 
the virtual from the actual, among them their respective attributes of differentiation 
over that of similitude; in other words, we would have to question the very nature of 
creative problematizing, in fact, the notion of the new. For in The Urban Revolution, 
it was possible for Lefebvre to write: creation comes to a halt to create again. Yet, it 
becomes increasingly difficult today to identify the pause between the continuous 
and the discontinuous that allows us to imagine life’s arrest, of this thing that flees 
before our grasp. 
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An extended version of this chapter has appeared under the title ‘Problematizing the Virtual: Lefebvre and the 
Urban Problematic’, in Visualizing the Invisible, toward an urban space, eds. Stephen Read and Camilo Pinilla 
(Amsterdam: Techne Press, 2005).
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4 Benjamin and 
Bergson: Memory 
Matters
The double movement by which we come to assume objective realities without 
relation to consciousness, and states of consciousness without objective reality – 
space thus appearing to preserve indefinitely the things which are there juxtaposed, 
while time in its advance devours the states which succeed each other within it. 
(Bergson, Matter and Memory)1
In the opening line of ‘Some Motifs in Baudelaire’ Walter Benjamin tells us that 
‘Baudelaire envisaged readers to whom the reading of lyric poetry would present 
difficulties.’2 He goes on to question whether lyric poetry remained capable of 
resonating with the masses, with their experience of modernity. Benjamin continues: 
‘If conditions for a positive reception of lyric poetry have become less favourable, 
it is reasonable to assume that only in rare instances is lyric poetry in rapport with 
the experience of its readers. This may be due to the change in structure of their 
experience.’3 This chapter will examine the constituent elements of experience as 
they were brought forward in Benjamin’s essay; these elements include primarily 
a discussion on memory and perception and these as they are related to domains 
of time and space. By examining these structures of experience as Benjamin 
approximated them in terms of modernity we hope to address the constituents of 
experience, as they condition us today.
In order to address the problem of experience Benjamin suggests that we must look 
to philosophy; and the philosopher he turned to was Henri Bergson. He begins his 
discussion by positioning Bergson’s philosophical notion of time against the literary 
work of Marcel Proust, further suggesting that an understanding of Baudelaire must 
include a reading of Proust. And just as Benjamin constructs a trajectory that links 
these thinkers of modernity, our own trajectory will pass through contemporary 
thinkers who have emerged in and after the so-called postmodern turn into what 
we discuss today as the cognitive turn. More importantly, we believe that through 
Bergson it is possible to completely reconsider our use of the terms time and 
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space. As seen in the previous chapter on Lefebvre, in architecture and urbanism, 
it is an especially difficult task to ask that we apprehend our language from within 
a discourse, which for such obvious reasons, privileges space over time. Even 
Paul Virilio, with a critical fluidity of thought that almost makes us believe that 
the immediacy of time has supersede meditations on space, continues to beg the 
question: where did the here of the here and now go? 
Perception of Memory / Memory of Perception
Benjamin begins his argument on Bergson by questioning memory as both an 
element within and a condition of Proust’s work. With memory, he writes, we 
witness in Proust ‘an attempt to produce experience synthetically … under today’s 
conditions in which there is less and less hope that it will come into being naturally.’4 
In this he is referring to Proust’s lament over the inability of the intellect to summon 
the past upon will. The reference here is to his celebrated notion of mémoire 
involontaire.5 The contrary of this is, naturally, mémoire volontaire, and voluntary 
memory for Proust is connected to intellect. ‘And since the pictures which this kind of 
(voluntary) memory shows us preserve nothing of the past itself, I should never have 
had any with which to ponder over this residue’.6 Benjamin cites Proust writing that 
the past is ‘somewhere beyond the reach of the intellect, and unmistakably present 
in some material object.  As for that object, it depends entirely on chance whether 
we come upon it before we die or whether we never encounter it.’7 Proust is here 
referring to the material object which acts as trace, which triggers a recall of a past 
image, a moment in time actualized if not realized and either way a moment that has 
a form of objective existence on a time trajectory which moves in a direction from 
this moment back towards moments past. The past so understood constitutes the 
entirety of our history. Of course, when Proust recalls a ‘moment’ it may well require 
many, many pages of descriptive text to detail the moment with all its nuances and 
significance, thus we see not the compression of time and space (into an instant, 
an event) but the absolute extension of time through space spatializing all emotion, 
feeling and sensation so that it transcends the moment itself. Nevertheless, what 
remains is the fortuitous dependency on chance which allows for the breach between 
one’s past and one’s present, between tradition and progression; as Benjamin writes, 
according to Proust ‘it is a matter of chance whether an individual forms an image of 
himself, whether he can take hold of his experience.’8
In Benjamin’s view, unlike Proust, Bergson detaches memory from history. And he 
positions this rejection of ‘historical determinism’ as a reaction to ‘the inhospitable 
blinding age of big-scale industrialism’, a point we will return to below.9  He also 
compares Proust’s mémoire involontaire to Bergson’s concept of mémoire pure.10  
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While he does not elaborate on Bergson’s notion of memory, due, we believe, to 
the fact that his primary focus on experience is addressed without recourse to 
perception, we will offer a few remarks. Pure memory in Bergson must be described 
in subtle, yet fundamentally different terms than the involuntary memory of Proust. 
In Bergson pure memory has an intimate and immediate relation with the present 
while constituting the whole of the past; with Proust this includes history and pre-
history, both personal and collective. It acts in terms of continuous movement, 
it does not collect itself in terms of discrete moments. Further, its movement is 
unceasing and fluid, in terms of time, as opposed to contiguous and contingent, in 
terms of space. Pure memory is to time what perception is to space and further, in 
this account, perception itself would be impossible without it. Memory as such is not 
a memory of a perception to be recovered as a remembrance (of a thing past), nor 
is it a vague notion of a lost instance or distant image (a picture or representation) 
which can be called forward and re-lived; for it is-lived, and it is of the essence 
of time, in the sense that Bergson refers to it, as durée. This concept (commonly 
translated as duration) is considered of singular importance to the core of Bergson’s 
philosophy and will be returned to below. For now, suffice it to summarize the above 
as such: in the terms of Proust, it is through our present, through our accidental 
encounter with objects that we may, or may not, recover our past and, in the terms 
of Bergson, it is by virtue of the past that we are able to actualize our present. 
Returning to Proust, it is relevant to ask how it is that the mind – both in the sense 
of body and spirit and matter and memory, and as a term we will employ wherever 
possible in place of ‘man’ – could become dependent on a chance encounter with 
its past in order to take hold of experience. Benjamin argues that man is becoming 
isolated from his ability to assimilate the data of the world around him by way of 
experience. In this moment of modernity, life becomes isolating, and experience 
suffused with isolation can only serve to estrange neighbours from their community 
and people from both their cities and their stories. With this, one’s own identity could 
be lost in the masses, wavering if not struggling, in the breach between tradition 
and progress. Benjamin draws on the example of mass media to further explain 
this moment and its consequences; the intention of mass media being to bring the 
information of the day in a manner that above all allows the reader to dis-associate 
from even the possibility of engagement with the events being presented. Further, 
the structure of mass media itself derives from this principle of dis-association by 
avoiding any links or disallowing affinities to be established with the various articles 
of news. In other words, media in attempting to present only the present is non-
narrative and as such it has neither need for memory nor for the past. It is, in this 
sense, pure stimuli, in fact, synthetic. How then are were we supposed to recover, 
much less to recall, ourselves in this flux, within this barrage of meaning-less, 
non-symbolic images and information? And if we had become disassociated form 
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experience then how are were we to reflect upon the consequences of our actions? 
Again, the point is worth reiteration: not merely alienation – the recognition of one’s 
otherness, but absolute isolation – the realization of one’s irreconcilable aloneness, 
or absence. In this sense, it is not so difficult to see why terms such as ‘shock’, 
‘horror’ and ‘revulsion’ were so commonly used by writers from Baudelaire, Poe, and 
Kafka to Engels and Freud to describe the mind’s encounter with the density of the 
nameless crowd as it manifested a change in the structure of experience. 
This historical determinism which, we believe, is too hastily applied to Bergson, is 
what motivates Benjamin’s reading of resonance with respect to lyric poetry and 
something we will discuss shortly in terms of shock, what we have referred to above 
in terms of Benjamin’s Schockerlebnis. Moreover, and in our view more importantly, 
we had become isolated from our very relationship to ‘things’, which in Bergson 
includes the entire of matter and memory itself.
Stimuli / Hide & Seek
In part III of ‘Some Motifs in Baudelaire’, Benjamin turns in the direction of Freud 
and his 1920 essay Beyond the Pleasure Principle.11 What is important in this is not 
to follow his brief treatment of Freud, rather not to follow the structural categories 
or logic of the original work, but to draw upon it in order to introduce the idea of 
unmediated stimuli resulting in shock. In Freud memory and consciousness operate 
in mutually exclusive systems. And consciousness, which is disassociated from 
memory, does not act as the perceptive receptor of memory, or as the actualization 
of perception through memory. It is not, in other words, the awareness of a present 
moment on a trajectory directed to the past. Its function, following Freudian 
theorists, is not to process but to protect, to intercept, to deflect, and guard the mind 
from the ever-present threat of (un-assimilated) stimuli. Benjamin writes that the 
unique achievement of the shock defence ‘may be seen in its function of assigning to 
an incident a precise point in time in consciousness at the cost of the integrity of its 
contents.’12 He continues: ‘this would be a peak achievement of the intellect; it would 
turn the incident into a moment that has been lived’ and even further, as an incident 
which, ‘at its most powerful and enduring never actually enters consciousness’.13 A 
virtual condition which never actually actualizes; ‘without reflection there would be 
nothing but the sudden start, usually the sensation of fright.’14
This sensation of fright, so described, becomes a state of being in Baudelaire. 
Manifested externally in the form of his mannerisms (body/matter), and internally 
in his disposition (spirit/memory), in short, his entire being. But more importantly, 
it is a state which he negotiates in order to both engage the city (within space) and 
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simultaneously distance himself from the crowd (within time). In other words, he 
contracts the space of the incident and time of the lived to the point where they 
cross trajectories, neither one nor the other, but the both/and of the virtual, not on 
its way to actuation but in the self-preserving necessity to elude realization. This 
‘shock’ as it is absorbed (contracted) by Baudelaire both reveals and conceals itself 
by virtue of the hidden figure of the crowd; but it is interesting to note that both the 
crowd and the city that contains it are only rarely actualized, either in terms of space 
or time, in his work. Benjamin writes: 
The masses had become so much a part of Baudelaire that it is rare to find a 
description of them in his works. His most important subjects are hardly ever 
encountered in descriptive form; it is futile to search in ‘Les Fleurs du mal’ or in 
‘Spleen de Paris’ for any counterpart to the portrayals of the city which Victor Hugo 
wrote with such mastery. Baudelaire describes neither the Parisians nor their city. 
Forgoing such descriptions enables him to invoke the one in the form of the other.15 
Neither the mass nor the city is described, but each is called upon, one in the figure 
of the other. In other words, they are ‘present without being represented’: ‘it is 
true that an image may be without being perceived – it may be present without 
being represented – and the distance between these two terms, presence and 
representation, seems just to measure the interval between matter itself and our 
conscious perception of matter.’16
If, as suggested above, a stimulus evades the deflection of consciousness and is 
recorded directly in conscious memory, then ‘it would sterilize this incident for poetic 
experience’. We are reminded of a favourite passage in the ‘Artist’s Confiteor’ of Paris 
Spleen: ‘these thoughts, whether they come from me or spring from things, soon, at 
all events, grow too intense. Energy in voluptuousness creates uneasiness and actual 
pain.’17 Thus, if a stimulus gets past the barricades of consciousness it would be 
neutralized into non-actualized experience. And this suggests precisely the problem 
of lyric poetry for, as Benjamin asks, ‘how can it have as its basis an experience for 
which the shock experience is the norm?’18 How can a representational form based 
on metaphoric narration resonate with the masses when the structure of experience 
has shifted to a theory based not in recognition, but in deflection? Of course, 
Benjamin alludes to this in his embrace of the technological invention of cinematic 
film where he speaks of the new and urgent need of the masses for stimuli. Where in 
film, ‘perception in the form of shocks was established as a formal principle.’19
When shock becomes a formal principle, when it has been incorporated into the 
body of our desires, the notion of ‘stimuli’ becomes a different matter altogether: 
what before could be seen as a new product of consumption, witnessed critically 
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by the advent of film, today can be witnessed, for instance, in urbanism’s focus on 
the ‘event’, and further in architecture’s reliance on the object of presentation, not 
the (Proustian) image of representation. Stimuli, in a contemporary sense, seen as 
a simple form of presence, of image as already neutralized information that can be 
individually appropriated or  culturally acquisitioned and economically deployed. 
Further, and importantly, stimuli which are already beyond mass media theories of 
ideological consciousness and self-conscious reflection. According to Freud, when 
shock has been incorporated by memory, it manifests itself in trauma; but if we 
begin, as Bergson does, with memory then it is perception which buffers us in the 
form of the virtual. For in Bergson, only when a virtual action – and all objects, all 
images exist as virtual bodies in space – moves into a determinable proximity with 
our body, are we compelled towards action, and with action the virtual passes to the 
real. That which we may be missing in our current understanding of stimuli, as a (less 
threatening) condition of information flow, is precisely Bergson’s notion of the image 
as that which lies between representation and the ‘thing’ in itself. He writes: ‘my 
perception is outside my body and my affection within it, so my affective states are 
experienced where they occur, that is, at a given point in my body.’20 Here perception 
is placed at the centre of the nervous impulse and understood as ‘appearing at 
the precise moment when a stimulation received by matter is not prolonged into a 
necessary action.’21 It is interesting to note that ‘of all the experiences that made 
his life what it was, Baudelaire singled out his having been jostled by the crowd 
as the decisive, unique experience.’22 The body as conscious experience, not only 
consciousness as a mental state, but as the last line, the last site of resistance.
Reflection/Recognition/Recapitulation
Returning to the above idea of disassociation – as that which not only estranges us 
from our own identity, but from the space of our own occupation within the world 
in which we perform – we find that in contemporary society it is precisely a new 
form of disassociation, of distancing as a self-conscious (self-actualizing) act of 
appropriation which accommodates a new form of associative experience.
The media theorist Douglas Rushkoff writes on a manner of processing stimuli into 
information, and of information into knowledge under the term ‘recapitulation’. He 
distinguishes the presentation of information directed at knowledge from that of 
data directed at the accumulation of information into three categories of storytelling: 
‘instructional’ (real-life exchange of experience as a survival method in pre-history 
– literal), ‘metaphorical’ (narrative exchange or experience which functions with 
the ‘like me’ recognition of similarity through empathetic recognition – symbolic) of 
and ‘recapitulative’ (the intentional distancing from emotional reality through self-
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conscious awareness – abstract), the third of which is nonrepresentational. And it 
is this last category that interest us here for it addresses the ‘change in experience’ 
which today constitutes our memory and perception, the virtual and the real, the 
actualized and the lived.
The play within the play compels the self-conscious recognition of the self-similar, 
not the ‘like me’ reflection of parable but the ‘actuated me’ of recapitulation. 
Benjamin writes: ‘The so-called immortal works just flash briefly through every 
present time. Hamlet is one of the very fastest, the hardest to grasp.’23 Rushkoff 
also points to Shakespeare; but also to Brecht, as one of the first moderns to realize 
the necessity of recapitulation with the technique which he developed and referred 
to as the ‘alienation effect’.24 With this Brecht attempts to draw the viewer into 
the play by rearranging the structure of the role oppositions of actor/audience. 
He effectively disabled the pause of the curtain’s draw between acts, he pulled the 
audience into the entire production and thus created plays within plays: one of the 
story being told, the other of the action of telling it. Forcing the audience to be 
constantly aware both of the self-conscious position of the actors on stage and of 
their own self-conscious involvement with the issues, with the message, which the 
play itself performed. As Rushkoff writes, ‘instead of looking within the context of the 
play on stage for the answers that Brecht’s tragic characters could not find, we look 
outside the theatre into our very real world.’25  Nonrepresentational, self-conscious 
awareness (recapitulation) allows for an immediate engagement with media, with the 
flow of images and information that are ever present, ever ready to flood over us. 
When there is no time for reflection, no space for reflexivity, we are forced to engage 
in action as actors and this form of recapitulated engagement could be seen as one 
of the few mechanisms helping us to regain our sense of agency, and further, such a 
constellation has the possibility to impart an experience of commonality and a sense 
of community. ‘Why is recapitulation necessarily more advanced or better than literal 
or metaphorical understandings of our world? Because it is capable of re-presenting 
our chaotic cultural experience in a manner that allows us to relate to it. It gives us 
an insight into how nature works, and motivates us to become more fully conscious 
and self-determining.’26 
In little more than a century, the processing of information streams has passed 
through the objectivity of reflection, through the subjectivity of the reflexive to a 
form of a-subjective recapitulation. Virilio also writes of recapitulation as a ‘a pure 
phenomenon of speed, a phenomenon on the way to the realization of its absolute 
essence.’27 What is interesting in Virilio is that we see not merely the presence of 
immediacy but that of the instantaneous. The instantiation of time within space, not 
the immediacy of space within time. And it is precisely this inversion, this apparent 
privileging of time over space which gives to his work the sense of the loss of human 
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agency in favour of the machinic agency of the masses. In Bergson, this idea of the 
‘instantaneous’ is understood as a mechanistic, or reflex reaction whereby time is 
forcibly sectioned off as if its composite properties were similar to those of space. 
Whereas ‘subjectivity’, as described here in terms of the immediate, a-subjective, is 
‘affectivity’ itself, externalized in image, and internalized as memory. Although these 
terms as they are used by Virilio and Bergson are the same, what they denote is 
exactly inverted. Understanding of these new forms of perception and structures of 
experience relies on philosophical distinctions regarding notions of time and space. 
Distinctions so primary that they led Bergson to advance the conclusion that the past 
should be referred to as that which ‘is’ while the present must be always understood 
as that which ‘was.’28
Multiplicities of Immanence / Sites of Transcendence
In 1918 Benjamin writes that the ‘task of coming philosophy can be conceived as 
the discovery or creation of that concept of knowledge which, by relating experience 
exclusively to the transcendental consciousness, makes not only mechanical but 
also religious experience logically possible’, and he continues: ‘with a new concept 
of knowledge, therefore, not only the concept of experience but also that of freedom 
will undergo a decisive transformation.’29
In part X of ‘Some Motifs in Baudelaire’ Benjamin, like Proust summoning time, brings 
forward Bergson’s concept of time lived. He suggests that Bergson’s durée is essentially 
a-historical; that it functions to isolate man from history, and from ritual. While we see 
this interpretation as an incomplete assessment of Bergson’s metaphysics, the position 
he draws remains relevant. Benjamin’s reading suggests duration as absolute presence, 
presence without the structural trajectory of memory. He recounts Max Horkheimer’s 
critique of Bergson as the metaphysician who suppresses death. And Benjamin 
continues that durée ‘from which death is eliminated has the miserable endlessness 
of a scroll. Tradition is excluded from it. It is the quintessence of a passing moment 
that struts about in the borrowed garb of experience. The Spleen, on the other hand 
exposes the passing moment in all its nakedness.’30 The pure presence of time is 
understood here not as a condition to be valued as pure experience of the present, 
but as an eradication of experience, an annihilation of being. And in this, though he 
allows for the poetic surrender of Proust to this ‘new structure of experience’, he 
maintains the quality of transcendence in Baudelaire.
Proust also writes that time is peculiarly chopped up in Baudelaire; similarly 
Benjamin suggests, ‘they are days of recollection, not marked by any experience 
(they) stand out from time.’31 As such, they are days of waiting, of passing moments 
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standing as segments, they can only occupy space: the space of the day awaiting 
transcendence. This could not be more incompatible with Bergson’s philosophy 
of immanence, his continuous (virtual) multiplicities. Benjamin’s understanding of 
days which cannot be lived, but only thought, in the Bergsonian sense becomes 
days which cannot be thought but only lived. With Deleuze, Bergsonism is fully 
brought into lived experience, into a multiplicity of planes of immanence: the 
radical immanence of the process of perpetual becoming.32 The ‘embodied 
intensity – a process of approaching what we are, that is to say reducing oneself 
to the naked bone of one’s speed of rememoration, one’s capacity for perception, 
one’s empathy for and impact on others.’33  For Bergson the most common error 
of philosophy is that it confuses matters of degrees with matters of kind: domains 
of space (fundamentally homogeneous, quantitative and extensive) with those 
of time (essentially heterogeneous, qualitative and intensive). Space as extrinsic 
and mediated (perception) and time as intrinsic and immediate (memory). He 
understands movement (time) as the fundamental principle of life, motion as 
the essence of existence, continuity and heterogeneity as the two fundamental 
characteristics of duration. Durée is always seen as the process of continual 
changes in kind, not in degrees, it is transition in its purist form. The activity of 
transcendence, which always alludes to the spatial domain of experience in terms 
of a passage from one realm (the unperfected of the lived, the body) to the next 
(the perfected of the absolute, the spirit) thus establishes itself in a domain which 
can only admit to differences of degrees when in fact, the discussion must revolve 
on distinctions in kind.34 And even then, when it does address time, it poses itself 
within the logic of linear time as that which can be somehow apprehended (further 
compounded by the mechanical ability of the cinematic freezing of movement, thus 
constructing the illusion of sequential and spatial delineation). Immanence, on 
the other hand, is understood as the simultaneous unfolding of multiplicities both 
physical and spiritual, both matter and memory at once; it cannot be apprehended 
but only approximated in movement, it can never be fixed, for motion itself is 
molecular. Thus, we find one of the basic rules of Bergsonian logic – all problems 
related to subject and object must be stated in terms of time rather than space.35
Perhaps the distance which separates the modern interpretation of Bergson from 
contemporary interpretation is precisely this: the search for transcendent states 
of being, over and against the immanence of the subject embodying the process of 
becoming; the need for reflection over and against the necessity of recapitulation; 
and the confusion of domains of space with those of the experience of time. And, 
thus, the dilemma of architects and planners who, despite their rhetoric on ‘flexibility’ 
and ‘spaces of flow’, are equivocally addressing problems of heterogeneous flow with 
incompatible answers in terms of homogeneous spatial fixity.
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An extended version of this chapter has appeared under the title ‘The Past which Is: The Present that Was 
Benjamin and the Bergson Trajectory’ in: Cities in Transition, ed. D. Hauptmann (Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 
2001). 
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5 From Biopolitics 
to Noopolitics
What should we do with our brain? Is not a question reserved for philosophers, for 
scientists, for politicians – it is a question for everyone. … The guiding question 
of the present effort should thus be formulated: What should we do so that 
consciousness of the brain does not purely and simply coincide with the spirit of 
capitalism? (Malibou, What Should We Do With Our Brain?)1
This chapter begins with the basic premise that, in a world increasingly populated 
by technologies of information and communication, the analysis of biopolitics must 
be expanded to include thinking on noopolitics. While the former acts on body, or 
populations of bodies, and inscribes habits and practices specific to life (bios), the 
latter operates on mind (nous), on general intellect and mental disposition. Here 
the concept of noopolitics is broadly posited as a power exerted over the life of the 
mind, including perception, attention, and memory. In this last chapter questions 
are posited and ideas put forward pertaining to the conditions through which 
world, body, brain, and mind are coupled, influenced by, and inflected through 
contemporary forms of material and immaterial production and processes such as 
those found in our current communication and information age. 
The Foucauldian discourse on biopolitics and power has for decades been 
considered a cornerstone of theories (throughout numerous disciplines including 
architecture) that address the formation of society and culture in relation to 
economy and politics in all their permutations. It is important to retain the 
distinctions that have been made between biopolitics and biopower; primarily the 
distinction between the integration and stratifications of forces by institutions 
and various agents, organizations, and the constellations of power, singular or 
multiple, as a set of relations of forces acting on forces outside what some might 
refer to as the body-politic itself. Equally relevant is to recall that these so-called 
institutions of organization do not solely generate various sources of power, but in 
fact themselves stem from these relations of power.2 Furthermore, as readers of the 
work of Foucault will recognize, underpinning his entire discourse is the concern 
with the power to exercise freedom and the creative power of resistance. Which, to 
our mind, also remains as a central concern to what we are here discussing under 
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the terms of biopolitics/biopower and the subsequent forms that the production of 
subjectivities (considered both positively and negatively) take within noopolitical/
noopower frameworks of what have become highly distributed networks of forces 
and organization. 
Perhaps it should be pointed out that the prefix bio with respects to politics or power 
is not intended to simply be supplanted by the prefix noo. Nor can the mind-body 
problematic be so easily collapsed. According to Fredric Jameson the mind-body 
problematic – which he refers to as the raw nerve of metaphysics – runs through 
the dualisms of Cartesian and Spinozan philosophy ‘all the way down to base and 
superstructure if not the mechanical-materialist mirage of the cognitive brain 
itself.’3 Issues raised in this chapter are considered to be less ideologically related 
to the (Marxist) subject/labour paradigm, or the subjugation of populations through 
integration and capture within the order of reproduction, and more dynamically 
related to modalities of power as a relation between ‘forces acting on forces’ through 
integration and differentiation, which within an order of invention create sublime 
and complex conditions of control and resistance. Maurizio Lazzarato has developed 
the importance of these distinctions in his celebrated essay ‘Life and the Living in 
the Societies of Control.’ In this work, he outlines the continuation of disciplinary 
societies (Foucault) into societies of control (Deleuze). Following Gabriel Tarde, 
Lazzarato argues that media provide the conditions for ‘the action at a distance 
of one mind on another, through the brain’s power to affect and become affected, 
(which) is mediated and enriched by technology.’4 Identifying the importance of 
memory within action at a distance, he draws a distinction between ‘life as memory 
… [and] life as a set of biological characteristics’.5 In other words, between the 
bio of biopower and bio as it is held in memory; Lazzarato thus turns to the term 
‘noo-politics’ in order to distinguish the latter. Hence, the relevance of noopolitics 
in contemporary discourse and practice is integrally connected with memory and 
mind and to theorizing the relation between the forces and forms of communication. 
Networks of information and communication generate new logics of representation 
that are more topological than analogical. This action at a distance can be seen as an 
apparatus of noopolitics which emerged at the end of the nineteenth century with the 
advent of mass media in the form of something that today is seemingly innocuous. 
With the aid of the telegraph, it was the newspaper that delivered the first spatio-
temporal shock to the masses. Deleuze, in ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, 
also argues that the dispositifs of power and control that once operated primarily 
on the body (read pace Foucault) now operate on the mind through technologies 
of communication. With this we are no longer within the closed spaces of control 
outlined by geographic or political boundaries (sovereignties as such) of individuals 
or populations; but in the open spaces of public opinion, of multiple affiliations 
and dispositions dispersed across the globe. We witness not only the control of 
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territories, but new forms of deterritorializations (Deleuze/Guattari), in other words, 
intensive modulations and temporal reconfigurations are both superimposed upon 
and subordinate extensive modalities of space. Or, as Lazzarato expresses it, ‘we 
could say that noo-politics commands and reorganizes the other power relations 
because it operates at the most deterritorialized level (the virtuality of the action 
between brains).’6
Architecture and urbanism inhabit the same spaces and temporalities that 
characterize these new modes and relations; their presence also possesses the 
potential to bend and contort the very systems in which they operate. Architecture 
too often tends to be considered as autonomous, disengaged, and distanced from 
life as some form of hermetic (design-centric) endeavour. Quite the opposite is 
true – architectural technologies are embedded in the interwoven fabric of social, 
political, economic, psychological, historical, and spiritual relations of a community 
of differences and heterogeneity. Architecture has created its own set of dispositifs 
that provide for the smooth realization of new and diverse networks into planned 
conditions of the built environment. Put differently, architectural imaginations 
produce practices that allow for the exploration of remote territories, like the 
paranormal, non-linear, psychic, and insensible, which pulsate beyond the reach of 
the formulaic methodologies of the logics of computational programs. Equally, the 
concept of the virtual has become increasingly important to the architecture and 
urban design discourse. In fact, architectural and urban processes, procedures, 
and products commingle to form complex systems of recurrent and recursive 
circuits, which, in the end, help produce novel forms of networks that empower 
the imagination and constitute the cultural landscape with new objects and 
subject relations. 
The above briefly indicates the general concerns that motivated the discussion on 
biopolitics and noopolitics in the concluding chapter. The intention, equally, is not 
to remain primarily in the domain of philosophy and theory as these interests also 
lean heavily on thinking new relations between culture and the brain. By this the 
brain is not understood merely as the privileged metaphor for mind, consciousness, 
or cognition; but the brain as examined in contemporary neurosciences. What 
requires exploration is the manner in which the brain is transformed through cultural 
influences, and conversely, how the emerging knowledge of the brain informs both 
the limits and possibilities of our interaction with and effect upon our world. Our 
contemporary moment requires us to develop a better theoretical understanding 
of the emerging conditions that generate new continents of research and elicit 
forms of power and relations of power within the context of new economic, political, 
social, aesthetic, and cultural contingencies; a search that is also paralleled by 
many scientists who, in various manners, conduct research into our cognitive 
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capacities in general, and the brain (whether psychological, physiological, 
biological, or neurological) specifically. Further, in addressing recent advents in 
architecture the relation between culture and the brain cannot be ignored, thus 
recent ideas emanating from neuroscience must be included in the development of 
any understanding not merely of what architecture is, but how it acts.7 The chapter 
includes five sections representing concepts and ideas that resonate in architecture, 
theory, philosophy, and neuroscience simultaneously.
Plasticity and Potentiality 
Approached from a theoretical perspective, the concept of plasticity bears on 
questions pertaining to the conditions of the changing cultural milieu, what might be 
called cultural plasticity, which through its direct or indirect actions affect memory, 
perception, experience, and thinking. Further, these transformations can be directly 
related to technological developments as well. Of course, writings on such matters 
have echoed through discourses concerned with art and media and their effective 
relation to socio-cultural conditions and conditionings, whether considered as a 
virtual or an actual real. Developments in neuroplasticity, which sit within scientific 
research primarily within the fields of experimental and physiological psychology, 
cognitive psychology, cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience, have now been 
extended to the cultural realm. When coupled with technological developments on 
the one hand, and ontogenetically driven cognitive strategies on the other, plasticity 
and its effects greatly impact  our modes of understanding our life-world.
Henri Bergson argued that people are inclined to project their psychic or mental 
states into spatial form; and in so doing, not only are these mental states themselves 
transformed, but simultaneously they return to generate alternative and new 
forms of experience when reflected back into consciousness. We might easily recall 
Walter Benjamin’s now canonical claim that ‘the mode of human sense perception 
changes with humanity’s entire mode of existence’, and the vehicle of such change 
is determined by ‘historical circumstances’ (by which he was referring to the 
technology of film).8 A more current example can be seen in Fredric Jameson, who 
puts forward a similar perspective – specifically with respect to the architecture of 
the Bonaventure Hotel, Los Angeles – suggesting that built space is mutating into 
something that people do not yet possess the perceptual faculties to understand.9 In 
other words, as architecture changes, so too must the mind that must fathom it.
As these examples portray, the plasticity at play in experience and perception 
(along a sensation-affect and memory-attention axis) can be extrapolated in terms 
of both bios and nous. Thus, the notion of plasticity as it generally indicates the 
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idea of mutability, transformation, and the inherent potential for change (whether 
productive or prohibitive) within the spheres of both real and imagined states and 
processes within beings. For some, this can be seen as a theoretical notion of 
(pluri)potentiality10 as a means to elucidate a diagrammatic concept applied to the 
process of social and cultural evolution, especially as it creates new forms in the 
built environment or elicits new cultural niches in various and nuanced ways (cultural 
plasticity). For others, this is seen as a property of the brain (neuroplasticity), 
providing for a greater understanding of how contemporary science posits human 
evolutionary capacities.
Potentiality is also used as a notion within discourse on capitalist organizations, 
tertiary economies, and the public sphere of sociopolitical practices. Paolo Virno 
suggests this as nothing less than the arena of struggle in which human nature itself 
is at stake. Virno identifies the differential traits of the species (Homo sapiens) in 
such things as ‘verbal thought, the transinidividual character of mind, neoteny, and 
the lack of specialized instincts’ and will situate these ‘species-specific prerogatives’ 
within a complex meta-history of biology, power, and temporal contingents.11 Natural 
history, for Virno, takes on complex form in relation to sociopolitical configurations 
(experienced facts) and biological invariants (possibility of experience); with this 
he utilizes the diagram as a mechanism to identify this complex relation between 
what he refers to as the ‘just now’ (human nature) and ‘always already’ (biolinguistic 
capitalism): ‘I call natural-historical diagrams the sociopolitical states of affairs that 
display, in changing and rival forms, some salient features of anthropogenesis. The 
diagram is a sign that imitates the object to which it refers, meticulously reproducing 
its structure and the relation between its parts.’12 Biolinguistic capitalism is here 
considered as a key element in the global movement and although Virno does not 
name it as such, we consider this as a specialized reading on noopolitics as it posits 
a central concern regarding the organization of intelligence and the mutation of 
intellect.
In respect to potentiality, the concept of dynamis is raised. Virno addresses this 
as a ‘power’ evincing the ability of change, and identifies the dynamis as a non-
presence (absence of presence). In Virno this is related to the ‘not-now’ of an eternal 
presence. The eternal, as that which displays a high degree of invariance, is resistant 
to social and cultural change. It is therefore the faculty of language that modulates 
the power (in potentia) of the non-actual, undefined and indeterminate. Virno further 
roots potentiality (the indefinite) in neoteny, the condition of a non-specialized 
organism that characterizes man. This idea of a continuous, uninterrupted learning 
process is also found in the Deleuzian distinction between societies of discipline and 
control.13 Whereas the former indicates a progression, a passage from one state 
to the next (from the home, to the school, to the factory, and so forth) the latter 
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indicates recursive movements back and forth between these various modalities 
of training. Virno takes another step, however, and it is a step particularly relevant 
to architecture thinking; whereby he argues that the non-specialized organism is 
also one that is perpetually ‘out-of-place.’ The ‘human animal’, in this account, has 
no natural environment (no niche) in which he might insert himself ‘with innate 
expertise once and for all.’ In other words, he is an organism without organization. 
Thus ‘our “essential nature” is characterized … by the absence of a determinate 
environment, and therefore by and enduring disorientation.’14 Virno does not speak 
of the built environment per se, but it remains possible to interpret his argument in 
relation to the indeterminate, the open-ended and (seemingly infinitely) modifiable 
conditions of the cultural environment in which architecture establishes its own 
diagrams and maps of possible worlds that, in his words, ‘portray the absence of 
a univocal environment’. In fact, we might suggest that one of the potentials of 
architecture could here be posited as the power to help make the human animal 
less indeterminate in this regard, to sculpt through architectural languages the 
creation of a niche that acts on the neoteny of the human species, offering ‘plausible 
diagrams’ of an invariant human nature. Neotony is also related to neuroplasticity 
as it opens up the possibility for man to live in multiple domains that are in a state of 
constant flux; a multiplicity of natural as well as cultural niches, which architecture 
plays a role in forming. Virno succinctly takes on the traditional nature/culture divide 
with respect both to biology and history while equally regarding their sociopolitical 
interface with modes of capital production. 
Giorgio Agamben has made the comparison between an architect and a child, 
arguing that although the architect has the potential to build (as the poet has the 
potential to write), he or she also possesses the power to decide not to make a 
work but instead to maintain that potential in an unused state. The child, on the 
other hand, does not yet possess such knowledge (praxis), as he or she possesses a 
‘generic form of potentiality’. Thus, the child must ‘suffer an alteration (a becoming 
other) through learning.’15 And, these alterations can be seen as fundamental to 
the pluripotential of the nervous system and its administration within societies of 
control. There can be no doubt that language and culture are powerful immaterial 
forces in sculpting the brain. A different reading on potentiality through Agamben 
can be found in the work of Patricia Reed. In ‘The Politics of “I Can”’16 Reed 
dismantles the longstanding dialectic relation between potential and action – a 
necessary condition if we are to think noopolitics in relation to action at a distance 
(Lazzarato) as opposed to an actualization, or rather an action manifested in discrete 
(contiguous rather than continuous) form. It is within potentiality that Agamben 
finds the basis of life itself. ‘Lying in this zone of indistinction where a coincidence 
of two, seemingly opposed systems – the capacity to act and the capacity not to act 
– meet and produce an unknown, unnamed topology.’17 In other words, we cannot 
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neglect the importance of ‘in-action’ in Agamben. Those familiar with his work will 
recognize this idea as taken from his reading of Aristotle’s theory of dynamis. ‘The 
zones of indistinction exemplified in the existence of potentiality shift away from the 
dichotomous disposition of the term in its potential/actual configuration, and point 
to what Agamben calls “di-polarities,” not as substantial but as tensional.’18 
This idea of indistinctness (‘the in-between state of potentiality’) found in the ‘I can’ 
of Agamben can be thought further with respect to its ethical dimension with the 
concept of political equality developed in Jacques Rancière.19 We are dealing here 
with the sheer contingency of any sociopolitical system as that which lack natural 
law or order. Thus, a social order must be produced and this is what Rancière refers 
to as ‘the police’, a term that, according to Reed, denotes ‘a particular sensible 
ordering of bodies, roles, places, identities, and functions’.20 The police, according 
to Rancière, allocate ways of ‘doing’, of ‘being’ and ‘saying’; it defines an order of 
the ‘visible and sayable’. We are here once again reminded of Foucault’s difficult and 
enigmatic relation (or non-relation) between the articulable and the visible (between 
strata of knowledge functioning in relations of power).21 Or as Deleuze puts it in 
Foucault, knowledge is defined by ‘the combinations of visible and articulable that 
are unique to each historical formulation’; and as such, ‘knowledge is a practical 
assemblage, a mechanism of statements and visibilities.’22  In Rancière, politics does 
not derive from the governing of life through rules and regulations, but is opposed 
to these very structures. Politics ‘happens’ as a relational process, its enactment 
of statements and visibilities demarks the horizon where, one might say, act and 
potency (action and potential) converge and simultaneously disperse, disseminate, 
and disappear. 
In speaking of potentiality in relation to time, the present, or, as with the above, the 
‘absence of presence’, Boris Groys, in ‘Comrades of Time’, offers another view.23 
Groys puts forward an argument on the meaning of the term ‘contemporary’ in 
respect to time-based art (primarily video and cinema). If modernity understood time 
as productive (stable in respect to a past-future axis) our contemporary time would 
be seen through these filters as unproductive (without historical perspective) ‘wasted 
time’. Looking at this otherwise, as ‘excess time’, Groys offers another perspective. 
If excess time is seen as suspended and delayed, in fact, the postponement of time, 
‘it is precisely because such a wasted, suspended, non-historical time cannot be 
accumulated and absorbed by its product that it can be repeated’.24 Touching on 
Nietzsche’s eternal return and Bataille’s excess as modernity’s (repressive) ideology 
of progress (both of which are constituted in repetition), Groys points as well to 
Deleuze’s ‘literal repetition’ as being ‘radically artificial’ as a means of ‘initiating a 
rupture in the continuity of life by creating a non-historical excess of time through 
art’.25 But he intends to propose a new way of thinking the term contemporary so 
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as to be ‘with time’ rather than ‘in time’, suggesting that such art ‘ceases to be 
present, to create the effect of presence – but it also ceases to be “in the present,” 
understood as the uniqueness of the here-and-now. Rather, art begins to document 
a repetitive, indefinite, maybe even infinite present – a present that was always, 
already there, and can be prolonged into the indefinite future.’26 He also points to the 
advent of mass communication networks (Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and so forth) 
as means of distribution through which contemporary art has today become a mass-
cultural practice. Of course, Benjamin posed this similarly with the advent of the 
media of ‘the daily press’ in which ‘at any moment the reader is ready to turn into the 
writer.’27 However, the point here does not hinge on earlier critiques on the status 
of the author, but on a more contemporary distinction, which Groys reconfigures 
under the classical terms of vita activa (the predilection toward speed and movement 
as found in the modernist mentality precisely during the conception of film) and 
vita contemplativa (with its roots in ancient philosophy, typically understood as 
a passive spectatorship). Arguing that if there is still a society of spectacle today 
(Debord), ‘then it seems to be a spectacle without spectators’.28 The notion vita 
contemplativa here is situated in relation to the spectator who is permanently active. 
Potentiality here lies in temporal formulations (as location as such is inaccessible) of 
nomadic movement, which with Virno indicates the absence of univocal actions in the 
presence of a perpetual stream of stimuli. Time-based art, in this sense, eradicates 
the distance between the active and the contemplative (time-based art transforms 
into art-based time).  This collapse of what we here might refer to respectively as the 
bios and nous, offers an example of how cultural plasticity operates by creating new 
modes of intensive temporalities. 
From a neuroscientific perspective, the brain has its potentiality embedded into its 
neuroplasticity and its static living appendages, its neurons, dendrites and synaptic 
entities as well as its dynamic and oscillatory potentials. As we will see, these are 
flexible entities and are sculpted and complexified by the world we interact with. This 
is done in the context of a genetically prescribed unfolding narrative responding 
to events both inside and outside of our intellectual grasp. Put simply, the 
neurobiologist Marcus Jacobson defined neural plasticity as a process through which 
the nervous system adjusts to changes in the internal and external milieus.29 Central 
to this discussion is Steven Quartz and Terrance Sejnowski’s ‘The Neural Basis of 
Cognitive Development: A Constructivist Manifesto’.30 The paper provides an account 
of neural constructivism in terms of the dynamic interaction between neural growth 
mechanisms and environmentally derived neural activity. Quartz and Sejnowski 
demonstrate how this relationship between neural development and environment 
provides for a dynamic and flexible form of learning identified as ‘constructive 
learning.’ Their constructivist model posits progressive growth against that of the 
selectionist model (selective induction) which emphasizes regressive mechanisms. 
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By this they offer a way of understanding the complexity and interactivity of the 
brain as it becomes dependent on the environment as something other than 
what has been preconditioned or prescriptive (Edelman) by its neurobiological 
architecture. ‘Our view is that the human brain’s development is a prolonged period 
in which environmental structure shapes the brain activity that in turn builds the 
circuits underlying thought. In place of pre-wired modules, patterned activity 
builds up increasingly complex circuits, with areas staging their development.’31 
For Quartz and Sejnowski, the environment is understood as active, dynamic and 
non-stationary. They suggest that while ‘most natural systems are only confronted 
with ecological change, human cognition requires highly flexible and adaptive 
representations to accommodate both cultural and technological innovations.’32 
Scott Kelso, in ‘Metastable Mind’ offers a reading from the perspective of brain 
science developed through his significant work on coordination dynamics.33 
‘Coordination dynamics deals specifically with informationally coupled, self-
organizing systems, where information is meaningful and specific to coordination 
tasks and functions: functional information.’34 Kelso posits that, in disciplines as 
diverse as physics and philosophy, it appears that thinking sits most comfortably 
in dualisms and binary (dialectic) oppositions. These contrary states are easily 
grasped by the structural logics contained in most epistemological systems. Much 
harder to grasp is the notion that ‘contraries are complementary’. Kelso puts 
forward the model of metastability as, among other things, a new conception of 
brain organization; one that reduces hierarchical couplings between ‘the parts 
of a complex system while allowing them to retain their individuality’.35 A theory 
that allows for both local (‘segregative’) and global (‘interactive’) processes to 
coexist as opposed to conflict. It is not possible to recount the scientific basis and 
nuances of his specific argument here; however, it is important to note that in many 
ways this argument accounts for an understanding of brain functions in a manner 
that contributes much to Gregory Bateson’s account of a ‘difference that makes a 
difference’. Particularly relevant in this regard would be the manner in which Kelso 
discusses time (dwell time and phase dynamics) in terms of persistence, distribution, 
and destabilizations that intricately ‘switch’, or in the terms offered above, we might 
say modulate. As Kelso has written elsewhere, metastable coordination dynamics 
‘also rationalizes William James’s beautiful metaphor of the stream of consciousness 
as the flight of a bird whose life journey consists of “perchings” and “flights”.  Both 
tendencies appear to be crucial: the former to summon and create thoughts, the 
latter to release individual brain areas to participate in other acts of cognition, 
emotion and action.’36
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Epigenetic Reconfigurations 
If plasticity can be understood as a state of having multiple possibilities, epigenesis 
is here understood in broad terms as the process through which select possibilities 
are made stable within a given context. Put otherwise, if plasticity is generally 
understood as an underlying property of the brain, epigenesis constitutes the 
process through which this property is reconfigured. Following, for instance, 
Gerald Edelman’s neural Darwinist approach, the brain that one is born with, with 
its neural plastic potential, may become sculpted through a process of ‘neuronal 
group selection’ by existing environmental contingencies.37 Parallel to this, yet from 
a different perspective, as we saw above with Quartz and Sejnowski, is the neural 
constructivist approach. Both of which delineate the ways and means by which 
neural biological matter might be organized through epigenesis by the manmade 
milieu (meaning nature is open, possessing varied biological propensities). In other 
words, if the previous section on plasticity concerned the conditions of the brain and 
mind at birth as a reservoir of potential; this section addresses a becoming brain that 
can through the forces of epigenesis be sculpted by the world. Here we deliberate on 
a world transformed from one of a natural kind to that of a cultural kind. Of course, 
culture is continuously transforming; and both philosophy and architecture mirror 
and engender many of these changes.  
In thinking on the effects of the environment on the brain, Bruce Wexler offers a 
scientific perspective that is equally accessible from a theoretical outlook.38 In 
‘Shaping the Environments that Shape our Brains: A Long Term Perspective’, Wexler 
suggests that sensory input provided by the environment (cultural and biological) 
generate complex ensembles of systems and functions that form brain and human 
activity. ‘Psychological processes and cognitive operations like perception, 
memory and thinking are properties of these ensembles and functional systems.’39 
Information, how it is processed and stored in culture through dynamic distributions 
of artefacts and institutions, takes on an importance equal to, if not greater than 
(at least in terms of rapidity, incrementality, and variability) biological processes 
stored in stable sequences (such as DNA molecules). Neuroplasticity, accordingly, 
provides a key function with respect to the evolution of the human brain both within 
an individual lifetime and during the evolution of the species over time. The potential 
of neuroplasticity (and the neurochemical mechanisms that support it) also indicates 
the adaptive function of neurons to supplement selective processes (for instance the 
rerouting of visual with auditory input in the auditory cortex). Taken to an extreme, in 
aesthetic theory, this phenomenon is related to what is referred to as synaesthesia. 
Wexler will, however, focus more closely on the human rearing environment in order 
to make his claims about the significance of cultural environments, in other words, 
the influences of a more localized environment on the evolution of human behaviour 
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as man incorporates, transforms, and extends his modalities of thinking and doing. 
Thus, within a neuroscientific perspective we should grasp that ‘environment-
induced neural activation shapes brain development to be consistent with the largely 
human-made environment.’40 Here we are speaking directly of the matter that makes 
up the human sociocultural environment – music, architecture, art, media, and 
language, as well as political, social, and cultural institutions. 
In addressing the emergence of cities, Wexler identifies ‘population density, 
increased leisure, role specialization and increasingly complex social organization’41 
as critical factors that fundamentally altered relationships between people and the 
physical environment (significantly altering the ‘rearing environment’ so crucial 
to the evolutionary capacity of the brain). He also points to the powerful shift that 
took place due to the advent of symbolic systems, which extended human memory 
and broke down the barrier between internal states and external manifestations of 
those states. Foucault, too, had pointed to the moment where life was introduced 
into history as the moment that economy, originally understood as the governing 
of families, and politics, or the governing of peoples, became intertwined, forming 
new dispositifs of bio-power.42 And although he does not speak on this directly, 
Wexler also points to commerce as an influence that allows new forms of highly 
stable communities to emerge. In urban studies, for instance, against the long-
held perspective that finds cities emerging out of the shift from hunter-gatherer 
communities to the cultivation of agrarian societies (V. Gordon Childe) – leading to 
a Marxist archaeology approach arguing the impact of (agricultural) surplus value  – 
there are also those who find the development of nomadic migration and trade routes 
to be the critical factor in the formation of cities (Jane Jacobs). In other words, cities 
do not emerge only as an agglomeration of their natural surroundings, but are a 
product of networks of complex resources and activities by which we understand 
a dynamics of mobility as highly relevant to the generation of constellations of 
exchange (economic, social, cultural, and political). Later developments (whether 
artisanal, concerned with manufacturing, industrial, or post-industrial) only served 
to establish cities as more intensified seats of material and immaterial production 
further extending the complexities of these networks of organization. Of course, this 
schematic sketch does nothing to explain the more significant relationship between 
the formation of cities and formulation of societies. But, it is possible that there 
remain insights into these histories as they relate to the evolutions (and revolutions) 
of urban models through the concept of cognitive architecture. 
Questions pertaining to the brain – its function, structure, relation to cognition 
and, of course, mind – are as old as philosophy itself. And if epigenetics can be 
broadly understood as the unfolding development in an organism, we also take 
this to indicate the unfolding of developments (specific histories) in thinking about 
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matters of brain, and as situated within certain philosophical, psychological, and 
neuroscientific perspectives on such things as cognition, mind, intellect, and self. 
For instance, John Protevi engages intricately with Wexler’s work. In ‘Deleuze and 
Wexler: Thinking Brain, Body, and Affect in Social Context’, Protevi provides a 
reading of Wexler in relation to the ‘4EA’ approach (embodied, embedded, enactive, 
extended, affective).43 Protevi’s focus is on three areas or conceptual underpinnings, 
which we find particularly relevant to the concerns of this chapter: ‘an ontology of 
distributed and differential systems’ as found in the notion of the virtual; the idea 
of ‘multiple subjectification practices’, as opposed to an abstracted subject (‘the’ 
subject) as typically addressed in embodied mind theories; and a recasting of the 
notion of affect into a thematizing of ‘political affect.’44 In his work, the three are 
interwoven and can be read as a ‘radical relationality’ – a term Protevi utilizes in 
describing Wexler’s work. 
From a different perspective, Charles Wolfe points to the ‘social turn’ in theories 
of cognition. In ‘From Spinoza to the Socialist Cortex: Steps Toward the Social 
Brain’, Wolfe traces a specific philosophical history of the brain that runs 
seamlessly through a network of relations from Spinoza and Marx to early Soviet 
neuropsychologists Lev Vygotsky and Alexander Luria, to the more recent European 
philosophies of Deleuze, Virno, and Toni Negri.45 This trajectory situates thinking 
regarding the brain within its sociopolitical framework and naturalistic aspects of 
development (forming a unique materialist perspective), which Wolfe describes as 
the ‘Spinozaist Brain’. He briefly addresses the idea of an individual or individuated 
subject, but his focus is not the importance of inter-relationality between persons 
in a collective or ‘common’ environment. Communication, in this account, is not 
merely the transferring of information, but what would be understood as the 
affective dimension of communication. Throughout this reading Wolfe leads us to 
understand that the social (sociability) qualities of our mental being are considered 
a fundamental property of the brain. ‘Exactly as a contemporary practitioner of 
“social” or “affective” neuroscience might have it, the passions are not properties 
of an essential human nature, or an isolated individual, but rather of a relational 
spectrum between a plurality of individuals. Instead of Descartes’ cogito ergo 
sum, Spinoza says homo cogitat, “man thinks”: there is no foundational self, but 
always a process – a network.’46 This is reminiscent of Bergson’s formulation that 
‘consciousness is’ as set against the Husserlian formulation that consciousness is 
always ‘consciousness of’ (something). In other words, as Spinoza does not require 
an internal correlate (in the form of ‘I’) neither does Bergson require an external 
correlate (in the form of a ‘thing’). These are externalist and relational concepts, in 
the sense discussed here, they form (epigenetic) reconfigurations.
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The question we are dealing with here all, in one manner or another, ask or provide 
for a formulation of self. Addressing architecture in relation to ontologically driven 
formations of selfhood: ‘architecture as an object (objectum) that materially opposes 
us, us as beings that are subjects – plastic, mimetic beings that are sub-jected 
to the structures imposed by architecture.’47  Two contrasting models that have 
served to configure our possible experience of architecture have been sketched by 
Lukas Ebensperger, Suparna Choudhury, and Jan Slaby in their work on cognitive 
architecture. The first being the imposition of a geometric idealization of space 
that affords all objects a location (measurable and fixed). In this account, location 
becomes an external property that can be defined by and projected onto a system 
of coordinates and space thus provides a geometric-mathematical predetermination 
of ontology. The second, viewed from a phenomenological perspective, develops 
notions of space and time as directly derived from experience. In this account, 
space is internalized and transcribed with quotidian practices. The point, however, 
is not to map well-known perspectives on theories of architecture with the tools 
of neuroscience but to examine how such empirical fascinations and ontologically 
driven matters contribute to our experience (not merely our understanding) of 
architecture as it relates to the formulation of selfhood. A question that remains 
central to many urban theorists as well. Architecture ‘shapes our existential-space, 
out of which we formulate our self-understanding’.48 This could be said more 
directly: architecture and the physical environment shape our brains.
Importantly, Ebensperger, Choudhury and Slaby also point to studies in architecture 
and design that lean heavily on principles of environmental behaviourism – empirical 
and psychological studies, they suggest, that have no need to for the sciences 
that study the brain. Thus, they posit the question, why does the brain matter? 
Although they do not develop this observation, we have noted it here as it points 
to an earlier interest (ca. 1970s) in architecture and urban research that sought 
to illicit so-called positive behaviours from people(s) as a legitimate domain of 
design practice. Social engineering (planning practices similar to those discussed 
in Lazzarato, Tarde, Foucault, and Lefebvre, among others), hegemonic exertions 
of what constituted a ‘good society.’ In relation to our concerns this can be 
seen as an example of a practice that sought to capture and reproduce (through 
biopolitical means) a homogeneous and well ‘disciplined’ society. However, the most 
insightful critique on architecture and urban practice launched by Ebensperger, 
Choudhury and Slaby warns that current discourses and practices adopting a 
‘neuroarchitecture’ label tend to ‘prioritize ‘biologistic- and neuronally-reductionist 
descriptions’ of subject/object ontologies.49 Focusing on the ANFA (Academy of 
Neuroscience for Architecture), they suggest that there is danger in placing too 
much faith in neuroscience as a foundational approach to architecture as it validates 
the speculative claim that neuroscience has a privileged access to human nature. 
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In other words, according to the authors, these (too facile) approaches somehow 
conflate selfhood and ‘brainhood’. We, too, believe in remaining wary of disciplines 
that install a technoscientific (reifying and objectifying) or positivist outlook on the 
quest for a meaningful formulation of selfhood; which, the authors of ‘Designing the 
Lifeworld’ contend, remains at the core of every existentially relevant philosophy.  
Administering Attention 
Language and culture are powerful immaterial and material forces in the sculpting 
and administration of both experience and cognitive responses. Lazzarato identifies 
memory and attention as the key components in understanding how (noo)power 
exerts force in societies of control. Here we find that it is the incorporeal dimension 
of bodies that are now fixed in the crosshairs of the forces (acting on forces) of our 
contemporary life-world. We might also consider how institutions and organizations 
concerned with the exertion of power deploy means (in tertiary economies) to hype 
up selective nodes of information that accentuate administrative power over not 
only attention and memory, but also, with respect to cognitive capital, desire. Of 
course, there is also a well-instantiated practice that puts these theories to work; 
we are speaking naturally of what is currently referred to as the attention economy. 
Data driven algorithm design generates abstract machines, apparatus of a new 
enlightenment.50  Commodities, now linked together as branded networks, form 
intricate arrangements and systems whose primary purpose is to intensify their 
desired quotient. The so-called global marketplace now generates powerful and 
complex networks of attention that further serve to define not only economic but, 
moreover, political and aesthetic regimes. We can no longer speak solely within 
the rubrics of immaterial labour, nor within that of the so-called general intellect 
(Marx).51 Or, from the neuroscience perspective as Kelso describes: ‘active, dynamic 
processes like “perceiving,” “attending,” “remembering,” and “deciding,” that are 
associated with the word thinking are not restricted to particular brain locations but 
rather emerge as patterns of interaction among widely distributed neural ensembles 
and in general between human beings and their worlds.’52
Discourse on the notion of attention is often framed within terms relating to 
the principle of motion/rest and time-space: dynamic processes, static states, 
properties, qualities, successions, simultaneities, hesitations, tendencies, intensities, 
potentials, propensities, etcetera. The importance of the relationality (perhaps 
‘radical relationality’) such terms articulate with respect to spatiotemporal (or 
temporalspatial predicates and organizations should not be overestimated. Keller 
Easterling writes on disposition, as another highly nuanced term that unfolds a 
multiplicity of relations between the active form and inactive potential. Disposition, 
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she suggests, locates activity, not in movement, but in relationship or relative 
position, in other words, it is a relationship of potentials. This discourse implicates 
modes of change, and for purposes here we would also say that it acts through 
(differential) modulations of perception, habit, memory and attention. Noopolitics, 
Easterling suggests, can be found in ‘interior virtual territory as well as exterior 
physical territory. For instance, ideation and habit of mind project scripts onto the 
urban sphere, and the interactions between these scripts and urban infrastructures 
gradually author the city.’53 Carrying this discussion through the work of such 
thinkers as Gilbert Ryle, Bruno Latour and Gregory Bateson, Easterling writes: 
‘Ryle describes disposition as a latent or inherent property of both materials and 
intentions, Latour retools social science techniques to account for the ever-unfolding 
dispositional nature of sociotechnical networks. Bateson, perhaps most overtly 
landing in the noopolitical territory, posited the cybernetic model as a means to 
create equilibrium amid violent tensions in the mind, the group and the larger 
political scene.’54 In Bateson, disposition is a behavioural property inherent in 
groups. Although we do not find a specific discussion on the concept of attention (as 
presented in this chapter) in Easterling, she speaks instead of a  leaning-towards, or 
being drawn-to, of both active and inactive registers, or forms and forces within what 
she refers to as the contemporary ‘scripting’ of noopolitical organizations. 
In ‘Loose Coexistence: Technologies of Attention in the Age of the Post-Metropolis,’ 
Elie During offers insights into conditions impacting forms of life and living in 
contemporary cities. He suggests that new technologies of information and 
communication have erupted into new and unprecedented regimes of attention, 
which in turn generate new forms of spatiotemporal organizations inseparable 
from those affecting contemporary urban life.55  Of course, the ‘post’-metropolis 
expands on early theories of the metropolis as found in the writings of such thinkers 
as Georg Simmel, Siegfried Kracauer, and Walter Benjamin, as well as figures such 
as Baudelaire’s flâneur. During points to various themes that emerged due to the 
conditions of the early metropolis, such as shock, fragmentation, hyperstimulation.56 
During recognizes this as a pathology commonly attributed to those who dwell in 
large urban centres and likened often to sheer neurasthenia. He notes Simmel’s 
correlation between ‘hyperesthesia and latitude’, resulting in some cases as a 
dulling of sensitive skills. No doubt that, today, we all have our own associative 
memories paralleling these early twentieth-century critiques. However, the focus of 
During’s work does not linger in the past but turns to the mechanisms contemporary 
conditions trigger within a person’s perceptive skills. As well as the developing of 
means with which to process the effect of such things on over-stimulation within a 
regime of attention and its necessary correlate, inattention. 
TOC
 102 Architecture  and the Time  of Space
Distraction here becomes the catchphrase for all the misgivings associated 
with technologies of information and communication – from broadcasting to 
telecommunications, internet interfaces and digital devices in all their major and 
minor keys. New forms of distributed attention (neither scattered nor diffused), 
‘better suits the new figure of the flâneur emerging from the context of ubiquitous 
technologies’.57 Clearly, the spatiotemporal logic of these new environments, 
whether in the screen space of our personal computers or manoeuvring the city, 
needs to be thought on new terrain. During argues convincingly that discourses that 
overemphasize the nature of speed – immediacy of forces acting on mental states 
and perceptual awareness – have distorted concepts of coexistence and simultaneity, 
now an issue of some importance for both theories and practices concerned with 
spatial and temporal interconnectedness. On this account there is no such thing as 
instantaneous action at a distance, not, that is, for living, embodied subjects. That 
it is not only a sense of connectedness, that our hyper-networked era achieves, but 
equally produces specific forms of desynchronization and disconnection. Attention 
then becomes a matter of an individual’s ability to organize their own dispersion. 
Notions such as split attention and distributed attention, rather than distraction, 
better estimate the ‘polyphonic immersion’ of the contemporary subject within 
the material and immaterial fabric and forces of coexistence within urban life and 
urban form. 
Contemporary urban theories turn as equally on the concept of dynamic action 
as the idea of static form. In the work of Lisa Blackman and Jane Harbord we find 
explicit articulation on one of attention theory’s possible contours. In discussing 
attention, or the remaking of attention, within the paradigm of co-enaction, co-
constitution and co-evolution, they both populate and invent new relations between 
actors and agents and the built environment. Addressing new technologies of 
information and communication, the authors point to the rising development of so-
called media cities – dedicated developments ‘more precise and precisely designed 
than the global city and more tactile and fluid than the modernist city’ – explored 
through a case-study of MediaCityUK.58 Through the entangling of both ambient 
communication and digital technologies the place in a media city is at once virtual 
and actual. This leads Blackman and Harbord to investigate the distinction between 
the concepts of media and mediation. The latter possesses virtual potential, and 
more directly suggests informational processes and better identifies somatic 
experiences in affective as well as cognitive relations. As with During, Blackman and 
Harbord point to the problem of attention as arising in the late nineteenth century, 
‘tied to the problem of how a subject maintains a coherent and practical sense of the 
world’.59 Yet the notion on which this study critically turns is that of memory, which 
the authors develop extensively in such terms as trans-subjective, co-enacted, co-
emergent, and post-memory. In this scheme, the dynamic transmission of memory 
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is more affective than cognitive, and it is through the discussion on memory that it 
is possible to consider questions of affect, bodies and the task of ‘re-thinking and 
re-modeling sensation, perception, memory, attention, listening, and emotion’ which 
is how Blackman and Harbord understand cognitive architecture.60 
As we have seen in previous chapters, for Henri Bergson the brain does not so 
much have thinking as its primary function, ‘but that of hindering the thought from 
becoming lost in dream’, and as such the brain is seen as ‘the organ of attention 
to life’.61 The state of dreaming, like that of distraction as discussed in During, has 
another interpretation when read directly from a cognitive neuroscience perspective. 
As the title indicates, in ‘The Industrious Subject: Cognitive Neuroscience’s 
Revaluation of “Rest”’, Felicity Callard and Daniel Margulies explore the other side of 
attention, that is, what happens in the mind when it is in a so-called state of rest.62 
The authors begin by situating their own highly specialized concerns within a broader 
theoretical context. Sketching upon well-founded discourse regarding the knowledge 
economy (knowledge commodity pace Harvey), and following Virno’s account of 
post-Fordism as it eradicates all distinction between labour and non-labour time: 
‘Labour-time now draws upon, indeed depends upon, the life of the mind.’63 But the 
point here is not to reiterate theories founded in philosophy, the social sciences 
and such, in fact, but to issue a challenge to move beyond ‘generic abstractions’ in 
an attempt to explicate the history and scope of terms and constructs that indicate 
humans’ cognitive capacities. Under the rubric of ‘cognitive productivity’ Callard and 
Margulies open the discussion on the brain during activation versus when at rest. 
With this we are led to understand that, here too, such distinctions remain perched 
upon a certain valorization of assiduousness over idleness. Even daydreaming, 
distraction, and the pale thoughts that accompany idle imagination, it seems, 
cannot escape attempts to be harnessed by capitalism’s modes of production. A 
point similarly taken up a bit later in this chapter with respect to ‘capitalism and the 
mutating intellect’.
Callard and Margulies deliver a faceted and succinct genealogy of rest state 
research as it emerged in debates surrounding the cognitive neurosciences 
over the past decade, suggesting that the studies on rest have now developed 
their vocabulary so significantly that they are ‘primed for a neuroscientific 
reframing of inner mental life.’64 In this account, resting state research has 
significant implications for advancing our theoretical understandings of self and 
subjectivity. For instance, research in cognitive psychology have re-conceptualized 
understandings of the default mode, leading to hypotheses on such things as the 
future-oriented (prognosticating) nature of the resting brain, the importance of 
stimulus independent thought and ‘self-related processing, episodic memory, social 
cognition, and sense of agency’.65 The default mode function is subsumed in what 
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would emerge as a default mode network. Inattention, it seems, may indeed be very 
creative as Virno suggests, certainly it needs to be reconsidered on new grounds. 
Neuroscientific research carried out in advancing an understanding of rest also 
points to a possible reorientation of thought models within the humanities and social 
sciences in theorizing a notion of self in respect to non-purposeful (non-deliberate) 
activity. ‘It is our contention that through the reconfiguration of rest, the resting 
brain has been territorialized: it is conceptualized and materialized as a matrix that 
is constituted as perpetually productive, as intrinsically creative, and as thrown 
toward the future.’66 This further extrapolates to possible reconfigurations of our 
understanding of memory. Through such things as mind wandering, daydreaming, 
or the otherwise heretofore perceived aimless journeys of the mind, memories 
themselves become created. In terms of Bergson’s philosophy, memories are not 
memories of perceptions, or mere recollections of events. In rest state research the 
purpose of memories may well be, ‘less for leisured reminiscing, as in the famous 
example of Proust’s madeleine, and more as a knowledge-base that guides our lives 
in an increasingly formed manner.’67 With this, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
we are no longer in the domain of Proust’s mémoire involuntaire; but still in that of 
Bergson’s mémoire pure with its intimate relation to the present.
The tendency to see distraction, absentmindedness and the like as opposed to 
attention is suffuse through modernist discourse; and as During shows, today 
this opposition remains pervasive. However, we also now find that ‘network brain 
activity “at rest” is mapped on to the psychological category of attention, such that 
attention’s opposite no longer exists.’68 Yet, concerns over capitalism’s desire to 
harness all forms of creativity in cognitive capital might give us pause. Callard and 
Margulies also raise the concern that ‘uncovering the mystery of the resting state 
might also be the moment in which its mystery is colonized.’69 Resting-state research 
demands exploring whether such research contributes to the strengthening or to 
the weakening of the creative capacities of human subjects. It is impossible not to 
agree with the Callard and Margulies when they suggest that their colleagues in the 
humanities and social sciences might well have something here to learn.
The Noo-Sensorium
The implications of questions on the nature of such things as sensation, affect, 
perception, memory, and experience may once have sat comfortably solely in the 
categories of vitalist and aesthetic philosophy, yet today, as we hope to have shown 
here, they extend to the neurosciences as well as economic and political theory in a 
multiplicity of ways. This section could have been titled ‘the governing of the senses’,  
owing to ‘the distribution of the sensible’ following Rancière, whereby politics and 
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the arts construct material rearrangements of signs and images producing real 
effects that define ‘variations of sensible intensities, perceptions and the abilities 
of bodies’.70 However, once the issue of individuality and commonality are set 
against notions of the bios and nous in all their permutations, matters of materiality 
come under fire, affecting the logics of perception and experience. As with the 
section on plasticity, the capacity of art and architecture to generate new modes of 
temporalities is crucial to understanding what we here term the ‘noo-sensorium’. 
Here we are no longer dealing with the sensorium as the sum of perception seated 
in sensation and focused on space or the relation to objects (visual or haptic), nor 
on traditional modes of aesthetic representation. Time now becomes the horizon 
on which the contours of perception, experience, memory, and sensation are 
traced. Time-technologies as apparatuses (Deleuze) and social machines (Virno) 
reconstitute sensibilia through both affective and intellectual processes. It is 
necessary to consider not only the processing of data (immediate and mediated) in 
relation to the body (active/reactive), as such, but also the processing of data within 
a mind that is increasingly directed toward the future (active/prognosticating). 
This was touched upon just above in referring to the way we are now understood 
to construct memories during states of rest – not memories of perceptions, but 
memories forming perceptions. Or, as one neuropsychologist has put it: ‘To conjure 
up an internal representation of the future, the brain must have an ability to take 
certain elements of prior experience and reconfigure them in a way that in its totality 
does not correspond to any actual past experience … the ability to manipulate and 
recombine internal representation critically depends on the prefrontal cortex and the 
emergence of this ability parallels the evolution of the frontal lobes.’71
John Rajchman’s work, ‘Deleuze’s Time, or How the Cinematic Changes Our Idea 
of Art’, begins with a reminder that there are times when our thoughts and ideas 
can no longer be held in old thought models, when new constellations arise in 
which ‘upheavals in sensibilities’ call for an entirely ‘new image of thought’.72 This 
new image of thought is that which Deleuze and Guattari have termed noology. In 
taking up his works on cinema, Deleuze sought to address mutations occurring in 
society in relation to images, to space and time, and place.73 We are speaking here 
of a continuous multiplicity, of time no longer grasped as succession and space 
no longer held by simultaneity. Memory too, will come under reconsideration as 
something other, something more than mere recollection or the draw toward a past 
remembrance. This is not so much a disposition to the future, but a multivalent 
present. In Rajchman’s rendering of Deleuze, sensibilia (refracted through Kant) 
become freed from schematic links to understanding, releasing them to artistic 
‘experimentation or invention’.74 Of course, for Deleuze there is a substantial 
correlation between the terms experiment and experience. 
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Cinematic sensibilia emerge from the problematic relation between psychology 
and the image; ‘images’ here are not understood as inner representations located 
or held in our brains or minds, they are related instead to the questions explored 
in neurology and psychology. And as Deleuze’s work on cinema left off in the 
mid-1980s, the question of how to extend his thinking further in light of new 
developments remains one that Rajchman takes up in his discussion on the visual 
arts. Architecture here comes into play as new temporal-spatial experiences of 
movement within time-images: ‘The cinema hall or gallery is “architecture”, just when 
architecture itself is seen in terms of a given dispositif – the darkened room itself 
deriving from a theatrical dispositive transformed by opera, the first modern mass 
form.’75 Reference to Benjamin on the manner in which technologies and media of 
mass production transform our very possibilities of experience is fundamental here.76 
But the comparison runs deep, for we are not merely addressing transformations 
affecting architecture, cinema and art; but shifts within sensorial registers that 
are not yet internalized in human perception. Jameson’s appraisal of architecture 
(inaccessible to perception) reverberates. Rajchman points to a problem with respect 
to the audience, a problem which ‘Deleuze associates … with “thinking with cinema” 
– and, in a singular way, thinking with time-image cinema – is that the “the people 
are missing”; they must yet be invented along with making the film itself.’77 So too 
was the proposition made by Benjamin as to the public’s lack of resonance with lyric 
poetry in his masterworks on Baudelaire.78
Perhaps the noo-sensorium as we have here conceived it, much like the time 
horizon it reflects, is always receding before our grasp. Ina Blom also addresses 
memory, thinking, and the image – the transformative aspect of art as a means to 
govern the senses. In ‘Spectacle versus Cinematic Sociality: Art and the New Media 
Architecture’, she does not explore the image as such, but instead the rejection, the 
eradication of the image within certain artistic inventions/interventions.79 Ruptures 
in time, refusals to capture attention, a refusal at the very site where media imagery 
is said to confront and shape subjects. Questioning how media interacts with and 
challenges ‘the conditions for collective creation under an advanced capitalism that 
engages not just working bodies, but the entire human sensory apparatus – including 
our capacity for perception, cognition, and thinking.’80 Blom studies Guy Debord’s 
Hurlements en faveur de Sade (1952), an early critique of spectacle interrogating 
what had begun to be seen as a radical shift in the structuring of temporalities of 
individual and social memory, and Tobias Rehberger’s 81 Years (2002), a profoundly 
prolonged, thus experientially an a-temporal event. She refers to these examples as 
‘rejections of imagery’, each attesting to different understandings of the way in which 
media interact with human perception, as well as the socio-political consequences of 
this interaction. Both, we believe, contain infinitesimal whisperings on the chromo-
luminescent logic of the senses.
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Blom suggest that in these works, although they are radically different, we see 
less of a concern for the production of images and forms than in an interventionist 
engagement with the forces that structure our everyday life. We will recognize 
Debord’s social critique of mass media by what would become his catchphrase: 
‘society of spectacle’. Here we understand life as no longer authentically lived, but 
merely sustained through endless representations. Similarly, Rajchman points out 
that one of Deleuze’s projects was to reinstall life in place of the subject or self. The 
spectacle as such structures time and reorganizes memory. Estrangement in the 
‘world picture’ is intensified in the image-world.81 However, while Heidegger spoke 
to an externalization – we cannot enter the picture, but must observe it from the 
outside – Blom’s reading of Debord, speaks to an internalization – we cannot escape 
the concentration of the gaze, the continuous flow of images that capture both eye 
and mind, and our ‘entire cognitive and sensorial apparatus’.82 As one might imagine 
with half a century separating Debord and Rehberger’s works, the latter’s reduction 
of experience works differently. In fact, Blom suggests, 81 Years even seems to 
pass beside the paradigm of watching, as the ‘nothing to see’ derives not from the 
lack of visual events, but from the ‘sheer duration’ of a work that cannot be held 
within a person’s span of attention. Time out of joint, indeed. Images, here not as a 
phenomenon emerging from subjective imagination, but as ‘autonomous material 
instances’: streams of light and the flow of signals, not meanings. Signaletic material 
registering a sensation of movement that is impossible for human perception 
while, equally, capable of producing new forms of perceptual and sensorial and 
effects. Blom exemplifies this further with a turn to architecture, or more precisely, 
an intimate spatiotemporal exchange between a film and a set (not the film-set) 
by Philippe Parreno and Francois Roche, entitled respectively, The Boy from Mars 
by the film-maker and Hybrid Muscle by the architect. What her rendering of this 
work expresses is the permeability of succession with simultaneity, two perfectly 
reiterative material durations. An opening onto ‘time-in-general [is] a form of radical 
temporalization’, as Blom suggests, ‘whose only real correlate is the “sense of time” 
produced in the human brain’.83 We might understand this as an example of the 
permeability between matter and time, between the senses and their new modes 
of experience as located in the contours of the noo-sensorium. We would like to 
recall and reframe Benjamin’s conception of the aura: ‘the unique phenomenon of 
a distance, however close it may be’, in the light of our contemporary technology 
rethought as the unique consciousness of proximity, however distant it may be. 
Jordan Crandall exposes a different reading of proximity and distance, of coordinates 
(co-ordinations) of temporal-spatial and cognitive-sensorial events. In ‘Movement, 
Agency, and Sensing: A Performative Theory of the Event’, Crandall provides a virtual 
lexicon of the terms and conditions within which both human and machinic agency 
interact, interoperate, inter-immerse.84 A Borgesian taxonomy of technologies of 
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information: networks of networks within networks. Through techniques of tracking, 
of tracing (codifications of movements), cartographies of surveillance, data-mining, 
(locationing of agential articulation), sensors, processors, and filters (‘centres 
of indetermination’), the author unfolds a new continent in thinking the agent as 
actor. Or, perhaps we should speak rather of an actor, following Deleuze in his 
conceptualization of ‘a life’ as ‘expressing singularities or events that coexist with the 
accidents of the life that corresponds to it’.85 There is something at once ‘inhuman 
and vital’ in Crandall’s reading of agency, of apparatuses and prosthetic devices of 
extension that both expand and contract human and non-human perception and 
action into realms that even the imagination is just able to touch.86  The sensorium 
in Crandall is related to something other than (mere) sensory faculties of animate 
bodies. Wolfe’s reading of Spinoza suggests that ontology makes no clear-cut 
distinction between the natural and artificial. And his account of agency in Negri as 
well as that of scaffolding in Clark, could be instructively read in relation to Crandall. 
Of course, in the case of distributed cognitive systems, the body (itself already a 
distribution system), the human is only one kind of actor among countless others. 
A body, in Deleuze, much like the agent in Crandall, can be almost anything: ‘it 
can be an animal, a body of sounds, a linguistic corpus, a social body; yet, a body 
must be defined as a unity of parts, parts held together relationally and having a 
capacity to affect and be affected both internally and externally. But in all the bodies 
and their actions and interpenetrations, which Deleuze sometimes calls resonance 
and interference, there is also the incorporeal, which for the stoics lies in making 
a line of separation pass no longer between the sensible and the intelligible.’87 
Affect, in Crandall’s account, is a vitality, a pure potentiality. And further, it is ‘an 
undifferentiated, moving kaleidoscope of sensations and states … a form of activation 
that is not necessarily available to the conscious mind, but is shared nonetheless 
by the synaesthetic perceptual faculties of the body substrate – including the 
proprioceptive [and] the visceral … . Agency acts through combinatory practices, 
assemblages that span familiar designations and ontological distinctions, and which 
connect deep into the realms of the somatic-sensorial, and the imaginary.’88 
Bergson’s pathology of duration is here echoed in what we can refer to as 
Crandall’s pathology of the (performative) event. What actors may become, what 
new molar organizations take place – that is the concept of organism or machine 
– depends also on the event as understood by science. In the theory of science as 
événementielle, scientists are more and more concerned with singular events of 
an incorporeal nature that are affected in bodies, in states of bodies, in completely 
heterogeneous assemblages. In Crandall there are heterogeneous actors, bodies and 
the events that pass across irreducible domains, there are lines that shoot between 
domains – interregnums – and science and technology are part of a new geography 
of resonances to which the term ‘radical relationality’ may here well apply.89
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Capitalism and the Mutating Intellect
There is an important distinction to be made between so-called neoliberal economies 
(global capitalism) and emerging theories of cognitive capitalism. Not that the 
mental and cognitive were absent in the earlier forms of capitalism, but that the 
degree to which the mind and the mental are engaged by those power structures 
(soft power) – and how they have been inflected into our very patterns of thought 
– has never been as rigorously pursued or intense. One might add simply that if 
globalization can be generally said to act to spatially reconfigure our geographic 
world, then cognitive capital further acts through a reconfiguration of the temporal 
structures that also serve to mediate such things as memory and attention. This time 
of space no longer refers to capitalism solely as a mode of production of material 
goods and labour. Neither does it simply insinuate immaterial labour and goods 
prevalent in neoliberal economies, nor organizations of power and distribution of 
intensive networks that capital production reproduces. We are here referring to 
highly complex sets of tangible and intangible forces and factors – simultaneously 
integrated and dispersed – in the production of political-aesthetic cosmologies and 
socioeconomic ecologies. In this contemporary moment, we are fully immersed 
in new networks of relations, and subjectivities. These are both empowering and 
coercive means and distributions of relations of forces – biopower and noopower – 
operating through and within both biopolitics and noopolitics. 
The ‘mutating intellect’ indicates the moving, shifting, and transformative capacity of 
ideas, or of ‘thinking’ as opposed to ‘thought.’ It is neither necessarily evolutionary 
(if evolution implies an ascendance to a more refined or advanced organization); 
nor does it intend a so-called ‘global-mind’ or ‘universal-consciousness’ (as found 
in Vladimir Vernadsky or Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s concept of the noosphere). It 
cannot be subsumed in the notion of the general intellect as discussed above.  This 
does not, of course, mean that the mutated intellect is not based in a collective 
or commons, in fact it may well loosely approximate the Ego Sum = Eco Cum as 
formulated by Jean-Luc Nancy.90 And naturally, as we hope to have already made 
clear, we do not consider the notion of intellect as solely belonging to the domain of 
‘human’ thinking, as it transgresses into both natural and artificial agency in all its 
complex and nuanced permutations. 
In ‘Mutations in Contemporary Urban Space and the Cognitive Turning Point of 
Capitalism,’ Yann Moulier Boutang presents an argument that holds particular 
significance for architecture and urban practice.91 He presents an insightful reading 
of the current state of political economy and cognitive capitalism grafted upon 
the economy of contributions and an ecological argument based upon what he 
refers to as ‘beeconomics’, concluding with a compelling call to urban designers. 
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Reformulating the principles of the noosphere, he situates his discussion of the 
noopolitic. Pointing out in his opening comments that since the scientific turning 
point that enunciated our human capacity to decimate the globe (identified with 
Oppenheimer at Los Alamos), what once sat comfortably in the domain of the bios 
shifted to the nous: ‘The potential of catastrophic actions is both implicit and explicit 
within the efforts of intellectual activity.’92 Both literally and figuratively, Moulier 
Boutang extols the beehive as an exemplary model of a healthy socioeconomic and 
ecologically viable society. Bee colonies are endangered and the author reminds 
us that without bees the entire ecosystem will collapse. He projects the idea of 
pollination (one of the bee’s most fundamental functions) on society. Corresponding 
to pollination Moulier Boutang identifies various modes of circulation of information, 
knowledge, affect, and care. This corresponds well to our understanding of 
noopower. An information-based society (whether codified or implicit) increasingly 
relies on intangibles. But, as previously discussed, these immaterialities are 
reconfiguring the entire socioeconomic system through growing intensities of 
diffusion (‘networks of networks’) at a virtually global scale. The question to ask, the 
further parallel to be made, is how capitalism can engender positive externalities 
such as those found in pollination? Positive externalities (negative ones as well) are 
understood as conditions resulting indirectly from the activity of a primary function. 
Positive (or negative) spin-offs some might say in a simplified way.
If industrial and mercantile capitalism captured the value of mental effort through 
such things as patents and copyrights and intellectual property (still belonging 
to internal models of equivalency); cognitive capitalism has long understood 
that greater value can be extracted from such ‘pollinations’ than from material 
production; opening, in fact, an entirely ‘new continent of wealth for capitalist 
valorization’.93 Examples such as data mining, information search engines, and on-
line networking exemplify new forms of cognitive capitalism that have become apt at 
capturing externalities. The problem, Moulier Boutang points out, is that economics 
based on market output (relations of equivalencies in their measurable or monetary 
form) has not yet developed a model to correctly value these externalities. 
Borrowing form Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation of 1944 (identifying 
three fundamentals of market economy in capital, labour, and money), Moulier 
Boutang suggests that there is a new ‘great transformation’ taking place due to 
new relations between ownership and property. We would add to his discussion on 
intellectual property, housing rights for those who are unable to own property.94 
Transformations that cannot help but have profound repercussions and impacts on 
our conceptions of space. Structures, form, geometric segregations, conventions, 
order, and hierarchies, so too the advent of digital techniques, computational 
repetition and networks – res extensa extended. Boutang offers a glimpse of the 
TOC
 111	 From	Biopolitics	to Noopolitics
history of architecture as ‘the complex coexistence of pieces of Euclidian space 
situated between a global arrhythmic fabric [that] reflects the incorporation of the 
virtual through digital devices with respect to the way in which the brain works, 
communicates and lives.’95  But then, there is the ‘chiasmus of political economy and 
ecology’: a structure that requires urban architecture to fundamentally change.96 
Naturally, the terms we use to identify these relatively new configurations, must 
also be held to scrutiny. Warning against the tendencies in the humanities and 
social sciences to too quickly appropriate terms and ideas issuing from the neuro- 
and cognitive sciences is not so much a guarding of disciplinary boundaries as 
an appeal that we might grasp the full consequences of the cross-application of 
terminologies within diverse discursive practices. As Gabriel Rockhill argues, we must 
also challenge the moniker ‘globalization’ as a reckless ‘conceptual abbreviation’ 
that holds everything from economics, politics, society, culture, to technology within 
its grasp. In ‘A Specter is Haunting Globalization’, Rockhill argues that the implicit 
belief that globalization is actually as geographically extended as the term itself 
implies identifies the distance that exists between words and things.97 Reminding us 
that if globalization has indeed, as it purports, created a singular world – a unified 
economic market, world-wide information network, homogenized cultural products, 
and so forth – then ‘globalization allows us to resist its consequences only if we are 
already subject to its effects’.98 The implications of such a reality (virtual or actual) 
should be seen to have profound effects on cognitive constructions of self and world. 
Naturally, globalization cannot be captured as a ‘word’, or reproduced as a ‘thing’, 
it ‘emerges from practices linked to a specific schematization of the world, practices 
that have, moreover, been effective insofar as they have helped produce “the thing” 
supposedly described by “the word.”’99  
But it is the spectre of vulgar Marxism to which we turn our focus. The supposed 
antagonist of globalization, it would seem, unwittingly providing the principles for 
its (historical) inevitability. Globalization’s historical centre of gravity seems indeed 
to be immense. The consequence of accepting such an inevitability leads to an 
abandonment of all political and economic responsibility. The invisible hand of the 
market instantiated from Thatcher’s acclaim of neoliberalism in her ‘There Is No 
Alternative’ slogan, to Bush’s bailout of the US economy (businesses and institutions 
that had become too large to be allowed to fail), as well as his non-apologetic 
hubris that delivered a blow to the US constitution (from the Patriot Act, to illicit 
wiretapping, the list goes on and on). Rockhill sees this as ‘naturalizing the economy 
and transforming it into an autonomous authority’, which acting independently of 
any singular or collective agency has the unfortunate consequence of promoting 
‘passive reactivity’.100 Borrowing from Rancière, Rockhill speaks of the idée-force, 
which ‘intertwined with political, social, technological, and economic practices 
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… has played a fundamental role in the imposition of a new world image in which 
a determinist teleology dictates our destiny.’101 And indeed, when any image of 
thought becomes a ‘world-image’ then we are witnessing cognitive capitalism and 
the effects of an action at a distance, resisting the consequences of globalization 
only once we are already subject to its effects. 
So easy it is, or so it appears, to fall into the dark matter of such intellectual 
constructs. Against ideology Rockhill puts forward instead the idea of ‘political 
imaginaries’ as a mode of intelligibility secured in the practical sense of agents. 
A political imaginary, in this account, allows for a world-image that is entwined in 
perceptive and discursive dispositions. And dispositions, according to Easterling, 
offer an unfolding relationship between potentials, and resist codification in favour of 
practice.  This resistance is of significance as we are concerned here with the power 
of words, their force of form as codifications into what some may see as ideological 
meta-narratives working toward the production of subjectivities. Then the works of 
Maurizio Lazzarato offers much for consideration. 
While Lazzarato’s ‘Life and the Living in Societies of Control’ has had a clear impact 
on discourse related to the noopolitic, his essay, ‘“Exiting Language”, Semiotic 
Systems and the Production of Subjectivity in Félix Guattari’ speaks specifically to 
the construction of subjectivity as that which is now most widely produced by modes 
of capitalism within a ‘global mass industry’.102 Subjectivity, he suggests, must be 
considered a key commodity in Guattari, and he begins by outlining the pitfalls of 
structuralist theories of subjectivity as constructed through language. Subsequently 
he utilizes (primarily) Guattari’s work as a foil upon which to conceptualize a more 
adequate understanding of our contemporary capitalist condition. In this view, the 
world is no longer logo-centric, but instead has become ‘machine-centric’. Machines 
here include not only those of technology, but equally those produced by scientific, 
theoretical, economic, social and immaterial models; in other words, machine-centric 
productions of subjectivity as they have been posited in various forms throughout 
this chapter, albeit without the application of that specific moniker. Lazzarato argues 
that ‘statements are issued and received not by individuals, speakers and listeners 
– as in a communicative version of methodological individualism’, but instead (and 
here citing Guattari) ‘by complex assemblages of individuals, organs, material 
and social machines, of semiotic, mathematical and scientific machines’.103 And 
importantly, such machine-centric modalities, or ‘expression machines’ are as much 
‘extra-human, extra-personal’ (economic, scientific, technological, etcetera) as they 
are ‘infra-human, infra-personal’ (perception, memory, sensibility, affect). 
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In ‘Exiting Language’, Lazzarato articulates an account of relevant semiotic systems 
(symbolic semiologies and semiologies of signification) and theories necessary 
in order to develop a semiotic theory that goes beyond the semiotic register in 
(human) language. In other words, he is working towards a theory that will better 
address contemporary modes of capitalist organization. Semiotic systems which, 
as modes of operation, simultaneously organize the ‘production of subjectivity’ and 
the ‘production of the real’. And it is with this that we find Guattari’s assertion that 
we must ‘exit language’. An assertion that Lazzarato will reiterate in discussing what 
he believes to be Guattari’s most radical innovation – the notion of a-signifying 
semiotics. ‘A-signifying semiotics are the semiotics of mathematics, stock quotes, 
money, business and national accounting, computer languages, the functions and 
equations of science; but they are also the semiotics of music, art, and so on.’104 
They work outside the necessity of human (linguistic) signification, or systems of 
correspondence, whereby meaning can be said to take place. Here, correspondence 
takes the form of equivalencies based on an entirely other measure – diagrammatic, 
functional, operative, etcetera; in other words, with Guattari, we simply ‘exit the 
semiotic register’. Of course, no single semiotic register operates in isolation (though 
they can be analysed as such), semiotic systems are ‘mixed’ and Lazzarato will 
return to the signifying semiologies in two accounts: first, that of economics to show 
the power of the market to bring about a mutation of subjectivity, secondly, that of 
human ‘mixed semiotics’ in respect to the emergence of the ‘senses of self.’ This 
sense of self that emerges through language (articulations, utterances, statements) 
is something other yet not dissimilar to that which becomes realized through action 
(perception, memory, visibilities). 
The disciplinary range of the authors included in this chapter arguably demonstrates 
one of the dissertation’s most valuable achievements. It includes works by scholars, 
scientists, and practitioners in the areas of philosophy, neuroscience, cognitive 
psychology, economics, sociocultural theory, architecture theory and more. These 
inputs are conceived as a series of dynamic contingencies to be read as a distributed 
and complex network of ideas, which, taken together, will hopefully help to open 
up the possibility of new vocabularies and tools with which to further develop our 
understandings our contemporary cognitive turn. This is a mark of a decidedly 
transdisciplinary approach. Brian Massumi has written, that ‘just as the body 
lives between dimensions, designing for it requires operating between logics. … 
A translogic is different from a metalogic. It doesn’t stand back and describe the 
way multiple logics and the operative levels they model hold together. It enters the 
relations and tweaks as many as it can to get a sense of what may come.’105
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An extended version of this chapter has appeared in: Cognitive Architecture: From Biopolitics to Noopolitics. 
Architecture & Mind in the Age of Communication and Information, eds. D. Hauptmann, and W. Neidich 
(Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 2010).
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Excursus
On Bergson’s Two Kinds of Multiplicity
Henri Bergson’s first major and early work Time and Free Will: Essay on the 
Immediate Data of Consciousness provides a basis for exploring the concept 
related to the distinction between spatial and temporal categories formulated 
under the terms of discrete and continuous multiplicities. Inclusive to this will be a 
brief introduction to Bergson’s notion of the virtual. This excursus will provide an 
interpretation of the concept of multiplicity that remains close to Bergson’s thinking 
of space as homogeneous and time as heterogeneous. Although with Bergson, and 
certainly Deleuze and similar thinkers, a much more complex way of thinking the 
dynamics of space is indeed possible; the intention here is primarily to provide a 
basis for first decomposing the composite of time and space (or the one and the 
many) in order that in recomposing it we might operate with a clearer understanding 
of the elementary characteristics and attributes of our contemporary ontology of the 
virtual. Deleuze, in paraphrasing Bergson, summarizes the two kinds of multiplicity as 
such: 
One is represented by space (or rather, if all the nuances are taken into account, by 
the impure combination of homogeneous time): It is a multiplicity of exteriority, of 
simultaneity, of juxtaposition, of order, of quantitative differentiation, of difference 
in degree; it is a numerical multiplicity, discontinuous and actual. The other type 
of multiplicity appears in pure duration: It is an internal multiplicity of succession, 
of fusion, of organization, of heterogeneity, of qualitative discrimination, or of 
differences in kind; it is a virtual and continuous multiplicity that cannot be reduced 
to numbers.’1
This excursus will not address architecture and urbanism directly, the concepts and 
notions explored contribute to the ongoing debates within many forms of spatial 
theories engaged in discourse that sees the city as an emergent and dynamic 
phenomenon capable of both acting and being acted upon; the urban entity as it 
offers powerful stabilities while at the same time generating a series of seemingly 
fragmented moments of a captured yet still generative force. While we discuss similar 
issues in other chapters, we have not elsewhere addressed questions of centrality 
that continue to arise even in the face of the seeming agreement that the city is 
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now composed of multiple and diverse parts. Each (part) capable of generating a 
unique ‘centrality’, each amongst the others forming an overall dynamic that cannot 
be explained by merely thinking the multiple within a more traditional notion of 
‘plurality’. 
On Unit and Unity
In Time and Free Will Bergson introduces what may well be one of the most 
underappreciated aspects of his philosophy – the formulation of the logic of 
multiplicities.2 In Chapter I, ‘The Intensity of Psychic States’, Bergson concludes 
with the argument that we cannot discuss psychic states, aesthetic feelings, 
affective sensation or moral feelings in the manner of a scientific quantifiable. He 
demonstrates that ‘feelings’, while they may be expressed in terms of greater and 
lesser intensity, cannot be calculated in direct correspondence with the physical 
function proper to external cause – not, at least, if we maintain that the lesser can 
be contained in the greater as in the case of an extended magnitude. This is not to 
say that intensive states do not seemingly have the effect of changes in degree of 
intensity, but this is due to our habit of conceiving pure temporal states – which 
are affective – in terms of space. Thus, we see change in analytical terms, whereby 
qualitative differences in kind are construed as quantitative measurements of degree 
and accomplished through representational symbols. Put otherwise, in proportional 
relation to affective character and representational symbol, a sensation loses the 
former as it becomes the latter. Our reactions to the change tend to recede, while 
at the same time we perceive the external object (which is its cause). This cause 
perceived as object is extensive and measurable: 
a constant experience which began with the first glimmerings of consciousness 
and which continues throughout the whole of our life, shows us a definite shade 
of sensation corresponding to a definite amount of stimulation. We thus associate 
the idea of a certain quantity of cause with a certain quality of effect; and finally, 
as happens in the case of every acquired perception, we transfer the idea into 
the sensation, the quantity of the cause into the quality of the effect. At this very 
moment the intensity, which was nothing but a certain shade or quality of the 
sensation becomes a magnitude.’3
For the sake of argument, Bergson allows that we can discuss two types of ‘quantity’: 
one intensive, admitting of ‘more and less’ and the other extensive, lending itself to 
measure. Additionally, however, he provides that while the second is supported by 
representation and acquired perception, the former admits of something other, of 
what he terms a confused perception. ‘The idea of intensity is thus situated at the 
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junction of two streams, one of which brings us the idea of extensive magnitude from 
without, while the other brings us from within … the image of inner multiplicity.’4 
With this Bergson introduces the idea of a ‘concrete multiplicity’, as that which 
unfurls itself through time, or more precisely, for Bergson, as that which is unfolded 
in pure duration.5
In the second chapter of Time and Free Will, entitled ‘The Multiplicity of Conscious 
States. The Idea of Duration’, Bergson introduces the problem of the singular 
and the multiple in terms of spatial and temporal orders and uses the case of the 
mathematical numeric in order to identify the confusion between quantitative and 
qualitative categories. Here, number is understood as both an individual collection 
of units and a unity of multiple parts. Conceived either inclusively in a single image 
or in succession as discrete elements, the mistake, he consistently argues, is in 
thinking that succession places these elements in time (durée) as opposed to space.6 
Number, he writes, ‘may be defined in general as a collection of units, or, speaking 
more exactly, as the synthesis of the one and the many’.7 Every number can be 
considered as ‘one’ in that it is given a name (symbol) and can be identified by a 
simple intuition which brings it forth. I can mention the number three for instance 
and you can all bring forth an adequate representation of it. Equally, however, we 
also know that this number can be decomposed into a collection of units (1 +1 + 1), 
and on to infinitum. What is important to the argument is simply to realize that any 
and all such units are identical. There are also cases of enumerations where we can 
draw distinctions with regard to the individual units. One such example Bergson gives 
is when we count the soldiers in a battalion, we are dealing with a numeric identical 
with which we achieve a ‘unity’ (the simplest relation of part to whole). However, 
when we call the roll of names, we are distinguishing particular features which, 
although they can be enumerated, cannot in any way be accumulated to a numeric 
totality. The problem that emerges from this seemingly non-problematic description 
is this: while ‘the idea of number implies the simple intuition of a multiplicity of 
parts or units, which are absolutely alike …  (somehow) they must be distinct from 
one another, since otherwise they would merge at once into a single unit.’8 In this 
view, things that are constituted by duration and motion are not given as objects 
but only appear to arrive as such through the process of ‘mental syntheses’. In our 
consciousness, states permeate one another and imperceptibly organize themselves 
into a whole, and in this way, they are able to bind the past to the present. Conceived 
as a virtual, qualitative and concrete multiplicity, this duration only possesses the 
potential to contain the numeric. With Bergson, in short, we must admit two kinds 
of multiplicity: ‘two possible senses of the word “distinguish”, two conceptions, 
the one qualitative and the other quantitative, of the difference between same and 
other. Sometimes this multiplicity, this distinctness, this heterogeneity contains 
number only potentially, as Aristotle would have said. Consciousness, then, makes 
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a qualitative discrimination without any further thought to counting the qualities or 
even of distinguishing them as several.’9
The question thus arises, what is the mechanism we utilize when conceiving of 
numeric extension? In order to perform such a simple operation as counting we 
have to retain the successive images of a thing (be it concrete – a soldier in a 
battalion, or abstract – the symbolic representation and repetition of the number 
twelve for instance), we set them alongside each other in spatial juxtaposition as 
an ‘extended image’. The problem here is simple, as Bergson observes, we have 
fallen into the habit of believing that we are counting in time as opposed to in 
space. Does experience retort: 1 (second), 2 (seconds), 3 (seconds) and on to 
(temporal) infinitum? Perhaps, but with Bergson, the argument is that numeric, 
linear ‘clock-time’ is nothing more than a spatialization of instants that pre-suppose 
spatial extensity and not temporal intensity, or the life of ‘real duration’. ‘Note that 
the mental image thus shaped implies the perception, no longer successive, but 
simultaneous, or a before and after, and that it would be a contradiction to suppose 
a succession which was only a succession, and which nevertheless was contained 
in one and the same instant.’10 To illustrate the point: It is 12:58 and your train is 
leaving for the airport at 1:07 (thus 9 numerically identical units measured in an 
arbitrary figure we call minutes, between this moment and the moment the train 
departs). How is it then that this numeric extension could be experienced as a ‘unit’ 
of varying intensities? Two scenarios: One, you are safely sitting on the train, your 
luggage stowed and (although in full anticipation of the journey ahead, which forms 
its own unique intensity) you open a book and begin to read. Two, you are running 
through the city, luggage in tow, colliding into one obstacle after another, from 
the red lights that catch you at the cross walks to the kindergarten class waddling 
along hand in hand forming a block as distinct as the construction site that you 
just detoured around, all the while checking the seconds on your watch as they 
relentlessly tick by at a seemingly ascending rate. The question is simple: are these 
two states of temporal extension precisely equal within the particular consciousness 
that perceives them? Whereas we can say empirically, that the numerically extensive 
passage of time will be identical in either case. The answer is clearly that they are not 
equal in concrete experience nor are they identical in perception. 
On the Discrete and the Continuous
Bergson introduces an additional term for this idea of number which implies a ‘visual 
image in space’: discrete multiplicity. And he will later set this against the other idea 
of multiplicity which will come to be known as a continuous multiplicity. The former 
being related to quantitative distinctions and belonging properly to the domain of 
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space and the latter to qualitative differentiations and belonging to the domain of 
time understood as duration (durée). Further, the discrete multiplicity is by definition 
divisible (as discussed above, number can be infinitely divided) and the continuous 
multiplicity by nature indivisible. This brings us back to the problem of the ‘unity of 
the whole’ (every number being both a collection of units and a unity in itself as a 
synthesis of the units which compose it). Bergson writes that ‘there are two kinds 
of units, the one ultimate, out of which a number is formed by a process of addition, 
and the other provisional, the number so formed, which is multiple in itself, and 
owes its unity to the simplicity of the act by which the mind perceives it.’11 Yet, with 
this we are returned to a similar point as mentioned above: if the mind, in its simple 
act of unification forms this perception of ‘the whole’, then it must be able to do so 
only by virtue of the fact that there was a ‘multiplicity’ for it to unify. If we extend 
this further, providing that the moment we analyse this composite and including 
the fact that mathematics, in utilizing provisional units, allows for these units to be 
subdivided without limit, then the question returns us to the fact that we could not 
even conceive of a ‘unity’ made up of fractions if we did not implicitly regard it as an 
extended object, as Bergson puts it, as ‘one in intuition but multiple in space’. And 
to remind us where we are going with this argument, we will rely on one of Bergson’s 
many seemingly curious passages: ‘You will never get out of an idea which you have 
formed anything which you have not put into it; and if the unity by means of which 
you make up your number is the unity of an act and not of an object, no effort of 
analysis will bring out of it anything but unity pure and simple.’12 
We will further examine this distinction before going on to other aspects of this 
argument. If we wish to conceive of the ‘whole’, this provisional unity, as an 
indivisible act (and staying with the argument of numeric distinctions) we will find 
that this conception, thus represented to us by the naming of a unity (3 for instance) 
is also symbolized in the form of a mathematical point, separated from the following 
point by an interval in space. Bergson contends:
We must distinguish between the unity which we think of and the unity which we set 
up as an object after having thought of it, as also between number in process of 
formation and number once formed. The unit is irreducible while we are thinking it 
and number is discontinuous while we are building it up; but, as soon as we consider 
number in its finished state, we objectify it, and it then appears to be divisible to 
an unlimited extent. In fact, we apply the term subjective to what seems to be 
completely and adequately known, and the term objective to what is known in such 
a way that a constantly increasing number of new impressions could be substituted 
for the idea which we actually have of it.13
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It is necessary to introduce the critical distinction between what will come to be 
referred to as ‘virtual’, ‘actual’ and ‘realized’. As previously mentioned, the general 
appearance of an object (here Bergson uses the term ‘body’) as analysed in 
thought will not yield anything more than what is already visible in the mental image 
which we have formed of it.14 Yet the ‘actual’ perception of subdivisions in what is 
undivided, as we have just seen, is precisely what is referred to as ‘objective’. That 
which properly belongs to the mind (in the argument on numeric conception) is the 
‘indivisible process by which it has the capacity to concentrate attention successively 
on different parts of a given space’.15 However, this ‘successive concentration’ 
operates as an extended form of perception, thus it spreads itself out in space, space 
then becomes the very ‘material’ with which the mind builds up the idea of number, 
and thus applies this conceptualization of the spatialized numeric within the very 
heart of thinking the divisible and the indivisible, the unit and the unity. 
It is important to remember that duration (as well as continuous multiplicity) is 
not simply the indivisible, nor is it the non-measurable. Duration has its distinction 
from space in that within the process of change, duration divides only by changing 
in kind as opposed to degree. It is not that it defies all notions of measurability; it is 
just that it must vary its metric principle at each moment of division. Further, with 
this we can include the Bergsonian proposition regarding space whereby he argues 
simply that things are not in space, but rather it is space that is in things. In other 
words, we must not conceive of space as an abstract field upon which things are 
spread out (Cartesian space); but we must understand that it is by virtue of the fact 
that things themselves have extension, that space as such necessarily follows from 
such extensity, that space is in fact in things. Keith Ansell-Pearson reformulates this 
proposition, writing:
It is necessary to give an account of our categories of being and spatial habits 
of representation, to show how they are part of human evolutionary existence; 
space, for example, is a schema of matter which represents the limit of a movement 
of expansion that would come to an end as an external envelope of all possible 
extensions. In this sense it is inadequate to say matter and extensity are “in” space, 
it is rather the other way round.’16 
To reiterate, we have seen that there are ‘two types of multiplicity’ in Bergson. One, 
the discrete, by which we speak of material objects which are localized in space and 
to which the concept of number immediately applies; and the other, the continuous, 
which refers to states of consciousness, and cannot be regarded as numeric unless 
given symbolic representation which subsequently also places them in space. 
(Deleuze will rename these, as well as further extend their theoretical reach, under 
the terms of ‘actual and virtual multiplicities’).17 Before giving an example of a 
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continuous multiplicity we’ll follow one step further in the development of Bergson’s 
argument in order to bring forward a pertinent distinction when thinking through the 
notion of the virtual in its contemporary form. 
On Subject and Object
We make a distinction between these two types of multiplicity when we discuss 
the impenetrability of matter, whereby ‘we sometimes set up impenetrability as a 
fundamental property of bodies, known in the same way and put on the same level 
as (for example) weight or resistance.’18  Suggesting that when we try to picture one 
body penetrating another we must assume an ‘empty space’ in which particles can 
fill this space, merging into the interstitial voids left by the one and/or the other. In 
fact, our thoughts can prolong this process indefinitely in preference to picturing 
two bodies occupying the ‘same place’ at the ‘same time’. But if impenetrability is 
an actual quality of matter, ‘there is no clear reason why we should experience more 
difficulty in conceiving two bodies merging into one another than a surface devoid 
of resistance or a weightless fluid. But, in reality, it is not a physical but a logical 
necessity which attaches to the proposition: “Two bodies cannot occupy the same 
place at the same time”’.19 Reiterating the above, the point is that an assertion 
which insists on the impenetrability of matter does so due to the fact that notions 
of number and space have been inextricably linked. So much so that in stating 
the properties of matter, we are reducing these properties to only those that exist 
properly as properties of number.
Alternatively, when it comes to feelings, sensations and ideas, we can readily accept 
the notion of permeability. The permeability of feelings, of continuous and concrete 
multiplicities, can be easily grasped when we think, for instance, of music. Although a 
musical composition can be symbolically represented – laid out within the ‘discrete’ 
spatial frame of the score, as well as played by virtue of units measured in a precisely 
spatialized time; the experience of listening to, for example, an aria cannot be 
reduced to numeric measure. Bergson uses the example of a chiming clock to press 
this point even further, for although with each strike of the chime we know that one 
note ends and another begins, they persist within our conscious perception, they 
prolong each other in a time proper only to concrete duration. Even if we attempt 
to quantify this ‘experience of permeability’ and argue that a note can be played 
staccato and thus distinguishable from the note which follows or precedes it, this 
does not change our conscious perception of this note which endures throughout 
the composition as we cannot retain the experience of the music if we extend the 
intervals between the notes to the point at which their relation to the composition no 
longer retains its ‘unity’. 
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Science, Bergson argues, ‘works exclusively with measurements, and the measuring 
of time consists in counting simultaneities’.20 In dealing with time the concern 
of physics is with the extremities of time and the illusion is generated that the 
extremities of an interval are identical with the interval itself. What takes place in the 
interval – an actual duration – is neglected and lost sight of, and this means that the 
counting of simultaneities can only take the form of a counting of instants. Bergson 
goes further, arguing that it does not matter at what speed time runs, if the number 
of extremities is indefinitely increased, or if the intervals are indefinitely narrowed, 
these changes would have no great impact on the calculations of time carried out by 
the physicist:
The speed of unfolding of this external, mathematical time might become infinite, 
all the past, present, and future states of the universe might be found experienced 
at a stroke; in place of the unfolding there might be only the unfolded. The motion 
representative of time would then have become a line; to each of the divisions of 
this line there would correspond the same portion of the unfolded universe that 
corresponded to it before the unfolding universe; nothing would have change in the 
eyes of science.21
Of course, our own experience, our own perception of this change in speed would be 
immediately recognized in consciousness. 
The mind is capable of conceiving a succession without distinctions, thinking of it as 
a ‘mutual penetration, an interconnexion and organization of elements, each one of 
which represents the whole, and cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except by 
abstract thought.’22 However, the problem for thought seems almost overwhelming, 
Duration is nonrepresentational and just as we think it, so too it becomes spatialized. 
The composite of space and duration in which we act, in which we actuate (or 
presence) our memories into perceptions, is given to us by experience, not merely 
‘lived’ experience, or ‘immediacy’; but the very condition of experience. Duration 
is experience, but equally it is experience enlarged and gone beyond. For Bergson 
questions of experience go not merely to the state of experience but the very nature 
of the condition of experience. A condition which can only be reached, as Bergson 
argues, beyond the turn, where we engage with our will not the simple effects of 
action but the pure affect of all action (both virtual and real).23 Ansell-Pearson 
similarly writes: ‘the human condition refers not to an existential predicament but to 
accrued evolutionary habits of thought and patterns of action which prevent us from 
recognizing our own creative conditions of existence and which restrict the domain of 
praxis to that of social utility.’24
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Walter Benjamin, in a passage ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction’ writes: ‘during long periods of history, the mode of human sense 
perception changes with humanity’s entire mode of existence. The manner in which 
human sense perception is organized, the medium in which it is accomplished, is 
determined not only by nature but by historical circumstances as well.’  Benjamin is 
referring to technological advancements as having the power to alter the very mode 
of human experience and subsequently the nature of human perception. Bergson, 
foreshadowing Benjamin, also asks: ‘If, in order to count states of consciousness, 
we have to represent them symbolically in space, is it not likely that this symbolical 
representation will alter the normal conditions of inner perception?’ He continues: 
‘in the same way, our projection of our psychic states into space in order to form a 
discrete multiplicity is likely to influence these states themselves and to give them in 
reflective consciousness a new form, which immediate perception did not attribute 
to them’.25  On this account, if we wish to separate our feelings and sensations, our 
ideas, it is necessary to count them, to reduce them to number and represent them 
symbolically in space, as homogeneous units occupying separate positions in space 
and therefore no longer permeate one another. In other words, in order to continue 
this false problem which confuses quantity with quality, we continue to apply to our 
experience of time (durée) the notion of succession, thus discrete and discontinuous 
(extensive and homogeneous) sections. We thus spatialize our experience of time 
as simultaneity. And it is this conflation of time and space that prevents us from 
understanding the condition of the subject/object categories as delimitated on 
the plane, within the multiplicities and singularities of what has come to be simply 
referred to as the virtual.
In closing we would like to offer a beautiful example of a continuous (Bergson) 
and virtual (Deleuze) multiplicity. In the late 1920s William Faulkner captured a 
sympathy with the virtual multiplicity, actualized not as event (pure reserve in 
Deleuze), but as memory and matter, involving a virtual image as both pure space 
and pure time.26 Faulkner, in his novel Light in August, tells the story of Lena, a 
child of the depression, uneducated, unemployed, orphaned at twelve, pregnant and 
searching for the father of her unborn child. This is the story of a journey in search 
of a memory, for once, not so long ago, ‘he said he would send for me’. Lena, waiting 
upon a dusty red ribbon road for a weary ride, and once riding, approaching a town 
where she believes she will find her child’s father, Lucas Birch, these are the lines 
Faulkner writes:
So that at last, as though out of some trivial and unimportant region beyond even 
distance, the sound (of the wagon) seems to come slow and terrific and without 
meaning, as though it were a ghost traveling a half mile ahead of its own shape. 
“That far within my hearing before my seeing”, Lena thinks. She thinks of herself as 
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already moving, riding again, thinking, “Then it will be as if I were riding for a half 
mile before I even got into the wagon, before the wagon even got to where I was 
waiting, and that when the wagon is empty of me again it will go on for a half mile 
with me still in it”.
She waits, thinking, “I will be riding within the hearing of Lucas Burch before his 
seeing. He will hear the wagon, but he wont [sic] know. So there will be one within 
his hearing before his seeing and there will be two within his seeing before his 
remembering”.27
Perhaps in thinking through the questions of the divisible and the indivisible we might 
also ask what is within the hearing before the seeing, what is within the seeing before 
the remembering as it might direct us towards another understanding that refuses to 
conflate the part and the whole, unit and unity; and, ultimately, decompose so that 
it can properly recompose the most critical of composites which we refer to as time 
and space.
A extended version of this text has appeared under the title ‘“like already measures thread rewound upon a 
spool”: (an)notation on Bergson’s two forms of multiplicity’,  in De-/signing the Urban : Technogenesis and 
the Urban Image, ed. Patrick Healy and Gerhard Bruyns (Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 2006).
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27 William Faulkner, Light in August, (New York): Random House, 1990 [1932]), 8–9 (emphasis in original).
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Afterword
Deleuze’s observation in Cinema 2: The Time-Image that ‘the people are missing’, 
was based on his reflection that film-makers in (Western) modern cinema achieved 
the greatest politically focused films not through the presence of people, but through 
their absence. In other words, because they know how to show what is not there, 
how ‘the people are missing’. By this we understand the hope that modern political 
cinema had the potential to invent a new subject (from the subjugation of the masses 
in the first half of the twentieth century). This is a complex idea developed around 
the triad of ‘consciousness, evolution, revolution’, both political and aesthetic. It is 
a schema that challenges the boundary between the public and the private – both 
physically constructed and socially perceived space. Architecture has been presented 
in this volume by a similar absence. In other words, the architecture is missing. And 
yet, it is this absence that is present in every thought that has motivated these texts. 
Said otherwise, an awareness that the people are missing from architecture critique 
acts as a substrate to these writings. Perhaps we, too, need to invent a new subject; 
certainly, it is necessary to consider the ethical and societal impacts of emerging 
technologies and their effect on the built environment and equally, with Benjamin, on 
‘humanity’s entire mode of existence’. 
Considering the city as a process of dynamic emergence, both material and 
immaterial, is the underlying theory that holds the first three chapters together. Live 
Space speaks to the notions of labour, emerging as a critical issue in the discipline 
through critiques of both the practice and the products of architecture in and in 
response to our current neo-liberal society. Cosmopolitan View offers neither a 
prescriptive nor speculative view of the city, but instead asks us to examine the 
framework and the categories in which we identify those who may or may not 
be accepted or allowed to inhabit our cities. We might consider such issues of 
particular import in our contemporary world exhibiting a regression to nationalism 
and thus the tribalism of the ‘us versus them’; or the ‘other’ as both the subject 
and the subjugated of empire building. Lefebvre and the concept of the virtual 
allowed for rich engagement with two philosophers on issues related directly to the 
transformations in our notions of the urban as well as concepts addressing ideas 
of differentiation, change, spaces of flow, and actual and virtual multiplicities, as 
well as assemblages of power, forces of form, and the administration of bodies both 
individual and collective.  These are issues of the socius, of the spatio-political body 
we call the urban, and by virtue of this – architecture.
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With Benjamin and Bergson, the ‘problem of experience’ was approached through 
memory and thus one’s relation to world. The city as the site of estrangement, 
technology as the apparatus of alienation. The ability, or lack thereof, to find oneself 
reflected in the space and time of one’s own occupation. Matters addressed at the 
turn of the last century remain reflected in our current time. This was the moment 
of modernity in which Deleuze’s above critique of film – the people are missing – 
begins. ‘Of all the experiences that made his life what it was, Baudelaire singled out 
his having been jostled by the crowd as the decisive, unique experience.’ The body as 
conscious experience, not only consciousness as a mental state, but as the last line, 
the last site of resistance. This was a moment that asked for a new people to emerge. 
So, too, today. From biopolitics to noopolitics we move from the proximate action 
of being jostled by the crowd, to the ‘action at a distance of one mind on another, 
through the brain’s power to affect and become affected … mediated and enriched 
by technology.’ 
There are issues raised in the final chapter that should give any rational being 
a moment of pause if not shock at the realization of its implications. What has 
motivated me most in pursing this theoretical trajectory is that research in the 
neurosciences now supports the proposition that culture, society and environment 
transform us at the level of our central nervous system, our neurological 
architecture. And in an environment where culture is constantly changing, so 
too must the mind that must fathom its new rubric. Given that the environment 
in which we live alters, affects and transforms brain and society – or the socius 
(Deleuze’s concept of the social body that takes credit for production) – architects, 
as producers of culture and environment, must begin to understand architecture’s 
direct potential to transform our fundamental relation to world. This is a vision 
of architecture, as Brian Massumi writes, ‘as constructing the environment that 
triggers the changes that issue new forms of experience’ and, as architects and 
urbanist develop further with these technologies, ‘what they are really designing are 
possibilities of experience’.  
Of course, we do not yet know exactly how this will advance our understanding of 
perception, memory, and sensation, or our experience of time of space. What is 
apparent however is that the most crucial questions, in light of the technological 
developments of the day, cannot be asked from within any single discipline. 
This expanding discourse in my own work is what I refer to here as the double 
progression of body and brain. 
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The Double Progression of Body and Brain
Deborah Hauptmann
In this work Deborah Hauptmann deals with the relationships between mind, body, architecture and 
the city. Major authors ranging from Henri Bergson and Walter Benjamin to Henri Lefebvre and Gilles 
Deleuze are discussed in order to open up thinking on the roles of perception and the cognitive 
sciences in today’s society. Various themes are explored. Matter and mind are considered as kinds 
of multiplicities that affect our distinctions between subject and object. A theoretical framework 
is carefully constructed and argued in detail, allowing us to grapple with the existing problems of 
a rapidly changing field of disciplinary actions. The author looks at how vitalism has been applied 
to space, offers a view of the city through the question of who is allowed to claim right to the city 
and addresses the idea of the virtual and emergent. She examines the problem of experience by 
posing questions pertaining to both voluntary and involuntary memory. She concludes by making 
concepts surrounding biopolitics and noopolitics explicit and investigates their past discourses, 
demonstrating that they are still pertinent to both the field of architecture and philosophy.
This study should be regarded as an original contribution to the discipline of architecture in its 
broadest sense.
Deborah Hauptmann is professor and chair of Architecture, Iowa State University.
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